Array
(
    [0] =>  ..... say that grievous hurt was only an aggravated form of hurt, and that the liability of the accused did not cease, if he committed an act which resulted in a simple hurt. indeed, the learned judge did not tell the jury that even if they held that the accused did not cause a grievous injury, it would be open to them .....  facts were compatible with his guilt. so far as this direction went, nothing can be said against it. the judge next proceeded to explain what was meant by the expression 'fact proved'. he paraphrased the definition of 'proved' from the evidence act. in dealing with this topic, he omitted to explain also the expressions 'disproved' and 'not proved'; but that .....  unjustified or that he wrongly influenced the jury against the witness. it must be stated here that the learned judge had cautioned the jury that they were not bound by his opinion on a question of fact and were free to act on their own opinion. 24. this brings us to the medical evidence. the two doctors of importance who ..... 
    [1] =>  .....  the main points raised before them. they referred the matter to the chief justice for obtaining the opinion of a third judge on the following two points : '(i) was the provision of s. 3 of the u.p. special powers act of 1932 making it penal for a person by spoken words to instigate a class of persons not to pay dues .....  the 26th january, 1950.' question no. (ii). 'the restrictions imposed by section 3 of the u.p. special powers act, 1932, were not in the interests of public order.' in the usual course the matter was placed before the two learned judges who first heard the case and they, on the basis of the majority view, allowed the petition and directed the ..... , followed the earlier decision in the context of s. 7(1)(c) of the east punjab public safety act, 1949. fazl ali, j., in his dissenting judgment gave the expression 'public order' a wider meaning than that given by the majority view. the learned judge observed at p. 612 (of scr) thus : 'when we approach the matter in this way, we find ..... 
    [2] =>  ..... s. 397 -398. the applicability of this principle is not to be denied either because the court there considered a wartime statute or because, having set forth the governing inquiry, it went on to find, in the language of the statute, affirmative confirmation of the power to order reimbursement. id. at 328 u. s. 399 . when  ..... 3), for instigating the first action, issued an injunction against respondents from violating that section, and ordered respondents to offer reinstatement to those employees. but the district judge doubted that he had jurisdiction under 17 to award reparations to the employees for their lost wages, and held that, even if he did have jurisdiction to do  .....  right to sue for back pay lost by a discriminatory discharge is not explicit in the act. we do not agree that the case is distinguishable. . . ." 177 f.2d at 138. and, in his separate opinion concurring only in the result, judge learned hand's opening sentence was: "i agree that the decision below followed from what ..... 
)
Judges Inquiry Act 1968 Section 5 Powers of Committee - Sortby Recent - Court Supreme Court of India - Year 1960 - Page 6 - Judgments | SooperKanoon Skip to content


Judgment Search Results Home > Cases Phrase: judges inquiry act 1968 section 5 powers of committee Sorted by: recent Court: supreme court of india Year: 1960 Page 6 of about 53 results (0.257 seconds)

Feb 12 1960 (SC)

Smt. Nagindra Bala Mitra and anr. Vs. Sunil Chandra Roy and anr.

Court : Supreme Court of India

Decided on : Feb-12-1960

Reported in : AIR1960SC706; 1960CriLJ1020; [1960]3SCR1

..... say that grievous hurt was only an aggravated form of hurt, and that the liability of the accused did not cease, if he committed an act which resulted in a simple hurt. indeed, the learned judge did not tell the jury that even if they held that the accused did not cause a grievous injury, it would be open to them ..... facts were compatible with his guilt. so far as this direction went, nothing can be said against it. the judge next proceeded to explain what was meant by the expression 'fact proved'. he paraphrased the definition of 'proved' from the evidence act. in dealing with this topic, he omitted to explain also the expressions 'disproved' and 'not proved'; but that ..... unjustified or that he wrongly influenced the jury against the witness. it must be stated here that the learned judge had cautioned the jury that they were not bound by his opinion on a question of fact and were free to act on their own opinion. 24. this brings us to the medical evidence. the two doctors of importance who .....

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Jan 21 1960 (SC)

The Superintendent, Central Prison, Fatehgarh Vs. Dr. Ram Manohar Lohi ...

Court : Supreme Court of India

Decided on : Jan-21-1960

Reported in : AIR1960SC633; 1960CriLJ1002; [1960]2SCR821

..... the main points raised before them. they referred the matter to the chief justice for obtaining the opinion of a third judge on the following two points : '(i) was the provision of s. 3 of the u.p. special powers act of 1932 making it penal for a person by spoken words to instigate a class of persons not to pay dues ..... the 26th january, 1950.' question no. (ii). 'the restrictions imposed by section 3 of the u.p. special powers act, 1932, were not in the interests of public order.' in the usual course the matter was placed before the two learned judges who first heard the case and they, on the basis of the majority view, allowed the petition and directed the ..... , followed the earlier decision in the context of s. 7(1)(c) of the east punjab public safety act, 1949. fazl ali, j., in his dissenting judgment gave the expression 'public order' a wider meaning than that given by the majority view. the learned judge observed at p. 612 (of scr) thus : 'when we approach the matter in this way, we find .....

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Jan 18 1960 (FN)

Mitchell Vs. Robert Demario Jewelry, Inc.

Court : US Supreme Court

Decided on : Jan-18-1960

..... s. 397 -398. the applicability of this principle is not to be denied either because the court there considered a wartime statute or because, having set forth the governing inquiry, it went on to find, in the language of the statute, affirmative confirmation of the power to order reimbursement. id. at 328 u. s. 399 . when ..... 3), for instigating the first action, issued an injunction against respondents from violating that section, and ordered respondents to offer reinstatement to those employees. but the district judge doubted that he had jurisdiction under 17 to award reparations to the employees for their lost wages, and held that, even if he did have jurisdiction to do ..... right to sue for back pay lost by a discriminatory discharge is not explicit in the act. we do not agree that the case is distinguishable. . . ." 177 f.2d at 138. and, in his separate opinion concurring only in the result, judge learned hand's opening sentence was: "i agree that the decision below followed from what .....

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