Court : Chennai
Reported in : AIR1932Mad605; (1932)63MLJ764
Reilly, J.1. This. Civil Revision Petition comes before us on the question what is the proper court-fee to be paid on the plaint in the suit concerned. In the plaint the prayers are for a declaration that the decree obtained by Defendant 1 in O.S. No. 302 of 1916 on the file of the Additional District Munsif of Bhimavaram is void, for setting aside that decree, if necessary, and for recovery of the property, covered by the decree. The Plaintiff valued the suit for court-fee as if it came under Clause (c) of Section 7(iv) of the Court Fees Act. The Defendants objected and said that in its nature this was a suit for the cancellation of the previous decree and that therefore the Plaintiff should pay court-fee under Section 7(iv-A) of the Act, i.e., under the new Sub-section introduced into the Act for this Presidency in 1922. The Subordinate Judge after hearing arguments on the question came to the conclusion that the suit was really one for possession of the property and therefore that i...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Mumbai
Reported in : AIR1932Bom468; (1932)34BOMLR917
John Beaumont, Kt., C.J.1. This is an application under Section 23 of the Indian Press Act, 1931, asking us to set aside two orders passed by the Government of Bombay on March 11, 1932, made under Section 3, Sub-section (3) and Section 7, Sub-section (3) of that Act. Under Section 3, Sub-section (3), whenever it appears to the Local Government that any printing press is used for printing or publishing any newspaper containing any words, signs or visible representations of the nature described in Section 4, Sub-section (1), the Local Government may, by notice in writing to the keeper of the press stating or describing such words, signs or visible representations, order the keeper to deposit with the Magistrate, within whose jurisdiction the press is situated, security to such an amount not exceeding three thousand rupees as the Local Government may think fit to require. Section 7, Sub-section (3), confers similar powers on Government in respect of a publisher of a newspaper. The present...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Mumbai
Reported in : AIR1932Bom498; (1932)34BOMLR862
John Beaumont, Kt., C.J.1. This is an appeal against a decision of Mr. Justice Rangnekar. The plaintiffs are suing defendants Nos. 1 and 2, who are father and son, for a sum of Rs. 26,844-13-0 and interest, the money being due in respect of transactions in cotton and silver carried out by the plaintiffs as agents for defendant No. 1 between the months of January and September 1928. At the trial the plaintiffs obtained a decree against defendant No. 1 for the amount claimed. Defendant No. 1 had set up a defence that the transactions in suit were void, but the learned Judge decided against those contentions, and there is no appeal from that part of the judgment. Defendant No. 2 succeded in the suit, which was dismissed as against him, and the question we have to determine is whether that decision is right or wrong.2. The original case of the plaintiffs was that defendants Nos. 1 and 2 owned a joint family business in respect of which these debts were incurred, but that contention was giv...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : AIR1932Mad693; (1932)63MLJ303
Anantakrishna Aiyar, J.1. This revision petition has been filed by the plaintiff in Section C. Suit No. 861 of 1928 on the file of the District Munsif's Court, Nellore. The plaintiff instituted the above small cause suit on the footing of a promissory note, dated 4th August, 1925, executed by the defendant in plaintiff's favour for Rs. 180. The plaint was filed on 4th August, 1928, namely, the last day of the period of limitation for filing a suit on the promissory note. The defendant, after obtaining time to file a written statement, filed a written statement on 1st October, 1928, in which he admitted the execution of the promissory note sued on but pleaded discharge. Subsequently, as the learned District Munsif remarks in his judgment, 'when the argument upon the question of discharge was proceeding, the defendant discovered a legal objection to the maintainability of the suit on the ground that the stamp affixed to the promissory note had not been cancelled as required by Section 12...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Kolkata
Reported in : AIR1933Cal154
1. This is an appeal from a preliminary decree for sale. The appellants are Messrs. H.V. Low & Co., Ltd., who were defendants 3 (ka) in the suit. The following are the facts of the case: The plaintiffs are the landlords. Mauza Chalbalpur belongs to them in zamindari right. The surface of the said mauza had been settled long ago with the proprietors of Searsole estate in mukarrari rights. On the assumption that the subsoil was in the khas possession of the plaintiffs, one Kalikumar Misra, on 17th October 1913, executed a kabuliyat, which was duly registered, in their favour, taking what is commonly known as a coal mining lease of the said mauza for a term of 499 years. It was stipulated that royalty at certain rates would have to be paid monthly for the coal taken and, in default of such payment, interest at the rate of 1 per cent per month would be charged; it was agreed that a minimum royalty of 600 would have to be paid for the first year, of Rs. 3,000 in the second and in the third ...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Mumbai
Reported in : AIR1933Bom26; (1932)34BOMLR1469
Baker, J.1. The plaintiffs sued for a declaration that they were the managers and owners of the plaint property and had the right of collecting the income of it and for an injunction directing defendant No. 1 not to collect the income of the property from the tenants, defendants Nos. 2 to 27, and to recover mesne profits as the income already collected by defendant No. 1 with future mesne profits and costs. Subsequently by Exhibit 84 at the end of the case they applied to amend their plaint by adding a prayer for possession. That application was granted although no formal amendment was made in the plaint.2. The facts of the case are that certain lauds-or the income of certain lands it is not clear which-were granted to a shrine at Mahuli of Jivanram Swamy, the family of the plaintiffs being the vahivatdars. The Sanad was given to one Govindbhat bin Rambhat who had two sons Ramchandrabhat and Haribhat. Ramchandrabhat was the father of the present plaintiffs. Haribhat sold the suit prope...
Tag this Judgment!Court : US Supreme Court
Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co. - 285 U.S. 393 (1932) U.S. Supreme Court Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393 (1932) Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co. No. 341 Argued January 15, 1932 Reargued March 16, 1932 Decided April 11, 1932 285 U.S. 393 CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Syllabus Lands granted by the United States to the State of Oklahoma for the support of common schools and dedicated to that purpose by the state constitution were leased by the State to a private company for extraction of oil and gas, the State reserving a part of the gross production, the proceeds of which were paid into the public school fund, and the lessee taking the remainder. Held: (1) The lease was an instrumentality of the State in the exercise of a strictly governmental function. P. 285 U. S. 398 . (2) Application of the federal income tax to he income derived from the lease by the leasee was therefore unconstitutional. Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : AIR1932Mad734; (1932)63MLJ587
Cronish, J.1. The defendants are the appellants. They were sued for damages for breach of a covenant to level plaintiff's land after removing earth and sand therefrom. The plaint alleged an agreement, dated 25th June, 1927. The defendants in their written statement denied this agreement. But they alleged an unregistered agreement in writing, dated 4th August, 1927, under which, and in consideration of a rent of Rs. 500, they took on lease the suit lands subject to the covenants contained in the agreement; and they further pleaded that 'all conditions and covenants binding on the part of the defendants were duly performed and that the lands were properly levelled'.2. The learned trial Judge has found that the written agreement, dated 4th August, 1927, contained the contract between the parties. Having so found, the learned Judge, rightly in our judgment, held that the agreement was for the transfer of an interest in immoveable property. The terms of the agreement were that in payment of...
Tag this Judgment!Court : US Supreme Court
Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm'n of Oklahoma - 286 U.S. 210 (1932) U.S. Supreme Court Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm'n of Oklahoma, 286 U.S. 210 (1932) Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Commission of Oklahoma No. 122 Argued March 23, 1932 Decided May 16, 1932 * 286 U.S. 210 APPEALS FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA Syllabus 1. In Oklahoma, as generally elsewhere, the owners of the land containing an oil and gas pool do not have absolute title to those minerals as they permeate below the surface, but each has the right, through wells on his own land, to take all the oil and gas that he may be able to reduce to possession, including that coming from the land of the others. P. 286 U. S. 233 . 2. This right, however, is constitutionally subject to reasonable regulation by the state, to the end that the natural gas pressure available for lifting the oil to the surface may not be unreasonably and wastefu...
Tag this Judgment!Court : US Supreme Court
Sproles v. Binford - 286 U.S. 374 (1932) U.S. Supreme Court Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374 (1932) Sproles v. Binford No. 826 Argued April 27, 28, 1932 Decided May 23, 1932 286 U.S. 374 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS Syllabus 1. A provision of the Motor Vehicle Act of Texas limiting net loads on trucks using the highways to 7,000 pounds was attacked upon the ground that damage to the highways from overweight can be prevented only by fixing a maximum gross load and providing for its proper distribution through axles and wheels to the highway surface, and that the limitation in question is unduly and arbitrarily restrictive of cargo. Held: (1) The limitation was within the broad discretion of the state legislature, and does not violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. P. 286 U. S. 388 . (2) In such matters, the courts are not to apply scientific precision as a criterion of constitutional powers. ...
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