Court : US Supreme Court
Bandini Petroleum Co. v. Superior Court - 284 U.S. 8 (1931) U.S. Supreme Court Bandini Petroleum Co. v. Superior Court, 284 U.S. 8 (1931) Bandini Petroleum Co. v. Superior Court No. 43 Argued October 13, 14, 1931 Decided November 23, 1931 284 U.S. 8 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL, SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT, OF CALIFORNIA Syllabus 1. A judgment of a state court denying a writ of prohibition to restrain another state court and one of its judges from enforcing an injunction order held a final judgment within the meaning of Jud.Code, 237(a). P. 14. 2. A proceeding in California for a writ of prohibition to restrain a California court from exercising jurisdiction in an injunction suit under a statute of that state alleged to be in conflict with the Federal Constitution goes only to the jurisdiction of that court to entertain the suit before it, and if, on its face, as construed by the state courts, the statute be valid, judgment denying prohibition should be affirm...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : 140Ind.Cas.331; (1932)63MLJ450
Reilly, J.1. The questions referred to us are(1) whether the High Court has power to interfere with a decision of the Board of Revenue under Chapter XI of the Madras Estates Land Act,(2) whether the Board of Revenue has in this particular case exceeded the jurisdiction conferred upon it, and(3) what should be 'the final order to be passed in this case,' i.e., on this revision petition.2. It appears that under Section 164 of the Estates Land Act the Local Government ordered that a survey should be made and a record-of-rights should be prepared for 21 villages in the Mandasa Zamindari in the Ganjam district, which was done. On an application made by the ryots of the villages the Local Government afterwards ordered under Section 168 of the Act that a settlement of rent should be made for the villages. The Revenue Officer appointed for the purpose settled the rents for the villages. The ryots being dissatisfied, appealed against his orders to the Board of Revenue, which had been appointed ...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : AIR1932Mad352; 137Ind.Cas.740; (1932)63MLJ152
Reilly, J.1. This Civil Revision Petition relates to a creditor's insolvency petition presented to the Subordinate Judge of Ramnad. That petition alleged a preferential transfer as the act of insolvency necessary to support it; but the date of that transfer according to the document representing it was more than three months before the date on which the insolvency petition was presented. So with their insolvency petition the creditors presented a petition to excuse the delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. That petition the Subordinate Judge dismissed. On appeal the District Judge, feeling himself bound by the decision of a Bench of this Court in A.A.O. No. 523 of 1925, held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act applied to the case and reversed the Subordinate Judge's order and remanded the petition to excuse the delay for fresh disposal. The present Civil Revision Petition is preferred by the transferee concerned against the District Judge's remand order.2. It was decided by a F...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1932)62MLJ665
ORDER1. This is an application for an extension of time by two months for furnishing security for costs. Leave to appeal to the Privy Council was granted on the 16th October, 1931, and the petitioner was directed under Order 45, Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure to furnish security for costs of the respondent within six weeks from the date of the granting of the certificate. The last day for furnishing security was the 27th November, 1931. By that date the petitioner had been unable to furnish the security and on the 30th November, 1931, she presented this petition praying for an extension of time by two months.2. The petition is supported by the affidavit of the kariasian of the petitioner. The two reasons for the granting of the petition set out in that affidavit are: (1) the inability of the petitioner to furnish the security owing to her difficulty in getting the necessary funds, and (2) because the petitioner is an old widow and for the two months previous to the presentation:...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Mumbai
Reported in : (1934)36BOMLR568; 152Ind.Cas.947
Mirza, J.1. This suit has arisen out of an unfortunate dispute between the plaintiffs who are the Municipal Corporation of the city of Bombay and as such represent the interests of the rate-payers of that city, and the defendant who is the Secretary of State for India in Council and as such represents in this case the interests of the tax-payers of the Bombay Presidency. The dispute is in respect of the liability of the Secretary of State for India in Council to contribute a certain amount annually towards defraying the expenses of primary education in the city of Bombay, under an arrangement said to have been arrived at between the Bombay Government and the plaintiff Municipality. [After referring to the efforts made to settle the dispute between the parties, his Lordship proceeded:]2. The case for the plaintiffs is that as the result of certain negotiations in the years 1916 and 1917 a contract was eventually arrived at between the plaintiffs and the Government of Bombay by which the...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : 137Ind.Cas.9; (1932)62MLJ742
Reilly, J.1. In connection with Referred Trial No. 173 of 1931 the following question has been referred to us, vis.:Does the expression 'statement made by any person' in Clause (1) of Section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code include statements by persons accused of the offence under investigation?2. The reference has been made: because objection has been taken at the hearing of the Referred Trial to the admission of evidence that certain statements were made by the accused which the learned judges, Waller and Krishnan Pandalai, JJ., describe as statements made 'to the Police directly or indirectly through strangers in the presence of the Police' in the course of the Police investigation of the case when the accused were not in custody. In Sheik Kalesha v. Emperor (1931) 62 M.L.J.71 Jackson and Cornish, JJ., decided that a statement made by an accused person to the1 Police in the course of their investigation of the case could not be used at the trial for any purpose. In that case the...
Tag this Judgment!Court : US Supreme Court
Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine Co. - 284 U.S. 498 (1932) U.S. Supreme Court Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine Co., 284 U.S. 498 (1932) Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine Co. of Florida No. 251 Argued January 6, 1932 Decided February 15, 1932 * 284 U.S. 498 CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Syllabus 1. A suit to restrain collection of an excise imposed under the Oleomargarine Act is a suit to restrain collection of a tax, within the meaning of R.S. 3224, and not a suit to collect a penalty. P. 284 U. S. 506 . Page 284 U. S. 499 2. Tax laws are to be interpreted liberally in favor of taxpayers; words defining things to be taxed may not be extended beyond their clear import; doubts must be resolved against the Government and in favor of the taxpayer. P. 284 U. S. 508 . 3. R.S. 3224 is declaratory of the equitable rule that a suit will not lie to restrain the collection of a tax upon the sole ground of its illegality, and it should be con...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Mumbai
Reported in : (1932)34BOMLR1021
Tomlin, J.1. This appeal is concerned with the question whether a creditor's proof lodged by the respondent in the liquidation of the company whose liquidator is the appellant and rejected by the liquidator was properly so rejected.2. On December 23, 1929, the trial Judge on the original side of the High Court of Judicature at Rangoon held that the proof was rightly rejected. On August 4,1930, this decision was reversed on appeal to the appellate side of the Court.3. The proof in question was for Rs. 63,219-15-0, damages alleged to have been incurred by the respondent by reason of the failure of the company to complete the purchase of property agreed to be sold by the respondent by an agreement dated July 27, 1921.4. The only question in issue or debated at the hearing before the trial Judge, or on the appeal, was whether the agreement for sale (on the face of which the purchaser was one M.E. Moolla) had been entered into by Moolla on his own account or whether the company was the undi...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Kolkata
Reported in : AIR1932Cal775,140Ind.Cas.788
1. These two appeals have arisen out of a decree which purports to have been made under Order 34, Rule 6, Civil P.C. The suit was commenced by the plaintiff on 8th November 1924 against four sets of defendants namely, defendant 1 Ghose, defendant 2 Paul, defendants 3 to 5 the Bagris and defendant 6, the Bengal National Bank Ltd. The bank having subsequently gone into liquidation, the liquidators were brought in as defendant 6. On 24th February 1925 a firm carrying on business under the name and style of Khangarji Amrita Lal & Co. were added as defendant 7.2. On 6th March 1919 defendant 1 had obtained a coal mining settlement in respect of coal lying under 366 bighas of land in mauzha Banbahal from the plaintiff and executed in his favour a kabuliyat stipulating to pay royalty at certain rates for the different kinds of coal to be taken and a minimum annual royalty of Rs. 5,000 that is to say at the rate of Rs. 400 a month from January to November and Rs. 600 in December and undertaking...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Mumbai
Reported in : (1933)35BOMLR811
Macmillan, J.1. This appeal relates to the assessment of the taxable income of the appellant for the year 1924-25, under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922.2. On the death of his father in 1894 the appellant succeeded to the family ancestral estate. His stepmother, who had survived his father, subsequently brought a suit for maintenance against him in the High Court at Calcutta. The suit was compromised and a decree was by consent pronounced directing the appellant to make a monthly payment of Rs. 1,100 to his stepmother, which he has since regularly done.3. It is unfortunate that the decree has not been made available to their Lordships. The Chief Justice (Rankin), however, in the judgment now under review states that 'it was not disputed that the lady's maintenance was a legal liability of the Raja [the appellant] arising by reason of the fact that the Raja is in possession of his ancestral estate, that it is payable out of such estate and that this Court had declared that the maintenan...
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