Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1962SC853; [1962]Supp(2)SCR496
Sinha, C.J.1. By this petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution, the petitioner, whois the 51st Dai-ul-Mutlaq and head of the Dawoodi Bohra Community, challengesthe constitutionality of the Bombay Prevention of Excommunication Act, 1949(Bombay Act XLII of 1949) (hereinafter referred to as the Act) on the groundthat the provisions of the Act infringe Arts. 25 and 26 of the Constitution.The sole respondent in this case is the State of Bombay. 2. The petition is founded on the following allegations. The Dawoodi BohraCommunity consists of Muslims of the Shia sect, holding in common with allmembers of that sect the belief that there is one God, that Mohammad is HisProphet to whom he revealed the Holy Koran; that Ali, the son-in-law ofMohammad, was the Wasi (executor) of the Prophet, and that the said Alisucceeded the Prophet by Nas-e-Jali. The Dawoodi Bohras believe that the saidAli was succeeded by a line of Imams, each of whom in turn was appointed byNas-e-Jali by his immediate predecess...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1963SC503; [1962]44ITR732(SC); [1962]Supp2SCR613
Shah, J.1. These are two appeals with certificates of fitness granted by the High Court of Judicature at Madras against certain order passed in writ Petition under article 226 of the Constitution. 2. One Ramaswami Iyer - father of respondent - was assessed to income-tax in the status of a Hindu undivided family. Ramaswami Iyer died in 1949 and the respondent, M. R. Vidyasagar, became the manager of family. The family was partner through its manager in a firm styled 'The Madura Knitting Company', and the share in the profits of the partnership which was registered under the Indian Income-tax Act was the principal source of its assessable income. Under section 18A of the Indian Income Income-tax Act, the Hindu undivided family was liable to pay advance tax for each of the assessment years 1946-47, 1947-48 and 1948-49. The Income-tax Officer, Madura, issued notices under section 18A (i) of the Indian Income-tax Act for payment of advance tax on the basis of the preceding year's income. It...
Tag this Judgment!Court : US Supreme Court
Lehigh Valley Coop. v. United States - 370 U.S. 76 (1962) U.S. Supreme Court Lehigh Valley Coop. v. United States, 370 U.S. 76 (1962) Lehigh Valley Cooperative Farmers, Inc. v. United States No. 7 Argued January 17-18, 1962 Decided .June 4, 1962 370 U.S. 76 CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT Syllabus Under 8c of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended and reenacted by the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, the Secretary of Agriculture issued orders regulating the marketing of milk in the New York-New Jersey region. To protect the prices received by milk producers in that region, he included in the orders a provision in effect requiring those who buy milk elsewhere and bring it into the region for sale as fluid milk to pay to the producers who regularly supply the region a "compensatory payment" equal to the difference between the minimum price set by the Market Administrator for fluid milk and the minimum price for surplus...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1962SC955; 1962(0)BLJR636; (1963)IMLJ40(SC); [1962]Supp2SCR769
Sinha, C.J.1. In these appeals the main question in controversy is whether Sections 124A and 505 of the Indian Penal Code have become void in view of the provisions of Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. The constitutionality of the provisions of s. 124A, which was mainly canvassed before us, is common to all the appeals, the facts of which may shortly be stated separately. 2. In Criminal Appeal 169 of 1957, the appellant is one Kedar Nath Singh, who was prosecuted before a Magistrate, 1st Class, at Begusarai, in the district of Monghyr, in Bihar. He framed the following charges against the accused person, which are set out in extenso in order to bring out the gravamen of the charge against him. 'First. - That you on 26th day of May, 1953 at village Barauni, P. S. Taghra (Monghyr) by speaking the words, to wit, (a) To-day the dogs of the C.I.D. are loitering round Barauni. Many official dogs are sitting even in this meeting. The people of India drove out the Britishers from this coun...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1963SC439; [1962(4)FLR284]; (1962)ILLJ203SC; [1962]Supp2SCR697
Gajendragadkar, J.1. This appeal by special leave raises a short question about the scope and effect of clause 5 in the Schedule to the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 (20 of 1946) (hereinafter called the Act). That question arises is this way. The appellant Bagalkot Cement Co. Ltd. is a Limited Company registered under the Indian Companies Act, 1930; it carries on the business of manufacturing cement and for that purpose, it owns a factory as well as a limestone Quarry at Bagalkot in the State of Mysore. As required by s. 3 of the Act, the appellant submitted draft Standing Orders on the 3rd March, 1958, to the Certifying Officer and the Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), Madras, in order that they should be certified. The Certifying Officer considered the draft submitted by the appellant, heard the appellant and its employees, the respondents and passed an order of certification on the 16th June, 1959. While considering the draft for, the purpose of certificati...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1962SC918a; [1962]44ITR809(SC); (1963)IMLJ107(SC); [1962]Supp2SCR716
Shah, J.1. One S.K. Mohideen - (hereinafter referred to as the assessee) - was a partner in two firms - Messrs. Dinshaw and Co. and Messrs. Palaniappa Chettiar and Co. The firms were registered under the Indian Income-tax Act. The assessee submitted returns of his income and incorporated therein the estimated share of his losses in the two firms at Rs. 20,000 and Rs. 10,000 for the assessment year 1946-47 and at Rs. nil and Rs. 12,436 for the assessment year 1947-48. The Income-tax Officer, V Circle, Madras, completed the assessment for the two years on February 20, 1950, after adopting the estimates furnished by the assessee, but he made a note that the losses accepted were subject to revision on ascertainment of correct particulars. The assessment of Messrs. Dinshaw & Co. for the years 1946-47 and 1947-48 was completed on October 31, 1950, by the Income-tax Officer, II Circle, Madras, and the proportionate share of the assessee for the losses was computed for the two years at Rs. 15,...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1962SC1195; 1962(0)BLJR562; [1962]Supp2SCR948
Hidayatullah, J. 1. This is an appeal by special leave against an order of the High Court of Patna, by which an order passed by the Magistrate, First Class, discharging the appellants under s. 207A(6) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, was set aside, and the Magistrate was directed to commit the appellants to the Court of Session to stand their trial under Sections 307/34 and 148 of the Indian Penal Code. The only question that is argued is whether the High Court was justified in setting aside the order of the Magistrate, which, it is claimed was passed in the proper exercise of the jurisdiction conferred by s. 207A(6) of the Code. 2. The facts of the case, in brief, are as follows : On March 26, 1959, at about 10-15 p.m. one Rajbahadur Rai alias Chhote Rai, was alleged to have been assaulted by the appellants at a place where Chhote Rai was sitting, at the pan shop of one Raghunath Prasad. The appellants are said to have arrived there in a private car and a tandem, and after assaultin...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1962SC1106; [1962]Supp3SCR25
Ayyangar, J.1. This appeal by special leave against the decision of the High Court of Punjab raises for consideration principally the constitutional validity of s. 3 of the Pepsu Police (Incitement to disaffection) Act (Act 1 of 1953), which will be referred to hereafter as the impugned Act. 2. The four appellants were at one time members of the Pepsu Police force and were charged, before the First Class Magistrate at Faridkot, with having committed three offences : (1) under s. 26 of the Pepsu Public Safety Ordinance (No. 7 of Samvat 2006), (2) under s. 33 of the said Ordinance, and (3) under s. 3 of the impugned Act. We shall be referring to the provisions of the relevant enactments in due course. The accused pleaded not guilty and were tried by the learned Magistrate who by his judgment dated August 28, 1958, held the prosecution case fully established against all the accused. He convicted the four appellants under s. 26 of the Public Safety Ordinance and sentenced them to imprisonm...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1962SC1100; [1962(4)FLR317]; (1962)ILLJ250SC; [1962]Supp3SCR89
Venkatarama Aiyar, J.1. This is an appeal by special leave against the Order of the Industrial Tribunal, Punjab, dated September 11, 1959, in Reference No. 30 of 1957, overruling certain preliminary objections raised by the appellant to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to hear the reference. The facts are that on February 14, 1955, the Government of Punjab referred under s. 10(1)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, hereinafter referred to as 'the Act', certain disputes between the appellant and the respondents to the Industrial Tribunal Punjab, Jallundur, for adjudication. That was numbered as Reference No. 3 of 1955. This Tribunal had been constituted on August 29, 1953, by a Notification issued by the Government of Punjab, which is as follows :- 'In exercise of the powers conferred under section 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Act XIV of 1947), the Governor of Punjab, in consultation with the Punjab High Court, is pleased to appoint Shri Avtar Narain Gujral Advocate, as ...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1962SC1198; [1962]Supp3SCR180
Raghubar Dayal, J.1. Banwari and Ram Charan appeal, by special leave, against the order of the Allahabad High Court dismissing their appeal and confirming their conviction by the II Additional Sessions Judge, Etawah. Banwari was convicted of the offences under s. 302 Indian Penal Code for committing the murder of Lakhan Singh and Bhagwan Singh and also for an offence under s. 307 Indian Penal Code, for having attempted to Commit the murder of Babu Singh. Ram Charan was convicted of the same three offences read with s. 34, Indian Penal Code. 2. The facts leading to the appeal are these, Banwari, a Lodh by caste, and Ram Charan, armed with a gun and axe respectively, passed the field of Lakhan Singh, Lakhan Singh asked Banwari as to where he was going. Banwari replied that he was going for shooting birds. Lakhan Singh turned back. Banwari fired two shots at Lakhan Singh. Lakhan Singh fell down and died. 3. Banwari and Ram Charan, thereafter, proceeded south-wards and at a distance of abo...
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