Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1963SC354; (1962)64BOMLR403; [1962]2SCR59
Sinha, C.J. 1. The only question for determination in this appeal is whether the defendants-appellants are 'protected tenants' within the meaning of the Bombay Tenancy Act (Bombay Act XXIX of 1939) (which hereinafter will be referred to, for the sake of brevity, as the Act of 1939), whose rights as such were not affected by the repeal of that Act by the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act (Bombay Act LXVII of 1948) which hereinafter will be referred to as the Act of 1948). The Courts below have decreed the plaintiff's suit for possession of the lands in dispute, holding that the defendants were not entitled to the protection claimed by them as 'protected tenants'. This appeal is by special leave granted by this Court on April 4, 1955. 2. The facts of this case are not in dispute. Shortly stated, they are as follows. By virtue of a lease dated October 30, 1939, the defendants obtained a lease of the disputed lands from the plaintiff for a period of 10 years, expiring on October 30...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1961SC1684; [1962]2SCR292
Ayyangar, J.1. This appeal comes before us on a certificate granted by High Court of Patna under Art. 133(1) of the Constitution. 2. The appellant had filed a suit against the State of Bihar before the Subordinate Judge, Daltonganj and had succeeded in obtaining a decree in his favour the details of which we shall presently narrate. The State preferred an appeal to the High Court and by the judgment now under appeal the learned Judges of the High Court had allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit with costs, and the plaintiff has come up on appeal to this court. 3. The facts giving rise to the suit and the appeal may now be briefly stated. The village of June in the district of Palamau in the State of Bihar was within the estate of the Raja of Ranka. This proprietor had granted a mokarari lease of the village which consisted mostly of forest lands, in favour of certain persons who have been referred to in these proceedings as the Manjhis. The Manjhis in their turn entered into a regis...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1961SC1762; 1961CriLJ828; [1962]2SCR195
Subba Rao, J.1. These two appeals - one filed by accused No. 1 by certificate and the other filed by the State of Maharashtra by special leave - against the judgment of the High Court of Bombay confirming the conviction and sentence of accused No. 1 and setting aside the convictions and sentences of accused Nos. 2 and 3. 2. The prosecution case may be briefly stated. There was a depot called the Dehu Vehicle Depot in which military stores were kept. In the year 1944 Col. Rao the Chief Ordnance Officer, was in charge of the Depot; Col. Sindhi, the Station Commandant, and Brig. Wilson, the Brigadier, Ordnance, Southern Command, were his superior officers. Accused No. 1, Major Barsay, was second in command in the Depot and was in charge of stores section; he was subordinate to Col. Rao. Major Nag, another subordinate to Col. Rao, was in charge of the administration of the Depot. One Capt. Pratap Singh was the Security Officer in the Depot; but, during the period in question, one Lawrence ...
Tag this Judgment!Court : US Supreme Court
Konigsberg v. State Bar of California - 366 U.S. 36 (1961) U.S. Supreme Court Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36 (1961) Konigsberg v. State Bar of California No. 28 Argued December 14, 1960 Decided April 24, 1961 366 U.S. 36 CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA Syllabus Under California law, the State Supreme Court may admit to the practice of law any applicant whose qualifications have been certified to it by the California Committee of Bar Examiners. In hearings by that Committee on his application for admission to the Bar, petitioner refused to answer any questions pertaining to his membership in the Communist Party, not on the ground of possible self-incrimination, but on the ground that such inquiries were beyond the purview of the Committee's authority and infringed rights of free thought, association and expression assured him under the State and Federal Constitutions. The Committee declined to certify him as qualified for admission to the Bar...
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Stewart v. United States - 366 U.S. 1 (1961) U.S. Supreme Court Stewart v. United States, 366 U.S. 1 (1961) Stewart v. United States No. 143 Argued February 21, 1961 Decided April 24, 1961 366 U.S. 1 CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT Syllabus Petitioner was tried three times in a federal court for murder. At the first two trials, he did not testify in his own defense, but he did so at the third trial, at which the main issue was whether or not he was insane when the offense was committed. On cross-examination, the prosecutor alluded to the two earlier trials and asked, "This is the first time you have gone on the stand, isn't it, Willie?" Petitioner's counsel moved for a mistrial on the ground that it was prejudicial to inform the jury of petitioner's failure to take the stand in his previous trials. The motion was denied, and petitioner was convicted. Held: the question was prejudicial; the error was not harmless; a mis...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1961SC1669; [1961]31CompCas387(SC); [1962]2SCR339
Shah, J.1. M/s. Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. is a public limited company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, 1913 (7 of 1913). Art. 47B of the articles of Association of the company invests the directors of the company with absolute discretion to refuse to register any transfer of shares. That Article is in the following terms : 'The directors may in their absolute discretion and without giving any reason refuse to register any transfer of any shares whether such shares be fully paid or not. If the directors refuse to register the transfer of any shares, they shall within two months, after the date on which the transfer was lodged with the company, send to the transferees and the transferor notice of the refusal.' 2. One Banarasi Prasad Jhunjhunwala is the holder of a block of 9500 fully paid-up shares of the company. In January 1953, he executed transfers in respect of 2,500 out of those shares in favour of his son Shyam Sunder and in respect of 2100 shares in favour of his dau...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : [1963]1SCR778; [1963]Supp2SCR778
Venkatarama Aiyar, J. 1. The petitioner is a partner in a firm called Messrs. Mohan Lal Hargovind Das, which carries on business in the manufacture and sale of biris in number of States, and is dealer registered under the U.P. Sales Tax Act 15 of 1948 with its head office at Allahabad. In the present petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution, the petitioner impugns the validity of a levy of sales tax made by the Sales Tax Officer, Allahabad, by his order dated December 20, 1958. 2. On December 14, 1957, the Government of Uttar Pradesh issued a notification under section 4(1)(b) of the Act exempting from tax, sales of certain goods including biris, provided that the additional Central Excise duties leviable thereon had been paid. In partial modification of this notification, the Government issued another notification on November 25, 1958, exempting from tax unconditionally sales of biris, both machinemade and handmade, with effect from July 1, 1958. The effect of the two notif...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1962SC89; [1962]2SCR636
Raghubar Dayal, J.1. Civil Appeal No. 635 of 1957 is an appeal, by certificate, and raises the question regarding the effect of the abatement of the appeal, by the State of Punjab, against Labhu Ram, one of the respondents, on the State appeal against Nathu Ram, co-respondent. 2. Civil Appeals Nos. 636 to 641 of 1957 also raise the same question between the same parties. 3. The facts leading to the appeal are that the Punjab Government acquired on lease certain parcels of land belonging to Labhu Ram and Nathu Ram, for different military purposes, under the Defence of India Act, 1939 (XXXV of 1939). Labhu Ram and Nathu Ram, brothers, refused to accept the compensation offered to them by the Collector and applied to the Punjab Government, through the Collector, under r. 6 of the Punjab Land Acquisition (Defence of India) Rules, 1943, hereinafter called the Rules, as amended by the Notification of the Punjab Government No. 1444-HM-44/19124, dated 10th March, 1944, and published in the Pun...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1962SC361; [1962]2SCR762
Gajendragadkar, J.1. The short question which falls to be considered in this appeal relates to the construction of s. 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 - 5. It arises in this way. The respondent Rewa Coalfields Limited is a registered company whose coal-mines are situated at Burhar and Umaria. Its registered office is at Calcutta. The appellant is a firm, Chaurasia Limestone Company, Satna, Vindhya Pradesh, by name and the three brothers Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal are its partners. The appellant prepares and deals in limestone at Maihar and Satna and for the use in their lime-kilns it purchased coal from the respondent's coal-mines at Umaria by means of permits issued to it by Coal Commissioner Calcutta. According to respondent's case the appellant purchased from it 3,307 tons of coal at the rate of Rs. 14-9-0 per ton between January 1952, and March 1953. The price for this coal was Rs. 48,158-4-0. Since the appellant did not pay the price due from it the respondent filed the pre...
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Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market - 366 U.S. 617 (1961) U.S. Supreme Court Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market, 366 U.S. 617 (1961) Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market of Massachusetts, Inc. No. 11 Argued December 7-8, 1960 Decided May 29, 1961 366 U.S. 617 APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS Syllabus Appellees are members of the Orthodox Jewish Faith, whose religion forbids them to shop on their Sabbath (from sundown on Friday until sundown on Saturday) and requires them to eat kosher food; a group of orthodox rabbis and a corporation selling kosher food mainly to such customers. They sued in a Federal District Court to enjoin as unconstitutional enforcement of certain sections of the Massachusetts Sunday Closing Laws which had been construed as forbidding the corporation to keep its store open on Sundays (except for the sale of kosher meat until 10 a.m.), though it had formerly been open for business all day on Sundays...
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