Court : Chennai
Reported in : 50Ind.Cas.895; (1919)36MLJ367
John Wallis, C.J.1. This is a Letters Patent appeal from the decision of Sadasiva Aiyar, J., who held (Bake-well, J. dissenting), that the court has power to relieve against a provision in a mulgeni or permanent lease, a form of agricultural lease in use in South Canara for re-entry by the landlord on breach of a covenant or condition against any alienation by the lessee of his mulgeni right except in the manner therein provided. The lease, which is inartistically drawn, provides in substance that, if the lessee or his representatives have to sell or mortgage their mulgeni right, they are first to give a written notice to the lessor or his heirs, and, if they fail to act on it or to reply thereto, the lessee is to be free to make the alienation, but that alienations in contravention of these provisions are to be void, and the lessor is to be at liberty to re-enter and enjoy the land inclusive of improvements. This we read as meaning that the lessee is to give notice to the lessor of th...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : 50Ind.Cas.380
Oldfield, J.1. I have had the advantage of reading the judgment, which my learned brother is about to deliver, and, as I agree with his conclusion, I deal only with the one important question we have to decide, whether the appellant is entitled to the extension of time he claims, as transferee from a minor. It does not appear material that his transfer was not voluntary, but was effected by attachment followed by a sale of the debt and an order vesting it in him as purchaser; and I assume that time did not begin to run, before the minor's acquisition of the cause of action. Appellant's contention is that he is entitled to the full extension of time, which the minor would have had, if the cause of action had remained his property or, in the alternative, to three years from the date, when his own ownership began.2. This alternative contention can be dealt with shortly. It cannot be justified by any provision of the Limitation Act; for Section 6(3) is, as will be shown, the only one exten...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : 58Ind.Cas.969
Abdur Rahim, J.1. The plaintiff had an agreement in his favour for sale of certain mica mines, the property of certain Marwaris of this town. The mines are situated in the District of Nellore. It appears that, in pursuance of that agreement, a deed of sale was executed, but it was not registered as the plaintiff was unable to find the entire amount of the consideration for it. Rs. 450, however, part of the consideration money, was recovered from him by a suit in the Small Cause Court. Subsequently, the plaintiff entered into negotiations with the 1st defendant, the 1st respondent in this appeal, with respect to the mines, I may mention that part of the property was free-hold and part of it was lease-hold. The term of the lease hold expired on 31st October 1907. The contract between the plaintiff and the 1st defendant is embodied in two letters, Exhibits C and C1, which were exchanged between the parties on 4th February 1907, and the constriction of those letters is one of the important...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1919)37MLJ284
Wallis, C.J.1. The terms of the reference have, if I may say so, been very properly framed with reference to the terms of Article 182, Clause 5 of the Limitation Act (4 is a misprint) which makes the date of applying in accordance with law to the proper court for execution or to take some step-in-aid of execution of the decree a fresh starting point for the purposes of the Article which deals generally with applications for the execution of decrees. The question really is, whether a litigant who has been authorised to bring his suit in a particular court and has obtained a decree in such court in his favour, which he is strictly bound to execute within the time limited in Article 182, is not entitled to apply as of course to that court as the proper Court for the purpose of saving limitation under the Article, or whether, when he decides to apply for execution possibly at the last moment, he is bound to stop and enquire whether the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of the court wh...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1919)37MLJ81
C.J.1. In this case the accused appeals from a conviction under Section 124-A of the Indian Penal Code, and Mr. K. Srinivasa Aiyangar, who appears for him has raised the contention that the conviction is bad for want of legal proof of the sanction required by Section 196 of the Criminal Procedure Code in the case of prosecutions under this section.2. The telegram which contains the sanction on which reliance is placed was filed with the complaint, and the defence, having obtained a copy, took several objections to it, which were overruled by the trial magistrate on the 26th September 1918. On the same day the trial began, and the public prosecutor of Madura went into the box as the first prosecution witness, and deposed to receiving a letter marked Ex. A-1 from the District Magistrate, Madura, enclosing a telegram marked Ex A. The defence objected that the telegram was not proved and it was marked Ex. A for purpose of identification. In October, while the trial was going on, the defenc...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : 124Ind.Cas.7
ORDERAnanthakrishna Aiyar, J.1. Under Section 15 of the amended Letters Patent, an appeal would lie from the decision of a single Jud9 of the High Court passed in a second appeal, where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal. In Ramanayya v. Kotayya 121 Ind. Cas. 621 : 31 L.W. 386 : 57 M.L.J. 398 : A.I.R. 1920 Mad. 75 : 52 M.P 952 : Ind. Rul. (1930) Mad. 205 a bench of this Court held that no appeal lay from the refusal of such leave by the Judge.2. The question has been raised before me as to the grounds on which leave to appeal should be granted or refused in such cases. The section only enacts, that the Judge concerned should 'declare' that the case is a fit one for appeal. The principle's that should guide him in dealing with such applications are not specified in the section.3. It was argued that if there was any question of law, leave must be granted. It was further argued, that if a second appeal was allowed, and the decision of the lowe...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : 58Ind.Cas.124
1. The second. defendant is the appellant before ns. the suit was brought with the Advocate-General's sanction under Section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code for the framing of a scheme for the conduct of certain charities, for the appointment of a new trustee or new trustees (the office of trustee have become vacant according to the allegations in the plaint) and for other appropriate reliefs.2. A preliminary objection was taken for the respondents that no appeal lay; because to determination of any question between the parties has been arrived at by the lower, Court, and their learned Vakil relied upon the decision in Aiyappa Mudaliar v. Gopalaswami Mudaliar 16 Ind. Cas. 45 . But in that ease no decree was at all drawn up embodying any determination of the Court, whereas in the present case a formal decree has been drawn up determining that there is a vacancy in the office of trustee and that the plaintiffs are entitled to a declaration that the trusteeship is not vested in the second ...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1920)39MLJ431
Oldfield, J.1. The first question raised in this appeal is whether the plaintiffs, mortgagors, are entitled to execute their decree, one for redemption, by asking the Court to sell the mortgaged property. It is prima facie concluded in their favour by Govinda Taragan v. Veeran 21 M.L.J. 941 since we have been shown no case, in which that decision has been doubted and one, C.M.A. No. 99 of 1915, in which it has been followed, and since Mr. Anantakrishna Ayyar for defendants has declined to argue against its correctness. He has relied only on the fact that the decree provides for a sale at the instance only of the mortgagee. But that appears to have, been the case also in the decision referred to. The objection to the order under appeal must therefore be disallowed.2. The more important contention before us is however that the plaintiff's application for execution was made too late ; and certainly it was so, unless time ran, as they contend, from the date, 10--2--1915, on which an order ...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1920)ILR43Mad835
Oldfield, J.1. The first question raised in this appeal is whether the plaintiffs, mortgagors, are entitled to execute their decree for redemption, by asking the Court to sell the mortgaged property. It is prima facie concluded in their favour by Govinda Targan v. Veeran I.L.R.(1913) , Mad., 32, since we have been shown no case in which that decision has been doubted and in Venkatachalam Pattar v. Ramayyar C.M.A., 99 of 1915 (unreported.) it has been followed, and since Mr. Ananthakrishna Ayyar for defendants has declined to argue against its correctness. He has relied only on the fact that the decree provides for a sale at the instance only of the mortgagee. But that appears to have been the case also in the decision referred to. This objection to the order under appeal must therefore be disallowed.2. The more important contention before us is, however that the plaintiffs' application for execution was made too late; and certainly it was so unless time ran, as they contend, from the d...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1920)39MLJ525
Abdur Rahim, J.1. There can be no doubt that the settlement as it is called, Ex. B, was made with the object and in consideration of the donee cohabiting with the settler. This can be plainly inferred from the terms of the document itself. The plaintiffs who are usufructuary mortgagees of the property obtained the mortgage from the donee, Sadachi Ammal. The 1st defendant who is the appellant before us is the settler. His case is that the settlement or transfer to Sadachi having been made for immoral consideration, the transaction is void altogether and the plaintiffs can have no title under the mortgage executed by Sadachi Ammal.2. The facts are that this woman was kept by the 1st defendant, who made a gift of the property to her with the object that she should continue to be his mistress. She did in fact remain in his keeping and lived with him as contemplated by Ex. B. and to that extent therefore the immoral purpose which the donor had in view was attained. It is well established th...
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