Court : Chennai
Decided on : Jan-09-1902
Reported in : (1902)12MLJ208
Benson, J.1. Major Bell, the accused in this case, is the Superintendent of the Government Gun Carriage Factory in the City of Madras. He caused certain timber to be brought into the City on account of Government without Obtaining a license and paying the fees prescribed by Section 341 of the City of Madras Municipal Act I of 1884, and for this act he has been prosecuted at the instance of the Municipal Commissioners and has been fined the nominal sum of one rupee.2. The learned Advocate-General asks us, in the exercise of our powers of revision, to set aside the conviction and sentence as contrary to law. The object of the prosecution and of this revision petition is to obtain an authoritative decision of this Court as to the applicability of Section 341 to Government timber and firewood. The section enacts that no timber or firewood shall be brought within the City without a license specifying the place and conditions of storing, to be issued by the President under the bye-laws, on p...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Decided on : Jan-09-1902
Reported in : (1902)ILR25Mad457
Benson, J.1. Major Bell, the accused in this case, is the Superintendent of the Government Gun Carriage Factory in the City of Madras. He caused certain timber to be brought into the city on account of Government without obtaining a license and paying the fees prescribed by Section 841 of the City of Madras Municipal Act I of 1884, and for this act he has been prosecuted at the instance of the Municipal Commissioners and has been fined the nominal sum of one rupee.2. The learned Advocate-General asks us, in the exercise of our powers of revision, to set aside the conviction and sentence as contrary to law. The object of the prosecution and of this revision petition is to obtain an authoritative decision of this Court as to the applicability of Section 341 to Government timber and firewood. The section enacts that 'no timber or firewood shall be brought within the city without a license specifying the place and conditions of storing, to be issued by the President under the bye-laws, on ...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Decided on : Feb-10-1902
Reported in : (1902)ILR25Mad244
Davies, J.1. In Appeal against Appellate Order No. 35 of 1901 and Appeal against Order No. 48 of 1900.--There can be no doubt that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are applicable to cases tried under special Acts, if the trials are in a Court of Civil Judicature and if there are no rules in the special Acts inconsistent with, or substituted for, the general rules of the Code of Civil Procedure. Now, in the Transfer of Property Act, after an order for sale in a mortgage suit has been made, no further rules are laid down as to the subsequent steps to be taken for the conduct of the sale and other incidents attaching to it. These matters must therefore be governed by the Civil Procedure Code as the Transfer of Property Act is silent in regard to them. The rules for the conduct of sales by a Civil Court are to be found in Chapter XIX (G) of the Civil Procedure Code and there is nothing in that chapter excluding from its operation sales in pursuance of mortgage decrees under th...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Decided on : Feb-14-1902
Reported in : (1902)12MLJ128
Charles Arnold White, C.J.1. The question which has been referred in this case is whether, notwithstanding the institution, of a suit and the passing of a decree for redemption, a subsequent suit for redemption of the same mortgage can be brought when the decree in the former suit lifts not been executed. I take it that for the purposes of this reference the words 'when the decree in the former suit has not been executed' mean when the order provided for by Section 93 of the Transfer of Property Act for foreclosing the right to redeem, or for sale, as the case may be, has not been made.2. The view which has been generally adopted by this High Court, though the decisions are not altogether uniform, is that a second suit will lie. The Bombay and Allahabad High Court have held otherwise.3. The answer to the question appears to me to depend not upon whether or not at the time of the bringing of the second suit the relation of mortgagor and mortgagee subsists between the parties, but upon w...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Decided on : Feb-14-1902
Reported in : (1902)ILR25Mad300
Arnold White, C.J.1. The question which has been referred in this case is whether, notwithstanding the institution of a suit and the passing of a. decree for redemption, a subsequent suit for redemption of the same mortgage can be brought when the decree in the former suit has not been executed. I take it that for the purposes of this reference the words 'when the decree in the former suit has not been executed' mean when the order provided for by Section 93 of the Transfer of Property Act for foreclosing the right to redeem, or for sale, as the case may be, has not been made.2. The view which has been generally adopted by this High Court, though the decisions are not altogether uniform, is that a second suit will lie. The Bombay and Allahabad High Courts have held otherwise.3. The answer to the question appears to me to depend-not upon whether or not at the time of the bringing of the second suit the relation of mortgagor and mortgagee subsists between the parties, but upon whether th...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Decided on : Apr-24-1902
Reported in : (1902)12MLJ368
1. Plaintiff, as the assignee of a mortgage executed, by 1st defendant's father Kadir Lavvai, brought O.S. No. 540 of 1894 against Kadir Lavvai to enforce the mortgage by-sale. During the pendency of the suit and before the passing of the decree Kadir Lavvai died and the name of his son, the 1st defendant, was on plaintiff's application entered on the record as legal representative in place of the deceased defendant under Section 368 of the Civil Procedure Code. Subsequently on the 20th December 1899, a decree was passed ex parte against the 1st defendant as legal representative of the deceased defendant directing the sale of the mortgaged property. Plaintiff purchased the property at the sale held on the 7th September 1897, in execution of the decree and the sale was confirmed on the 8th November 1897. After obtaining the usual certificate of sale which purported to convey to the plaintiff the whole of the mortgaged property, as it must be assumed, as that of the deceased defendant, t...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Decided on : Dec-23-1902
Reported in : (1903)13MLJ83
ORDERBhashyam Aiyangar, J.1. The Permanently Settled estate of Merangi in the district of Vizagapatam was registered in the Collector's office in the name of one Jagannatha Raz as its sole proprietor. A suit was brought for its partition by three of his co-parceners, including the present defendant, which was unsuccessfully resisted by Jagannatha Raz on the ground that it was an impartible estate. Both the Indian Courts and finally the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council by its decree in 1891, Sri Raja Satmcharla Jagannadha Razu v. Sri Raja Satrucharla Ramabhadra Razu I.L.R.R. 14 M. 237 held that the estate was partible and directed its partition into four equal shares.2. On the 23rd October 1893, the late Maharajah of Viziana-garam, the testator under whom the plaintiff claims, purchased from Jagannatha Raz his undivided one-fourth share in the estate which purchase became absolute in the events that followed. There was no delivery of possession to the purchaser and on the 5th May...
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