Court : Mumbai
Reported in : (1948)50BOMLR151
Gajendragadkar, J.1. This confirmation case and appeal arise from the sentence of death passed by the learned Sessions Judge at Poona against the appellant. The appellant and another were charged in the Court of the learned Sessions Judge with having committed an offence punishable under Section 302 and Section 302 read with Section 109 respectively. The prosecution case was that on or about the night between August 25 and 26, 1946, the appellant intentionally caused the death of one Yeshwant Sapre by stabbing him with a knife and thus made himself liable to be punished under Section 302 and the case against the other person was that on the same day and about the same time and place he abetted the appellant in the com mission of the said offence of murder. The case against both the accused was tried with the aid of jurors. The jury unanimously returned a verdict of not guilty in regard to the charge against accused No. 2. The learned Judge agreed with that verdict and acquitted the sai...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Mumbai
Reported in : AIR1950Bom192; (1950)52BOMLR214
Chagla, C.J.1. The question referred to this Full Bench is whether a civil suit will lie to establish the right of members of the public to carry a non-religious procession through the public streets. A suit was filed on behalf of the Hindu community of Sakur against the Muslim community of the same place for a declaration that the Hindu community had a right to conduct religious and social processions accompanied with music along certain public thoroughfares upon which certain Muslim mosques abutted. In 1938 the Muslims attempted to obstruct a Dasera procession from marching with music near one of the moseques. The Magistrate issued an order prohibiting the Hindus from carrying out their procession unless they obtained a declaration of their right from a competent civil Court. Hence the suit. The suit was decreed by the trial Court and the decree was confirmed by the learned Extra Assistant Judge at Ahmednagar. The Muslims came in second appeal to this Court, and that appeal having co...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Mumbai
Reported in : (1931)33BOMLR1192
Patkar, Ag. C.J.1. These are four applications for quashing the order of commitment of the several accused under different sections of the Indian Penal Code passed on May 14,1931, by the Special Magistrate appointed to try the case. It is not necessary to mention all the facts leading to the prosecution of the accused in this case. The commitment can be quashed under Section 215 by this Court only on a point of law.2. The first point taken on behalf of the accused is that the case was started as a warrant case and the learned Magistrate led the accused to believe that he was trying the case under Chapter XXI of the Criminal Procedure Code and not inquiring under Chapter XVIII of the Code, and therefore the accused had no opportunity of cross-examining the prosecution witnesses and leading evidence on their behalf before the Magistrate. It is further urged that though the Magistrate had power to commit the accused under Section 347 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the Magistrate was boun...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Allahabad
Reported in : [1950]18ITR72(All)
These are two applications under Section 66(3) of the Indian Income-tax Act. The two applications under section 66(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act were sent by post from Allahabad to the appellate Tribunal, Bombay Bench, on the 1st of December, 1945. On the same day a money order of Rs. 200 was also sent. The packages containing the applications were received on the 4th of December, 1945, but the money order of was received on the 7th of December, 1945. The period of sixty days from the date of service of the notice expired on the 5th of December, 1945. The appellate Tribunal thereupon held that the applications had not been received within time and could not be entertained. They relied on the language of section 66(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act which is as follows :-'Within sixty days of the date upon which he is served with notice of an order under sub-section (4) of section 33 the assessee or the commissioner may, by application in the prescribed form, accompanied where applicatio...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : AIR1921Mad427; (1920)39MLJ649
John Wallis, C.J.1. The only question argued before us was whether money which became due to a money lending firm in the course of its business by way of interest in the year of account, or year on the income of which the tax is to be assessed for the current year, is to be treated as part of the assessable income for that year of account although it was not recovered or realized by the firm in that year either in cash or by adjustment in the accounts.2. Income is defined in the ' Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English' adapted from the great Oxford Dictionary and published at the Clarendon Press as ' Periodical (usually annual) receipts from one's business, lands, work, investments etc ; income-tax (levied on this).' This is also the legal acceptation of the term, as appears from Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, and numerous definitions, some of which are there cited while others have been referred to by Mr. K.V. Krishnaswamy in his argument for the petitioners. Lord Selborne's, 'i...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : 59Ind.Cas.482
John Wallis, C.J.1. The only question argued before us was, whether money which became due to a money-lending firm in the course of its business by way of interest in the year of account, or year on the income of which the tax is to be assessed for the current year, is to be treated as part of the assessable income for that year of account, although it was not recovered or realised by the firm in that year either in cash or by adjustment in the accounts. Income is defined in the 'Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English,' adapted from the great Oxford Dictionary, and published at the Clarendon Press, as 'Periodical (usually annual) receipts from one's business, lands, work, investments etc; income tax (levied on this).' This is also the legal acceptation of the term, as appears from Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, and numerous definitions, some of which are there cited; while others have been referred to by Mr. K.V. Krishnaswamy in his argument for the petitioners. Lord Salborne's, '...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Mumbai
Reported in : AIR1915Bom50; (1915)17BOMLR56
Basil Scott, C.J.1. These are cross appeals from an order of the District Judge of Poona awarding a lump sum of Rs. 5,000 to be paid to the petitioner for permanent maintenance under Section 37 of the Indian Divorce Act IV of 1869. The petitioner appeals on the ground that the sum awarded is not sufficient and that the Court should have secured to her a sum the interest of which would secure her at least Rs. 150 per mensem. The respondent appeals on the ground that the Court has no power to award payment of a lump sum and that if it had the power the sum awarded is excessive.2. First, as to the power of the Court to award payment of a lump sum.3. The material clause of Section 37 of the Divorce Act is the third. It gives the Court power to 'order that the husband shall, to the satisfaction of the Court, secure to the wife such gross sum of money, or such annual sum of money for any term not exceeding her own life, as having regard' etc.4. As the sentence is punctuated in the State publ...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Mumbai
Reported in : (1915)ILR39Bom182
Basil Scott, Kt., C.J.1. Those are cross appeals from an order of the District Judge of Poona awarding a lump sum of Rs. 5,000 to be paid to the petitioner for permanent maintenance under Section 37 of the Indian Divorce Act IV of 1809. The petitioner appeals on the ground that the sum awarded is not sufficient and that, the Court should Lave secured to her a sum the interest of which would secure her at least Rs. 150 per mensem. The respondent appeals on the ground that the Court has no power to award payment of a lump sum and that if it had the power the sum awarded is excessive.2. First, as to the power of the Court to award payment of a lump sum.3. The material clause of Section 37 of the Divorce Act is the third. It gives the Court power to 'order that the husband shall, to the satisfaction of the Court, secure to the wife such gross sum of money, or such annual sum of money for any term not exceeding her own life, as having regard' etc.4. As the sentence is punctuated in the stat...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Mumbai
Reported in : AIR1946Bom174
Lokur, J.1. The suit out of which this appeal arises was filed by the Mamlatdar, taluka Jalgaon, representing the Court of Wards, on behalf of Messrs. Bhagirath Ramchandra & Co., of which the present owner and vahiwatdar is Shivnarayan Bhagirath Shet. In 1927 the plaintiff company was appointed the managing agents of the Bhagirath Spinning, Weaving and ., Jalgaon, hereinafter referred to in this judgment as the Mills company. The Mills company having fallen into financial difficulties, a scheme for its reconstruction was submitted to and sanctioned by the High Court on 11th January 1932. In accordance with that scheme, the plaintiff company surrendered its managing agency to the defendant company for a period of fifteen years on condition that it should be paid a quarter of the commission earned by the defendant company from the managing agency. The Mills company went into liquidation in February 1935 and during that interval the defendant company is said to have earned a commission of...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Karnataka
Reported in : AIR1950Kant13; AIR1950Mys13
Mallappa, J.1. This is an appeal against the judgment and decree in R.A. No. 105 of 47-48 on the file of the Additional Subordinate Judge, Bangalore, confirming those of the II Munsiff, Bangalore, in O.S. No. 131 of 1946-47 on the file of this Court.2. The plaintiff-respondent filed the suit against the defendant-appellant for recovery of the Rs. 513 due on a promissory note executed by the defendant on 3rd September 1997 in favour of the deceased husband of the plaintiff. The plaintiff relied on an endorsement on the promissory note dated 7th September 1940 for the payment made towards interest. The defendant is admittedly an agriculturist. The defendant is admittedly an agriculturist within the meaning of the Mysore Agriculturists' Relief Act and he has pleaded discharge. This has not been believed by both the Courts and the suit is decreed as prayed for.3. The only point that was argued in this appeal is that the courts below erred in the view that the suit is not barred by limitati...
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