Court : Mumbai
Reported in : (1944)46BOMLR54
J.C. Shah, J.1. The question that arises in this case is, whether Ordinance XIX of 1943 is a valid Ordinance. It was promulgated on June 5, 1943, to repeal Ordinance II of 1942, which established Special Criminal Courts in India for trial of certain classes of offences. Ordinance II of 1942 was held to be intra vires by the Bombay High Court in Emperor v. Shreekant Pandurang Ketkar : (1943)45BOMLR323 , though the Calcutta High Court arrived at an opposite conclusion in Banoari Lal v. Emperor : AIR1943Cal285 as regards Sections 5, 10, 14 and 16. Eventually the Federal Court of India held in Emperor v. Banoari Lal that Sections 5, 10 and 16 of the Ordinance were ultra vires. This decision was given on June 4, 1943. The Governor General deliberated overnight and promulgated Ordinance XIX of 1943 the next day. The new Ordinance accepted the decision of the Federal Court in so far as it repealed Ordinance II of 1942. It also proceeded to terminate pending proceedings; but it went further to...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Mumbai
Reported in : AIR1949Bom42; (1948)50BOMLR450
M.C. Chagla, C.J.1. This is a suit filed by the plaintiff to eject his tenant. The defendant has pleaded the protection of the Rent Restriction Act. At the hearing; of the suit before Mr. Justice Desai attention was drawn to the relevant provisions. of Bombay Act LVII of 1947 under which all pending suits relating to recovery or fixing of rent or possession of premises to which that Act applied had to be transferred to and continued before the Court of Small Causes, Bombay. It was then contended both by the plaintiff and the defendant that Sections 28, 29 and 50 of that Act were ultra vires of the Provincial Legislature and were also repugnant to existing law and void and of no effect. Mr. Justice Desai directed that the plaint should be amended to make the necessary averments and that the Province of Bombay should be made a party to the suit. Consequently the plaint was amended and para, 2-A was added, containing the relevant averments and the Province of Bombay was made a party defen...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Mumbai
Reported in : (1948)50BOMLR499
John Beaumont, J.1. This is an appeal from the judgment and decree of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay dated November 24, 1943, dismissing the appellant's appeal from the judgment and decree dated December 16, 1942, of Mr. Justice Chagla exercising original civil jurisdiction of the High Court.2. In the suit out of which this appeal arises the appellant, who was plaintiff, claimed against the first respondent, the Alembic Chemical Works Company Limited (hereinafter referred to as 'the company') Rs. 9,00,000 damages for breach of an agreement of December 7, 1907, to employ the firm of Kotibhasker Amin and Company, of which the appellant claimed to be a member, as managing agents of the company.3. The claim arises in this way. The company was formed in the year 1907, and under clause 6 of the memorandum of association it was provided that the members who then constituted or who might thereafter constitute the firm of Messrs. Kotibhasker Amin and Company were thereby appointed secre...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Mumbai
Reported in : AIR1935Bom5; (1934)36BOMLR1021
Blackwell, J.1. In this case the petitioner sues for a divorce by reason of the respondent's alleged adultery and cruelty. Among other defences, the respondent pleads that a previous marriage of the petitioner with one Gulam Mahomed Ebrahim has never been dissolved or annulled by any Court of competent jurisdiction and is still subsisting. The question, whether the first marriage had been validly dissolved before the marriage in suit took place, was tried as a preliminary issue. The learned Chief Justice answered that issue in the affirmative, and this is an appeal from his decision.2. The issue was tried upon an agreed statement of facts. From this it appears that on December 4, 1906, the petitioner, who was domiciled in Scotland, married at the General Registry Office in Edinburgh Gulam Mahomed Ebrahim, who was a Sunni Mahomedan domiciled in India (which includes not only British India, but the various Native States). In 1912, the petitioner became a convert to the Mahomedan religion...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Mumbai
Reported in : AIR1949Bom134; (1950)52BOMLR189
Fazl Ali, J.1. This appeal has been filed by the appellant after obtaining special leave of this Court and it is directed against a judgment and order of a division bench of the Bombay High Court confirming the judgment and order of a single Judge of that Court by which he dismissed the appellant's motion for setting aside an insolvency notice taken out by the respondent-company.2. The respondent-company is a private limited liability company in which there are only four shareholders, viz. Mrs. Byramji, Mr. and Mrs. Cassad and the appellant. In November, 1945, the company filed a suit (No. 1726 of 1945) in the High Court at Bombay against the appellant claiming a number of reliefs, which need not be set out here. Subsequently, Mrs. Byramji and Mr. and Mrs. Cassad applied to be made parties to the suit and they were joined as plaintiffs Nos. 2, 3 and 4 respectively. After the suit had been heard for some time, a settlement was arrived at between the parties and a consent decree was pass...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Mumbai
Reported in : AIR1930Bom424; (1930)32BOMLR1035
Shingne, J.1. This is a suit to recover a debt due on two promissory notes Exhibits 54 and 56, executed by defendant No. 3 in his personal capacity. The promissory note Exhibit 54 dated June 3, 1925, was executed by defendant No. 3 in favour of plaintiff No. 1 alone and the promissory note Exhibit 56 dated July 81, 1925, was executed by defendant No. 3 in favour of plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 2. There is evidence to show that the dealings of both the plaintiffs are joint and the Court of first instance has found that both the plaintiffs are jointly interested in the two promissory notes in suit. This finding is not challenged by respondent's pleader. Exhibit 54 was for a sum of Rs. 5|200 due under an account and Exhibit 56 was for a sum of Rs. 300. Out of this sum of Rs. 300 a sum of Rs. 100 is stated to have been borrowed on June 7, 1925.2. Five persons were impleaded as defendants one of whom, , viz., defendant No. 5, is a minor. Defendants Nos. 1 to 4 are full brothers and defendant No. 5...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Mumbai
Reported in : (1930)32BOMLR1046
Amberson Marten, Kt., C.J.1. This appeal comes before us on the preliminary issue whether this High Court has jurisdiction to entertain the petition of the petitioner for restitution of conjugal rights. The learned trial Judge decided that issue in the negative feeling himself bound by a decision of the appellate Court in Nusserwanji Wadia v. Eleonora Wadia (1913) 15 Bom. L.R. 693, I.L.R. 38 Bom. 125. The petitioner now appeals, and as this is a Full Bench, we are not bound, as the learned Judge was, by that particular decision. So in effect this appeal is an appeal from the decision in Wadia v. Wadia. The sole ground on which it is contended by the respondent that the judgment should be upheld is that both parties to the petition are not Christians but only one, and that, consequently, the jurisdiction given or continued to this Court by the Indian Divorce Act 1869, as subsequently amended, does not apply.2. As regards the facts, it is sufficient to say that the lady claims to be a Ru...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Mumbai
Reported in : (1950)52BOMLR463
Reid, J.1. In 1934 the appellant was appointed to the Indian Civil Service. During 1943 he was employed as Additional District Magistrate at Midnapore, and while so employed he was concerned in the investigation of a charge of bribery against Dr. Panda, a sub assistant surgeon of the Bengal Nagpur Railway. While the case against Dr. Panda was still under investigation, the appellant was transferred from Midnapore and he went to Calcutta where he stayed for a time. It was alleged that on December 20, 1943, while in Calcutta he received a bribe from Dr. Panda and he was suspended. On July 6, 1945, the following order was made by the Governor of Bengal:In exercise of the powers conferred by Sub-section (1)(b) and Sub-section (2) of Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898) the Governor is pleased to accord sanction to the prosecution, of Mr. T.A. Menon of the Indian Civil Service under suspension in respect of(a) an offence under Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code.(b...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Mumbai
Reported in : AIR1925Bom485; (1925)27BOMLR973
Shah, Ag. C.J.1. It will be convenient in this case to state the few facts which have given rise to this appeal. The Divisional Forest Officer, Western Division, Thana, by a proclamation dated June 25. 1920, invited tenders with reference to certain forest coupes in the Thana District. The tenders were to be submitted on or before August 5, 1920, 1 P. M. The plaintiff submitted a tender in the standard form for several coupes, including coupe No. 4 in Block No. XIX before 1 P. M. on August 5. He offered to take up that particular coupe for Rs. 12,299. Immediately after, however, he discovered that he had committed a mistake in that the sum offered was not intended for that particular coupe but for coupe No. 5, which was near coupe No. 4. At 4-30 on that day the plaintiff's son sent a petition requesting the officer not to sanction the tender for coupe No. 4 as it was submitted under a mistake. The plaintiff 'and his son also sent a telegram' which reached the Divisional Forest Officer ...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Mumbai
Reported in : (1928)30BOMLR1242
Blanesburgh, J.1. This suit, commenced on January 10, 1920, in the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, was, in its inception, a simple action by a purchaser for the specific performance of a contract for the sale of certain valuable hereditaments on Malabar Hill in Bombay with claims for damages additional or alternative all in terms of Section 19 of the Specific Belief Act, 187 7. The defences to the suit wore that there never had been any concluded contract for the sale of the property : if there had been such a contract it had been entered into on behalf of the defendant by an agent with no authority to bind her to its terms. There is in the defendant's written statement no suggestion that the plaintiff's right was not a right to specific relief, if any existent contract binding upon the defendant was established. And the case, indeed, was one in which upon proof by the plaintiff of the facts alleged by him, he became entitled as of right under Section 12(o) of the Act to the specif...
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