Court : Intellectual Property Appellate Board IPAB
..... public. 16. the first respondents trade mark had acquired distinctiveness by use for a continuous period of five years and thus was qualified for registration under section 9 of the act. the first respondent was thus the proprietor of the trade mark philips as they had used the trade mark for several years without any interruption. 17. ..... respondent was prior in use to that of the appellant and as such they were the proprietors of the trade mark as per the provisions of section 18(1) of the act. on the above findings the assistant registrar disallowed the opposition and allowed the application for registration. 4. aggrieved by the order of the assistant registrar ..... heard and decided by the assistant registrar of trade marks. 3. the assistant registrar passed the impugned order on the grounds that the provisions of section 11(a) of the act were not attracted as the goods were of different description and as such there was no confusion or deception among the public; that the registration would .....
Tag this Judgment!Court : Intellectual Property Appellate Board IPAB
..... , section 16, section 17, section 18, section 19, section 20, section 25, section 27, section 28, section 51, section 54, section 57, section 60, section 61, section 63, sub-section (3) of section 69, section 78, section 84, section 86, section 88 (3), section 89, section 93, section 96 and section 97. therefore, any party aggrieved under section 25(1) also would have the option to go for appeal to the honble high court under the above section 116(2) of the principal act, until these sections 60 ..... no. cic/wb/a/2006/00274 of ms. vishaish uppal vs shri kamal dayani, cpio. pmo dated 31/5/06 before central information commission under the right to information act, 2005 section 19 the facts and decision are: chief information commissioner held that a decision by an appellate authority after issue of a notice and after a full hearing, in presence of .....
Tag this Judgment!Court : Intellectual Property Appellate Board IPAB
..... , air 1977 delhi 93 had occasion to consider the meaning of the words from any order or decision of the registrar under this act which occurred in section 109(2) of the repealed trade and merchandise marks act, 1958. in that case honble avadh behari rohtagi, j has observed in paras 18,22 and 23 as under:- 18. to my ..... copy of the order or decision appealed against and by such fee as may be prescribed. b. a close analysis of the provisions contemplated under section 91(1) and 91(3) of the trade marks act, 1999 read with rules 3(2) and 8(2) of the intellectual property appellate board (procedure) rules, 2003, it can be understood that ..... shri z. s. negi, chairman: the appellant, a registered partnership firm, through its partner mr. k. rangasamy has filed this appeal, under section 91 of the trade marks act, 1999 (hereinafter referred to as the act), against the decision dated 22.10.2007 of the assistant registrar of trade marks, trade marks registry, mumbai rejecting/returning the tm-44 and tm .....
Tag this Judgment!Court : Intellectual Property Appellate Board IPAB
..... forth his cause. there is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. this court has held that the words sufficient cause under section 5 of the limitation act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice vide shakuntala devi jain v. kuntal kumari (1969) 1 scr 1006 and state of w ..... his responsibilities, and to visit him with drastic consequences. 9. it is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the court. section 5 of the limitation act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. length of delay is no matter, acceptability of ..... on record, where the learned judges have laid the following principle: 11. thus it becomes plain that the expression sufficient cause within the meaning of section 5 of the act or order 22 rule 9 of the code or any other similar provision should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence .....
Tag this Judgment!Court : Intellectual Property Appellate Board IPAB
..... forth his cause. there is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. this court has held that the words sufficient cause under section 5 of the limitation act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice vide shakuntala devi jain v. kuntal kumari (1969) 1 scr 1006 and state of w ..... his responsibilities, and to visit him with drastic consequences. 9. it is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the court. section 5 of the limitation act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. length of delay is no matter, acceptability of ..... on record, where the learned judges have laid the following principle: 11. thus it becomes plain that the expression sufficient cause within the meaning of section 5 of the act or order 22 rule 9 of the code or any other similar provision should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence .....
Tag this Judgment!Court : Intellectual Property Appellate Board IPAB
..... concluding that the adoption of the mark by the respondent no.1 was not dishonest and he thus misdirected himself in not exercising the discretion under sub-section (4) of section 18 of the act against the respondent no.1. 8. learned counsel submitted that the conclusion by the respondent no.2 that the question of any likelihood of confusion ..... cause confusion among the pubic making the pubic to think that goods bearing the impugned trade mark emanate from the applicant. the essentials for prohibition under section 11(2) of the act is that the trade mark sought to be registered must be identical or similar to an earlier trade mark, the goods in respect of which registration ..... mark and as such the use of an identical mark by the respondent would cause confusion among the pubic and thus does not qualify for registration under section 11(2) of the act. in the instant appeal, the trade mark sought to be registered by the respondent no.1 is identical to the earlier trade mark of the appellant .....
Tag this Judgment!Court : Intellectual Property Appellate Board IPAB
..... application. the adoption and use of the impugned trade mark by the first respondent was honest and bonafide and thus was entitled for registration under section 12(3) of the act. 17. we have heard both the counsel and we have considered the written submissions of both the parties and have gone through the documents carefully ..... of registered proprietor. 13. learned counsel for the first respondent submitted that they had relied two judgments in support of their contention under the provisions of section 12(3) of the act before the registrar and the application was proceeded to registration based on the case laws [ 1998 ptc (18) 300 maekawa bearing manufacturing co. ltd. ..... trade mark application in the year 1990. so, the adoption of the trade mark kavi by the first respondent is dishonest and cannot claim registration under section 12(3) of the act. 12. learned counsel for the appellant relied on the following judgments in support of his claim:- a) 2007 (34) ptc 392 delhi ansul industries .....
Tag this Judgment!Court : Intellectual Property Appellate Board IPAB
..... of rule 12 of the said rules, is mainly for calculating the period within which the statement and undertaking on form 3 as required under sub-section (1) of section 8 of the act is to be filed in the designated state. rather to give a much beneficial time period to collect the details of other foreign filings and submit to ..... of the treaty shall have an over-riding power and those provisions only would apply in relation to the international applications. 11. looking at the provisions of section 7(1b) of the act, the filing date of national phase application in a designated state, for e.g., india, has been referred to be same as the international filing date ..... canadian patent office and the chinese patent office. thus the applicant requested that he is not in obligation to furnish the actual national phase entry date according to section 8(1) of the act or rule 12(1), (1a) and (2) of the patent rules, 2003. the applicant also pointed out to the respondent about the similar procedure adopted .....
Tag this Judgment!Court : Intellectual Property Appellate Board IPAB
..... into the applicants contention that the respondent has no intention to use the impugned trade mark. 16. the respondent no. 1 has not raised defence under sub-section (3) of section 46 of the act in its pleadings, it is, therefore, not necessary for us to go to the question of existence of the special circumstances to defend the non-use of ..... not to use the trade mark itself or through registered user during the relevant period? the evidence certainly does not support any such intention. the power under section 46 of the act is discretionary power of the court or the registrar and the question of whether to order rectification or not to do so is not so much between the ..... regarded as a person aggrieved . see also in re appollinaris co.s trade marks, (1891) 2 ch 186 corresponding to 8 rpc 137 and in re rivires trade marks, (1884) 26 ch d 48. on the facts stated above, i am therefore convinced that the madras match company satisfies the tests laid down by these authorities to come within the .....
Tag this Judgment!Court : Intellectual Property Appellate Board IPAB
..... registration is for the year1998-99. in view of the user prior to making application for registration, the registration is covered under proviso to sub-section (1) of section 9 of the act. regarding applicants contention that the mark k/c is common to trade is not sustainable in the absence of any iota of evidence regarding their existence ..... trade mark kic. 14. shri vidhani submitted that the mark of the respondent has acquired reputation and goodwill in terms of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 9 of the act. the mark has acquired a distinctive character by way of use made of it before the date of making application for registration. the registration was ..... , user, etc. the applicants ground of rectification for contravention of section 9 of the act is not sustainable. 22. now the next question for consideration is whether the mark of the respondent is identical to the mark of the applicant to .....
Tag this Judgment!