Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1963SC354; (1962)64BOMLR403; [1962]2SCR59
Sinha, C.J. 1. The only question for determination in this appeal is whether the defendants-appellants are 'protected tenants' within the meaning of the Bombay Tenancy Act (Bombay Act XXIX of 1939) (which hereinafter will be referred to, for the sake of brevity, as the Act of 1939), whose rights as such were not affected by the repeal of that Act by the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act (Bombay Act LXVII of 1948) which hereinafter will be referred to as the Act of 1948). The Courts below have decreed the plaintiff's suit for possession of the lands in dispute, holding that the defendants were not entitled to the protection claimed by them as 'protected tenants'. This appeal is by special leave granted by this Court on April 4, 1955. 2. The facts of this case are not in dispute. Shortly stated, they are as follows. By virtue of a lease dated October 30, 1939, the defendants obtained a lease of the disputed lands from the plaintiff for a period of 10 years, expiring on October 30...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Mumbai
Reported in : AIR1958Bom26; (1957)59BOMLR525; ILR1957Bom806
Tendolkar, J. 1. This is a civil revision application against an order of Judge Mehta of the City Civil Court allowing an amendment of the plaint in a matrimonial cause. The petition was originally filed for judicial separation by reason of desertion by the defendant, who is the wife of the plaintiff, for four years under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The amendment that was applied for was for a divorce on the ground of desertion under the Bombay Hindu Divorce Act, 1947, alleging that the wife had deserted the husband from August 1949. 2. Now, under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, only judicial separation can be obtained on the ground of desertion and not divorce; and what is urged before us by Mr. Kadam is that the learned Judge erred in granting leave to amend the petition to the husband, because, ac-cording to him, the petitioner not having availed himself of the provisions of the Bombay Hindu Divorce Act before it was repealed by the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, he should not be allowed...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : AIR1999SC3923; [2000]99CompCas383(SC); JT1999(8)SC66; 1999(6)SCALE441; (1999)9SCC334; [1999]Supp3SCR461
ORDERD.P. Wadhwa, J.The Facts:1. These three appeals raise three different questions relating to the construction and interpretation of Section 85 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (the 'new Act' for short) which contains repeal and saving provision of the three Acts, namely, the Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act, 1937, the Arbitration Act, 1940 (the 'old Act' for short) the Foreign Awards (Recognition and Enforcement) Act, 1961 (the 'Foreign Awards Act' for short).2. This Section 85 of the new Act we reproduce at the outset:85. Repeal and saving - (1) The Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act, 1937 (6 of 1937), the Arbitration Act, 1940 (10 of 1940) and the Foreign Awards (Recognition and Enforcement) Act 1961 (45 of 1961) are hereby repealed.(2) Notwithstanding such repeal, -(a) the provisions of the said enactments shall apply in relation to arbitral proceedings which commenced before this Act came into force unless otherwise agreed by the parties but this Ac...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1904)14MLJ37
S. Subrahmania Aiyar, Officiating C.J.1.The question raised in this case is indeed a very important one, though the amount in dispute is but a trifle--four annas and one pie--being the amount collected by Government from the appellant in connection with his having erected a platform and a shed over a portion of a path, by the side of which his house is situated in a village in the Kistna District. The effect of the findings by the Lower Court, I take to be that the owners of |the houses adjoining the path inclusive of the appellant, have only a right of way over it, the free-hold in the soil being vested in the Government.2. The point for determination is, whether the levy of the amount in question as land-revenue payable in respect of the site of the platform and the shed, is lawful. A levy of the kind under consideration is known in the language of Revenue Standing Orders as a ' prohibitory assessment.' That the practice of making such collections has been allowed to prevail so long ...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : AIR1970Mad27; (1969)2MLJ443
Sadasivam, J.1. These civil revision petitions have been directed by the learned Chief Justice to be posted before this Division Bench as they involve two questions of law of some importance, namely, whether Section 3 of the Government Grants Act of 1895 (originally called the Crown Grants Act) prevails over the provisions of the Madras City Tenants Protection Act 3 of 1922, and whether the State of Madras is bound by the provisions of the Madras City Tenants Protection Act unless this is expressly stated to. that effect in the Act.2. These civil revision proceedings arise out of petitions filed by four timber merchants carrying on business in Basin. Bridge Road, Madras for fixation of fair rent under Section 7 (a) of the Madras City Tenants Protection Act 1922. It is an undisputed fact that the lands on which the timber depots are kept belong to the State of Madras and they have been leased out by the Corporation to the several timber merchants. The Government allowed the Corporation ...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Mumbai
Reported in : (1943)45BOMLR945
John Beaumont, Kt., C.J.1. This is a special case stated under Section 90 and Order XXVI of the Civil Procedure Code, raising the question 'Whether the Crown is bound by Sections 222(1) and 265 of the City of Bombay Municipal Act, 1888.' The question is of some public importance to the citizens of Bombay, and the answer to it is not, I think, altogether free from doubt.2. The question arises in these circumstances. There is an estate in the neighbourhood of Matunga known as the Antop Hill estate, which belongs to Government, and in respect of which there is no adequate water supply. Accordingly the Municipality proposed to construct a 9' main under the Antop Hill Road, which is a private road belonging to the Government of Bombay, and they asked for the consent of Government to the proposed work. Government gave their consent on certain conditions, but the Municipality considered that they were not justified in agreeing to those conditions. The Municipality then proposed to get over th...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Privy Council
Lord Atkin: This is an appeal from an order of the Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa, varying an order of the Supreme Court of Kenya, which dismissed a motion by the applicant Abdulhusein Kaderbhai for a mandamus addressed to the appellant, the Commissioner for Local Government Lands and Settlement in Kenya. The Commissioner had given notice of an auction sale of town plots at Mombasa at which Europeans only were to be allowed to bid and purchase. The notice contained the further special condition, that during the terms of the grant the grantee should not permit the dwelling house or outbuildings which had to be erected upon it to be used as a place of residence for any Asistic or African not a domestic servant employed by him. The applicant, who is an Indian subject of His Majesty resident in Mombasa on 10th August 1928, by notice of motion dated 9th August, moved the Court for a mandamus commanding the Commissioner to allow the applicant to bid for and purchase at the auction sale t...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Delhi
Reported in : ILR1985Delhi331; [1974]95ITR34(Delhi)
T.V. Tatacjhari, J.(1) This reference to the Full Bench has been made by Avadh Behari Rohatagi, J. under Rule 2 (as amended) of the Original Side Rules. 1967, in Suit No. 64 of 1969 instituted on the Original Side of this Court. The questions referred to by the learned Judge for the opinion of the Full Bench relate to the scope and effect of the provisions in sections 54 and 59B of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, and sections 137 and 138 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.(2) The facts which have occasioned the reference are briefly the following. The plaintiff, Trilok Chand Jain, instituted the suit referred to above for recovery of Rs. 1,39,722.86 from the defendants M/s. Dagi Ram Pindi Lall, its three partners Pindi I all, Bishamber Nath and Dagi Ram and Smt. Budh Wanti, wife of Pindi Lall. While evidence was being recorded in the Suit, the plaintiff obtained summons from the Court requiring the Income-tax Department to produce in Court the records relating to the income-tax of M[s. Dagi ...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Allahabad
Reported in : AIR1954All144
Sapru, J.1. While agreeing with the order proposed by my brother Mootham, I would like to point out that, having regard to the nature of our Constitution, a licence for the carrying on of a business or profession cannot be looked upon as a mere privilege which is within the unfettered discretion of the Executive Authority empowered to grant it.Particular emphasis has been laid in Article 19(1)(g) on the right to practice any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business, subject, of course, as laid down in Article 19(6), to any reasonable restrictions in the interests of the general public as may be placed on it. In guaranteeing this right the founding fathers were, no doubt, influenced by their concept of the functions of the State. As is clear from the directive principles of State policy to which I think it is permissible to refer in this connection, they were establishing a State guided by certain directive principles which, though not justiciable, were, nevertheless...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Supreme Court of India
Reported in : II(1991)ACC449; 1991ACJ1060; AIR1991SC2156; 1992(2)BLJR816; [1992]75CompCas611(SC); JT1991(3)SC660; 1992(1)KLT338(SC); (1992)101PLR156; 1991(2)SCALE493; (1991)4SCC333; [199
ORDERLalit Mohan Sharma, J.1. Special leave is granted.2. The appellant was injured in a road accident and his claim petition has been dismissed as being barred by limitation. The accident took place on 22.1.1989. The Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 was repealed by Section 217(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 which came into force on 1.7.1989. The period of limitation for filing a claim petition both under the old Act and the new Act being six months expired on 22.7.1989. The claim petition of the appellant, however, was filed belatedly on 15.3.1990 with a prayer for condonation of delay. The Accident Claims Tribunal held that in view of the provisions of Sub-section (3) of Section 166 of the new Motor Vehicles Act, the delay of more than six months could not be condoned. The application was accordingly dismissed. The appellant unsuccessfully challenged the decision before the High Court.3. It has been contended that since the accident took place when the old Motor Vehicles Act was in force...
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