Privy Council Court February 1947 Judgments

Fiberglas Canada Ltd. and Others Vs. Spun Rock Wools Ltd. and Another

Court: Privy Council

LORD SIMONDS: This appeal, which is brought from a judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada reversing the judgment of the Exchequer Court of Canada, raises in the first place a question as to the validity of certain Letters Patent and, in the second place, questions as to the title of the appellants (the plaintiffs in the proceedings) to sue in respect of any infringement and as to the appropriate relief, if any, to be granted to them. [2] The Letters Patent in suit were granted on 4th July 1933, to a Dutch Company called N. V. Mij tot Beheer en Exploitatie van Octrooien, which will be referred to as "Maatschappy", for an invention made by Friedrich Rosengarth and Fritz Hager. Maatschappy was at all material times the legal owner of the patent, but, as it was a company domiciled in Holland, upon the occupation of that country by the German enemy in May 1940, its interest under the patent and under certain agreements to be later mentioned vested in the respondent the Custodian by virtue ...

Raleigh Investment Co. Ltd. Vs. the Governor-general in Council

Court: Privy Council

Lord Uthwatt: This is an appeal by the Raleigh Investment Co. Ltd., from a judgment of the Federal Court of India in its civil appellate jurisdiction reversing a decree passed by a Special Bench of the High Court of Calcutta in its ordinary original civil jurisdiction. [2] The suit in which that decree was passed was brought by the appellant against the respondent, the Governor-General in Council, claiming repayment of Rs. 4,35,295-5-0, part of a larger sum paid by the appellant under an assessment to income-tax made upon it. The basis of this claim was that in the computation of assessable income effect has been given to a provision of the Income-tax Acts which in the submission of the appellant was ultra vires the Indian Legislature, and that the assessment was therefore wrong. [3] The respondent contended first, that the impugned provision was not ultra vires the Indian Legislature and second that, whether the impugned provision was or was not ultra vires, the High Court in its ordi...

ZahiruddIn Vs. Emperor

Court: Privy Council

Lord Normand: This is an appeal from a judgment of the High Court in Bengal, which allowed an appeal against a Police Magistrate's order acquitting the appellant of a charge of accepting a bribe brought under S. 161, Penal Code. The High Court set aside the order of acquittal, convicted the appellant and sentenced him to one year's rigorous imprisonment. [2] The main ground of appeal is that there have been contraventions of S. 162, Criminal PC, that the High Court's judgment relies on the testimony of a witness, Mr. Roy, who had given a signed statement to the police in breach of the section and had, also in breach of the section, had it before him and made substantial use of it while he was giving evidence. It was also made a ground of appeal that the police officers engaged on the investigation had failed to keep a diary in contravention of S. 172 (1). [3] The appellant was employed from June till 24-8-1944, by the East Indian Railway as a grain depot officer at Howrah station. His ...

Emperor Vs. Sadashiv Narayan Bhalerao

Court: Privy Council

Lord Thankerton: This is an appeal by special leave from a judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, dated 25-1-1944, which affirmed an order of Mr. S. D. Adhav, Magistrate of the 1st Class, Jalgaon City, dated 22-6-1943, acquitting the respondent who had been charged under R. 38 (5), Defence of India Rules, for having, on 26-1-1943, made, published and distributed copies of a leaflet which contained prejudicial reports within the meaning of R. 34 (7) read with R. 34 (6) (e) and (g), Defence of India Rules, and having thus contravened R. 38 (1) (c). [2] The Defence of India Rules, which were made by the Central Government under S. 2, Defence of India Act, 1939-(Act 35 [XXXV] of 1939)-so far as material - provide as follows : "34.(6)'prejudicialact' means any act which is intended or is likely- **** (e)to bring into hatred or contempt, or to excite disaffection towards, His Majesty or the Crown Representative or the Government established by law in British India orinany other ...

Prafulla Kumar Mukherjee and Others Vs. Bank of Commerce Ltd., Khulna ...

Court: Privy Council

Lord Porter: This group of cases and those which immediately follow necessitate a consideration of the principle upon which the respective jurisdictions of the Federal and Provincial Legislatures in India are to be delimited and of the method to be adopted in determining the subjects which are to be dealt with by the one or the other under the provisions of Ss. 99 and 100, Government of India Act, 1935, and the three lists set out in Sch. 7 thereto. [2] The question immediately in dispute is as to the validity of the Bengal Money-lenders Act, 1940. By way of introduction it is enough to say that that Act limits the amount recoverable by a moneylender on his loans for principal and interest and prohibits the payment of sums larger than those permitted by the Act. [3] The respondents are an incorporated body to which by an order of 12-5-1941, passed by the High Court of Calcutta under S. 153A, Companies Act, the assets of the Khulna Loan Bank Ltd. (earlier known as the Khulna Loan Coy. L...

Bank of Commerce, Ltd. Khulna Vs. Amulya Krishna Basu Roy Chowdhury an ...

Court: Privy Council

Lord Porter: These consolidated appeals, like those which immediately preceded them, raise the question of the validity of the Bengal Money-lenders Act, 1940. The respondent in that appeal is the appellant in this, but the borrowers in the one case differ from the borrowers in the other. The facts and circumstances in either appeal are sufficiently similar to raise precisely the same questions of principle save in one particular. In the present appeal the borrowers had all been sued to judgment upon the promissory notes which they had signed whereas in the former they had not. [2] On the strength of this circumstance the Federal Court held that no question arose as to liability upon promissory notes. The actions had originally been instituted by several respondents against the appellant before the Subordinate Judge at Khulna under S.36 of the Impugned Act, claiming to reopen the decrees passed against them in Small Cause Court suits in order to scale down the debts and to direct repaym...

Megh Raj and Another Vs. Allah Rakhia and Others

Court: Privy Council

Lord Wright: This is an appeal from a judgment of the Federal Court of India, dismissing an appeal from the Full Bench of the High Court at Lahore, whose decision had been in favour of the respondents. The appellants have thus failed before both Courts in India. [2] The question is whether a certain Act of the Punjab Legislature, Punjab Act 4 [IV] of 1938, entitled the Punjab Restitution of Mortgaged Lands Act, is void as being ultra vires of the Punjab Legislature. The action was commenced by the appellants as mortgagees claiming a declaration that they were mortgagees in possession of certain lands therein specified and that the defendants were not entitled to redeem without payment of the mortgage debt due under the mortgage deeds, and also an injunction to restrain the defendants as mortgagors from prosecuting their petition for redemption of the lands in the Court of the Collector under the Punjab Act 4 [IV] of 1938 (hereinafter called the impugned Act) and for restitution of the ...

Alfred William Ludditt and Others Vs. Ginger Coote Airways Ltd.

Court: Privy Council

Reported in: AIR1947PC151

LORD WRIGHT: The three appellants were, on 29th November 1940, being carried as passengers for reward on an aeroplane operated by the respondent Company which was flying from the City of Vancouver to Zaballos on Vancouver Island. During the flight the aeroplane caught fire. Owing, as is not now contested, to the negligence of the respondents' servants, each of the appellants was injured. The appellants severally brought action in the Supreme Court of British Columbia claiming damages for the injury which they had sustained. They succeeded in their claim before the trial Judge and damages were assessed under the judgment in their favour dated 25th June 1941; but that judgment was set aside by a majority of the Judges of the Court of Appeal for the Province of British Columbia. On an appeal from that judgment to the Supreme Court of Canada, that Court in its turn by a majority affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeal. From that judgment the present appeal has been brought before this...