Mumbai Court March 1948 Judgments
Dattatraya Pandurang Datar Vs. Hari Keshav Gokhale
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Mar-31-1948
Reported in: AIR1949Bom100; (1948)50BOMLR622
Bhagwati, J.1. This is a suit filed by the plaintiff against the defendants to recover Rs. 7,300 as and by way of damages for malicious prosecution. The plaintiff was employed by the defendants on or about June 6,1945, at their jewellery shop as a part-time employee attending the shop only in the mornings. That was a temporary employment presumably on probation and the employment was confirmed on or about June 13, 1945, It appears that on or about June 16, 1945, some gold ornaments which had been entrusted by the customers to the defendants were missing and the plaintiff was amongst other employees questioned by the proprietor of the defendants, one Gharpure. Gharpure attended the shop and inquired of the plaintiff as well as the other employees what they knew about the theft of the ornaments and the plaintiff protested his innocence in the matter of the charge. On the night of June 16, 1945, one Anant Sakharam Joshi, a clerk of the defendants, gave the first information to the police ...
Tag this Judgment!Wasudeo Anant Sohoni Vs. Emperor.
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Mar-31-1948
Reported in: 1949CriLJ165
ORDERHidayatullah, J.1. This is an application under Section 491, Criminal P. C, by one Wasudeo Anant Sohoni (referred to hereafter as the petitioner) on behalf of his brother Shridhar who Was detained originally by the District Magistrate, Akola, by an order dated 2nd February 1948 and who is now detained under Section 2 (1) (a), C, P. and Berar Public Safety Act 1947, under the orders of the Provincial Govern, ment passed on 2nd March 1948. The applicant Wasudeo filed a supplementary application on 10th March 1948 and the Crown has filed a return against both applications and has produced the original order of detention passed by the Provincial Government. The applications as well as the return are supported by affidavits, that of the Provincial Government being sworn by the Chief Secretary, The detention is challenged on various grounds. Before dealing with the grounds we set out below certain facts which are admitted on both sides.2. Mr. Sohoni is an advocate of long stand, ing. He...
Tag this Judgment!Maria M.E.L. Noronha Vs. Peter E.V. Noronha
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Mar-30-1948
Reported in: (1948)50BOMLR477
M.C. Chagla, C.J.1. His Lordship after discussing the evidence in the case held that the lower Court was right in coming to the conclusion that the charges contained in the petition were not proved. On the question of costs his Lordship said : But the real point which Mr, Gauba has urged, and I suspect which is the real reason why this appeal has been filed at all, is found in the submission that the learned Judge was wrong in depriving the wife of her costs although she failed in her petition. Now Mr. Gauba says that the principle of law is that if a wife files a petition for dissolution of her marriage, if she has no property of her own and if no misconduct is proved against her solicitors in launching that litigation, then she is entitled to her costs. Mr. Gauba says that as in this case the learned Judge has not found that there was any misconduct on the part of the solicitors and it is common ground that the petitioner has no property of her own, she must be given her costs althou...
Tag this Judgment!Raonakali Roshanali Vs. Emperor
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Mar-29-1948
Reported in: 1949CriLJ84
Hidayatullah, J.1. These are eight applications under Section 491, Criminal, P. C. by per] eons who are detained by the Provincial Govern, ment and are in the nature of petitions for the issue of writs of habeas corpus. The main point which has been argued before us by Dr. Kedar is whether Section 2, Ordinance no. II of 1918 (The Central Provinces and Berar Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Ordinance 1948), is ultra vires the Governor of the Central Provinces and Berar. The Crown was not called upon to reply.2. The learned Counsel for the applicants urges that the matter covered by the impugned section of the Ordinance relates to items Nos. 29 and 42 of the Federal Legislative List in the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1985, and that the Provincial Legislature and the Governor are equally incompetent to legislate in this field, He invokes the non obstinate clause in Section 100 (l), Constitution Act.3. The impugned section provides as follows: 'Notwithstanding anything c...
Tag this Judgment!Bansilal Gulabchand Vs. the Commissioner of Income-tax
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Mar-24-1948
Reported in: (1948)50BOMLR375
M.C. Chagla, C.J.1. This is an application to excuse the delay of forty-five days in filing an application before the Appellate Tribunal by the assessee under Section 66(1) of the Act. It is not disputed that the application of the assessee was out of time and, when it was presented to the Tribunal, the Tribunal made an order dismissing the application on the ground that it was barred by limitation. The assessee now comes to us under Section 66(3) and he wants us to require the Appellate Tribunal to treat this application as made within time allowed under Section 66(1). Under Sub-section (3) it is only if we are not satisfied of the correctness of the Tribunal's decision that we have the power to require the Tribunal to treat the application as made within time allowed under Sub-section (1). Now can we say in this case that the decision of the Tribunal is not correct? The position under the Act is really very curious. Section 33(2)(a) gives power to the Tribunal to admit an appeal agai...
Tag this Judgment!Bansilal Gulabchand Vs. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay (Mofussil).
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Mar-24-1948
Reported in: [1948]16ITR251(Bom)
CHAGLA, C.J. - This is an application to excuse the delay of 45 days in filing an application before the Appellate Tribunal by the assessee under Section 66(1) of the Act. It is not disputed that the application of the assessee was out of time and, when it was presented to the Tribunal, the Tribunal made an order dismissing the application on the ground that it was barred by limitation. The assessee now comes to us under Section 66(3) and he wants us to require the Appellate Tribunal to treat this application as made within time allowed under Section 66(3) and he wants us to require the Appellate Tribunal to treat this application as made within time allowed under Section 66(1). Under sub-section (3) it is only if we are not satisfied of the correctness of the Tribunals decision that we have the power to require the Tribunal to treat the application as made within time allowed under sub-section (1). Now, can we say in this case that the decision of the Tribunal is not correct The posit...
Tag this Judgment!The Municipal Corporation Vs. Commissioner of Income-tax
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Mar-23-1948
Reported in: (1948)50BOMLR326
M.C. Chagla, C.J.1. The assessee in this case is the Municipal Corporation of the City of Bombay, and in the year of account 1988-39 the Corporation supplied water outside the City of Bombay to Government and other persons. The total receipts from this supply amounted to Rs. 4,12,366, and the question is whether the income derived by the Corporation by the supply of water is subject to tax. This water was supplied from the Municipal water works situated outside the City of Bombay on property belonging to the Corporation and the supply was metered at the water works. The Municipal Corporation's contention is that the surplus of receipt over expenditure with regard to this supply is exempt from income-tax under Section 4(3)(iii) of the Indian Income-tax Act.2. Now, Sub-section (3) of Section 4 contains various kinds of incomes which are not to be included in the total income of the person receiving it, and one of those kinds of income is the one mentioned in Sub-clause (iii) of that sub-...
Tag this Judgment!Shree Laxmi Silk Mills Vs. the Commissioner of Excess Profits Tax Act
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Mar-23-1948
Reported in: (1948)50BOMLR328
M.C. Chagla, C.J.1. The assessee is running a silk mill known as Sri Lakshmi Silk Mills. Artificial silk cloth is manufactured in these mills. There is also a dyeing plant attached to the mills for dyeing silk yarn. The assessee's business was to manufacture silk cloth and also dye silk yarn. In the chargeable accounting period January 1, 1942, to December 31, 1943, the assessee, owing to the difficulty in obtaining silk yarn on account of the War, stopped his dyeing activities, as a result of which the dyeing plant remained idle for some time. Therefore, on August 20, 1943, he let this plant to Messrs. E. Parekh & Co. on a rental of Rs. 4,00 per month. The assessee received from E. Parekh & Co. Rs. 20,005 by way of rent for the period the plant was hired to the company during the accounting period. The Tribunal held that this sum of Rs, 20,005 was the assessee's income in the chargeable accounting period from business as defined in Section 2(5) of the Excess Profits Tax Act. The asses...
Tag this Judgment!Tejaji Farasram Kharawalla Vs. Commissioner of Income-tax
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Mar-23-1948
Reported in: (1948)50BOMLR362
M.C. Chagla, C.J.1. The assessee in this case is a representative of the Ciba (India), Ltd., and by an agreement entered into between the assessee and Ciba on October 29, 1928, it was agreed that Ciba (India), Ltd., should pay to the assessee 12 per cent commission on various articles of Ciba which the assessee was to sell. On August 20, 1935, Ciba (India), Ltd., wrote a letter to the assessee making it clear that out of this commission of 12 per cent 7 per cent was to be the representative's own commission and 5 per cent was to be taken by him as compensation in lieu of the contingency expenses he has to meet with, such as commission to dyeing masters, agents, etc. For the account year relevant to the assessment year 1940-41 the assessee received a sum of Rs. 78,573 which represents this 5 per cent commission. The Income-tax Officer allowed as an admissible item of expenditure only a sum of Rs. 27,342. This sum was allowed because according to the Income-tax Officer the assessee prove...
Tag this Judgment!Kaikhushru Jehangir Vs. Bai Bachubai Jehangir and ors.
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Mar-23-1948
Reported in: AIR1951Bom339; (1950)52BOMLR694
Bhagwati, J. 1. This is an originating summons taken out for the purpose of determining the effect of the revocation of a codicil by the testatrix on 27-3-1947. The testatrix made & published her first will on 22-3-1934. Thereafter on 1-5-1939, she made & published her second will (hereinafter referred to as 'the second will') wherein she stated at the outset that she thereby revoked all wills, codicils & other testamentary dispositions theretofore made by her & declared that to be her last will & testament. On 4-1-1944, she made & published a first codicil to the second will & she made & published her seaond codicil to the second will on 28-2-1946, (hereinafter referred to as 'the second codicil'). On 6-5-1946, she made & published her third will &on; the very same day she cancelled by an endorsement written at the foot of the various documents, the first will, the first codicil to the second will & the second codicil. In the third will which she made & published on 6-5-1946, she agai...
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