Mumbai Court September 1941 Judgments
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In Re: Rustamji and Ginwala
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Sep-29-1941
Reported in: (1942)44BOMLR178
Chagla, J.1. The defendants filed a suit, being Suit No. 1751 of 1937, in this Court against the plaintiff for recovering a sum of Rs. 18,149-8-9 and interest being the amount alleged to be due by the plaintiff at the foot of a current account. The plaintiff's defence to that suit was that he had been, doing business in partnership with the defendants, that the accounts of the said partnership had not been made up, that on proper making up of those accounts a substantial amount would be found payable to him by the defendants and that this particular amount claimed by the defendants was an item in the partnership accounts. The plaintiff thereafter filed this suit for making up of partnership accounts in respect of the dealings between them to which he had referred in Suit No. 1751 of 1937. Both these suits were referred to arbitration by consent decretal orders of reference dated November 8, 1938, respectively. The arbitrators named in the said consent decretal orders of reference made ...
Union Bank of Bijapur and Sholapur Ltd., in Re. Vs.
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Sep-29-1941
Reported in: [1942]10ITR21(Bom)
BEAUMONT, C. J. - The only point raised in this case arises in this way. An employee of the assessee Bank embezzled certain money and in respect of that embezzlement the whole income of the year 1935-36 was written off. That is to say, the embezzlement was treated as a loss, which could be set off against income.The embezzlement was, no doubt, substantially more than the income of that year. In a subsequent year a sum is found to have been recovered in respect of that embezzlements, and it seems to me that the assessee, having alleged that the embezzlement was an embezzlement of income, which could properly be set off against income in previous year cannot affirm i another year that it was not income, and that a recovery in respect of its is a casual appreciation of capital, as he seeks to do. The assessee to pay cost.I think, therefore, we must answer the question by saying that the net sum of Rs. 4,737 recovered from the heirs of Parvatikar is a revenue gain, and is assessable to tax...
In Re: Govindram Gordhandas
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Sep-26-1941
Reported in: (1941)43BOMLR1009
John Beaumont, C.J.1. This is an application asking us to direct the Commissioner of Income-tax, (Central), to state a case. The learned Commissioner has refused to state a case, not because he denies that a point of law arises, but because he considers that he has no jurisdiction to deal with the matter. That is the question which we must decide on this application.2. The assessee was assessed on March 31, 1939, by the Income-tax Officer, Special Circle, and on the next day the amendments to the Indian Income-tax Act came into operation. On April 15 a demand for payment was made on the assessee. He applied under Section 27 of the Act to get the assessment set aside, but his application was rejected. On April 18 the Central Board of Revenue, acting under Section 5(2) of the Act, as amended, transferred the case of the assessee by name to the Commissioner of Income-tax (Central). Now, this Court held in Dayldas Kushiram v. Commissioner of Income-Tax, Central1, that cases transferred und...
Seth Govindram Gordhandas Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, (Central).
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Sep-26-1941
Reported in: [1941]9ITR679(Bom)
BEAUMONT, C.J. - This is an application asking us to direct the Commissioner of Income-tax, (Central), to state a case. The learned Commissioner has refused to state a case, not because he denies that a point of law arises, but because he considers that he has no jurisdiction to deal with the matter. That is the question which we must decide on this application.The assessee was assessed on March 31, 1939 by the Income-tax Officer, Special Circle, and on the next day the amendments to the Income-tax Act came into operation. On April 15, a demand for payment was made on the assessee. He applied under Sec. 27 of the Act to get the assessment set aside, but his application was rejected. On April 7, the Central Board of Revenue, acting under Sec. 5(2) of the Act, as amended, transferred the case of the assessee by name to the Commissioner of Income-tax, (Central). Now, this Court held in Dayaldas Kushiram v. The Commissioner of Income-tax, (Central) (1) : [1940]8ITR139(Bom) , that cases tra...
Sundarabai Balappanaik Chitguppi Vs. Gurushiddappa Gurubasappa Bhusnur
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Sep-24-1941
Reported in: (1942)44BOMLR164
Divatia, J.1. This appeal arises in execution of a mortgage-decree. It is preferred by one of the judgment-debtors against the respondent who is the transferee of the decree from the original decree-holder. The objections raised by the judgment-debtor against the executability of the darkhast were, firstly, that there was no valid and legal assignment of the decree in favour of the respondent; and, secondly, even though the respondent had joined with the decree-holder in applying for execution in one darkhast of 1926 and applied for execution by himself in subsequent darkhasts, the judgment-debtor was not barred from contending in the present darkhast that the assignment had not been proved, and that even if proved, it was not a valid assignment.2. The facts leading to these contentions are shortly these:-The mortgage-decree was passed in March, 1910, for Rs. 200 against two women. The decree-holder presented several darkhasts thereafter and recovered some amount. Thereafter, he is sta...
Nadirshaw H. Contractor Vs. Gajraj Sheokarandas
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Sep-22-1941
Reported in: (1941)43BOMLR1006
John Beaumont, C.J.1. This is an appeal from a decision of Mr. Justice Somjee given in chambers making absolute a notice under Order XXI, Rule 22, of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, which empowers the Court to authorise execution of a decree more than two years after the date of the decree. In this case there was) no decree; there was only an award made on July 27, 1929, and filed in this Court on August 16, 1929, under the Indian Arbitration Act, 1899. The present application was made on January 6, 1941, and a notice was issued under Order XXI, Rule 22, of the Civil Procedure Code.2. The question at issue is, whether the award which has been filed in this Court can be enforced within twelve years of the date of the award or whether the period of limitation is three years; i.e. whether the case falls under art. 183, or art. 181, of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. Article 183 limits the time for enforcement of a judgment, decree or order of any Court established by Royal Charter in the...
Ganpatrao Shripatrao Kalmadi Vs. Balkrishna Gururao Kalmadi
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Sep-19-1941
Reported in: (1942)44BOMLR333
Broomfield, J.1. The facts are given in the judgment of the trial Court. The only question argued in this appeal relates to the position in respect of inheritance of the sons of a man adopted in the dwyamushyayana form born after his adoption. A dwyamushyayana son means now a son adopted under an express agreement that he is to be the son of two fathers, i.e. he is to continue to be the son of his natural father while becoming also the son of his-adoptive father. There were formerly other ways in which a man might become the son of two fathers, but these are now obsolete : Basappa v. GUR-lingawa (1932) 35 Bom. L.R. 75. A man adopted in this form belongs to both families. He inherits in both families and both families inherit to him. This is not disputed.2. On general principles it might seem that the sons of such a man would also belong to both families, for it is in accordance with Hindu sentiment- not by any means peculiar in this respect-that one of the advantages expected from havi...
Krishnaji Kondo Sahasrabudhe Vs. Narayan Anant Phansalkar
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Sep-18-1941
Reported in: (1942)44BOMLR158
Wassoodew, J.1. This is a second appeal from a decree of the Assistant Judge of Satara. The only question involved in this appeal is whether the charge created by a registered compromise decree dated January 15, 1935, between defendant No. 1 Narayan and defendant No. 2 Dattatraya on certain house property is subject to the prior charge on the same property created by an unregistered decree on an award dated June 28, 1932, between the plaintiff and the said Dattatraya.2. The dispute has arisen in this way. The second respondent Dattatraya owed a certain sum of money to the plaintiff Krishnaji and his cousin, and upon a dispute arising as to the extent of the liability of the said Dattatraya it was referred to arbitration and an award decree was passed thereupon on June 28, 1932. By that award decree a charge was created on a house bearing No. 208A situated at Karad. This is the clause in that decree relating to the charge:-A charge in respect of the whole amount claimed in the suit is c...
Kantilal Bapubhai Vs. Rajnikant Babubhai
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Sep-17-1941
Reported in: (1942)44BOMLR132
Broomfield, J.1. This is a second appeal which purports to be bfought under Section 75 of the Provincial Insolvency Act.2. One Babubhai Sakerlal, who was the father of the present opponents, was adjudicated insolvent, but in appeal the District Judge set aside the order of adjudication. Pending the appeal to this Court, which was brought by the petitioning creditors against the order of the District Judge, Babubhai died, leaving two sons who have been brought on record as his heirs. The learned advocate who appears for these heirs has taken a preliminary objection that the appeal is not competent. He argues firstly that the appeal has abated, and secondly, that no second appeal lies under the provisions of the Provincial Insolvency Act.3. Order XXII, Rule 4, Civil Procedure Code, 1908, provides, so far as is material, that when a defendant dies and the right to sue survives, the Court, on an application made in that behalf, shall cause the legal representative of the deceased defendant...
Keshav Krishna Dhopade Vs. Bhagwan Sambhu Chaudharl
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Sep-17-1941
Reported in: (1942)44BOMLR138
Divatia, J.1. This is an appeal by the plaintiff against a decree allowing his claim to the extent of Rs. 103 in a suit filed by him to recover Rs. 523 on three promissory notes. The promissory notes were passed in the plaintiff's favour by the defendant, who is an agriculturist, on April 15, 1930, March 7, 1931, and March 4, 1933. The suit was filed on February 27, 1939. The ordinary period of limitation applicable to the promissory notes is three years, but Section 72 of the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act provides a period of six years for a suit of the description mentioned in Section 3, Clause (w), of that Act. A suit on a promissory note is included in that clause. So that the period of limitation in the present case would not be three but six years. Even so, the suit would be time-barred with respect to the first two notes which were passed more than six years before the date of the suit. The plaintiff, however, relied on certain endorsements about payment of interest on the ...
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