Mumbai Court September 1936 Judgments
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Emperor Vs. Sahebrao Baburao
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Sep-03-1936
Reported in: AIR1937Bom46; (1936)38BOMLR1192; 166Ind.Cas.731
Sen, J.1. The present criminal proceedings have originated from a civil litigation between the applicant and one of his brothers on the one hand and his elder brother on the other in the Court of the First Class Subordinate Judge, Ahmednagar. The applicant and his brother obtained a decree in their favour on March 27, 1934, against their elder brother, who is the complainant, in the present proceedings. Following the decree there was an application in execution on April 12, 1934, and on April 24, 1934, the Court issued a warrant for the attachment of the moveables in the possession of the opponent-complainant. The bailiff attached a considerable amount of move-able property consisting of grain and live-stock from the possession of the complainant and this property was handed over to the applicant on April 29, 1934, on the applicant's passing what is called a jimmapatra, by which he admitted that the said property had been given in his possession by the bailiff, and undertook that if th...
Dagdu Govindshet Wani Vs. Punja Vedu Wani
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Sep-03-1936
Reported in: AIR1937Bom55; (1936)38BOMLR1189; 166Ind.Cas.598
Broomfield, J.1. The question in this case is as to the legality of an order under Section 250 of the Criminal Procedure Code for payment of compensation to the accused by the complainant on the ground that the complaint was false and vexatious. The illegality is alleged to consist in the fact that the Magistrate who made the order heard the case de novo and discharged the accused, although another Magistrate who first dealt with the case had framed a charge. This is said to be contrary to the terms of Section 350 of the Code.2. The argument of the learned advocate for the applicant is that in a warrant case-and this was a warrant case-the proceedings are only an inquiry until the charge is framed and the trial only commences after the charge. Therefore, he says, if a charge has been framed and the trying Magistrate is succeeded by another Magistrate, the latter cannot re-commence 'the proceedings from the beginning; he can only re-commence the trial, i.e., re-commence the proceedings ...
Manaklal Hirabhai Vs. the Land Acquisition Officer
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Sep-03-1936
Reported in: AIR1937Bom177; (1937)39BOMLR142
Tyabji, J.1. On December 6, 1928, a notification under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, Section 6, was issued with reference to the acquisition of three plots of land by the Municipality of Nandurbar for widening a street at Nandurbar. The present appeals refer to two out of the three plots : City Survey Nos. 2171 and 2169 having areas of 36 17|24 square feet and 22 21|24 square feet respectively. The Land Acquisition Officer valued these sites at Rs. 1 per square foot and Land awarded for them Rs. 45-10-0 and Rs. 28-2-0 respectively. On appeal the learned District Judge held that the claimants were entitled to Rs. 2-8-0 per square foot. He awarded Rs. 4 for the plinth in City Survey No. 2171, i.e., Rs. 131-11-6 in all. In respect of this plot an additional claim of Rs. 868-4-6 is made in appeal here. With reference to the other plot, viz., 2169, the net amount allowed was Rs. 96-1-6 and the claim in appeal is an additional Rs. 503-14-6.2. The case of the two appellants stands on the sa...
Emperor Vs. Chhotalal Amarchand
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Sep-01-1936
Reported in: AIR1937Bom1; (1936)38BOMLR1164; 166Ind.Cas.7
Beaumont C. J. 1. In this case a question is referred to this Court in the following terms :-What is the starting point of limitation under Section 15 of the Indian Merchandise Marks Act in a case where it is proved that the offence of infringement of a trade mark, etc., has been a continuing one? Does time run (a) from the particular instance of infringement specified in the charge, or (by from the date of the first infringement or first discovery of infringement, whichever expiration first happens? The question assumes that you can have a continuing offence in the sense in which you can have a continuing tort, or a continuing breach of contract, and I doubt myself whether the assumption is well founded, having regard to the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code as to the framing of charges and as to the charges which can be tried at one and the same trial. It is quite clear that you could not charge a man with committing an offence de die in diem over a substantial period.2. The ...
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