Mumbai Court June 1936 Judgments
Emperor Vs. Motiram Raising
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Jun-30-1936
Reported in: AIR1936Bom372; (1936)38BOMLR818
Broomfield, J.1. [After setting out the facts of the case, his Lordship proceeded:] The learned advocate who appears for the accused in this Court has devoted a large part of his argument to the question of the admissibility of the dying declaration alleged to have been made by Sita to the Magistrate. The Magistrate was examined as a witness and has deposed to the questions which were put by him and to the manner in which Sitabai answered the questions by signs and gestures. The record of the examination is exhibit 14 and is as follows :-Q. Who caused you the injury to your neck ?A. She points out her finger to the accused Motiram alias Tana walad Raising Rajput of Aundane in front of her.Q. How is the injury caused ?A. She points out at the vili and the accused in front of her and makes signs with her finger on her neck as if cutting with vili.Q. In what position you were when the injury was caused Were you standing or sitting ?A. She pointed out at the accused by taking her right leg...
Tag this Judgment!Raja Jagadish Chandra Deo Dhabal Deb Vs. Gaur Hari Mahato
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Jun-30-1936
Reported in: (1936)38BOMLR1128
Thankerton, J.1. These appeals are taken against two decrees of the High Court dated August 8, 1933. Two questions are involved, the first being the question of res judicata. The High Court declined to allow the appellant to go into the question of res judicata on the ground that it had not been properly raised by the pleadings or in the issues, particularly in the issues. It seems to their Lordships that the High Court were right in this view, because it was necessary for the appellant, if he were going to make use of the judgment in the suit of 1900 as res judicata, to identify the subjects in dispute in the present case with the subjects which in that case were held to belong to the Rajah and not to the tenants.2. The other point is a mere matter of procedure, the question with regard to the use of exhibit 17 as secondary evidence. That does not appear to their Lordships to be a question of fact, but rather a question of procedure and the orders made by the High Court were to remit ...
Tag this Judgment!Emperor Vs. Dema Mahadu Amberkar
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Jun-17-1936
Reported in: (1936)38BOMLR790; 165Ind.Cas.637
Broomfield, J.1. This case involves some interesting and rather difficult questions as to the powers of the District Local Board of Ratnagiri to levy octroi in respect of goods lying on ship board in port before they have been landed. The applicant was the Tandel or master of a country ship, which on October 20, 1934, arrived at the port of Jaitapur, at the mouth of a creek in the Ratnagiri District, carrying goods consigned to various persons in Jaitapur and in Rajapur, a port some eighteen miles further up the creek. The goods which were consigned to Jaitapur traders were landed, and octroi was duly paid in accordance with the rules made by the District Local Board. It appears that there is no separate octroi Naka for the port of Rajapur, and the Nakedar of the Jaitapur Naka went on board the applicant's ship together with a peon and panchas, and demanded from the Tandel the amount of octroi duty, about Rs. 60 on the goods which he was proposing to take to Rajapur. The Tandel decline...
Tag this Judgment!Gundayya Hanmant Naik Vs. Shriniwas Narayan Naik
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Jun-17-1936
Reported in: AIR1937Bom51; (1936)38BOMLR1095; 166Ind.Cas.883
Rangnekar, Ag. C.J.1. [His Lordship, after dealing with the construction of the deed, exhibit 70, called swalantra mukhtyarnama, proceeded as follows :-]This brings me to the second contention of the appellant. It is argued that exhibit 70 was merely a deed of gift, and as the family was joint, the gift is bad. A short answer to that contention is that it was not a mere gift. The deed read as a whole shows that there was a proposal made by the plaintiff which was accepted by Durgaya, in other words, the deed was the result of an agreement between the parties, and there was consideration for it. By the arrangement or agreement one party agreed to undertake certain liabilities and in consideration of it the other party transferred his interest in the joint property to him. No authority is cited to show that such an agreement is not allowed by Hindu law. It is well-settled in this Presidency that a coparcener can sell, mortgage or otherwise alienate his interest in the coparcenary propert...
Tag this Judgment!Nazir Ahmad Vs. Emperor (No. 2)
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Jun-16-1936
Reported in: (1936)38BOMLR987; AIR1936PC253(2)
Roche, J.1. This is an appeal in forma pauperis by special leave from a judgment of the High Court of Lahore dated October 10, 1935, which affirmed a judgment of the Additional Sessions Judge of Lyallpur dated April 16, 1935, convicting the appellant of dacoity with murder under Section 396 of the Indian Penal Code and sentencing him to death.2. The appellant was convicted mainly, if not entirely, on the strength of a confession said to have been made by him to a Magistrate of which evidence was given by the Magistrate but which was not recorded under Section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code. It was not contended before their Lordships that the conviction could be supported if the evidence of the confession was inadmissible. Nor was it disputed that if the evidence was inadmissible, then, in the circumstances of this case, by well recognised principles laid down by this Board, it would be proper humbly to advise His Majesty to interfere (see Vaithinatha Pillai v. The King-Emperor fol...
Tag this Judgment!Mahadeo Vs. the King
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Jun-11-1936
Reported in: (1936)38BOMLR1101
Sidney Rowlatt, J.1. This is an appeal in forma pauperis by special leave from the judgment of the Supreme Court of Fiji sitting at the Lautoka Circuit Court, dated May 17, 1934, by which the appellant was found guilty of the murder of a boy named Ramautar, and being a young person within the meaning of the Fiji Ordinance No. 37 of 1932 was, pursuant to Section 12, sentenced to be detained as the Governor might direct. The appellant is in fact about sixteen years old. Ramautar, the boy alleged to have been murdered, was about thirteen years old.2. Pursuant to Ordinance No. 6 of 1875 the trial was held before the Chief Justice of Fiji, who is the only Judge in the Island, sitting with assessors, and by Section 29 of the same Ordinance the decision was vested solely in the Judge. By virtue of Section 32 of Ordinance No. 4 of 1875 the trial, for all purposes material to the present appeal, fell to be governed by the English common law.3. The materials before their Lordships on the hearing...
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