Mumbai Court September 1932 Judgments
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Gururao Narsingrao Desai Vs. Ramchandra Shrinivasrao Desai
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Sep-21-1932
Reported in: AIR1933Bom244; (1933)35BOMLR413; 145Ind.Cas.286
Murphy, J.1. This application arises out of F.A. No. 508 of 1927, decided by this Court. The petitioners, who were parties to the appeal, applied for leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council, and a certificate was granted them, the rule being made absolute on August 13, 1931. It is now stated in the civil application before us that the petitioners have paid into Court the necessary amount as security for the costs of opponent, and also the sum required for translating and printing the record and that the appeal has been declared admitted ; but that meanwhile the parties have entered into a compromise in the terms stated in the body of the application, and now pray that this Court should supersede its first decree and pass one in the terms of the compromise.2. There is no doubt that a compromise has been arrived at. But our difficulty is that we do not see how this Court, having once made a decree in the matter, can even by consent make a second one superseding the first. The learned c...
Onkar Bhagwan Vs. Gamna Lakhaji and Co.
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Sep-20-1932
Reported in: AIR1933Bom205; (1933)35BOMLR127
Murphy, J.1. This is an appeal against an order made under Order XXIII, Rule 3, of the Civil Procedure Code. In the course of a suit in the Court of the First Class Subordinate Judge, Poona, an application was put in purporting to be signed by all the parties to the suit, the applicants being represented by their pleader and a mukhtyar. The application was to the effect that the dispute between the parties had been compromised, and requested the Court to pass a decree in terms of the compromise. The Court's order was 'Granted. Decree accordingly.' Strictly speaking, the learned Judge should have made an order recording the compromise and then passed a decree in its terms. But the actual words used are, more or less, a formality, and I think that the word 'Granted' means the same thing. A decree was accordingly passed.2. Thereupon, the applicants came to this Court challenging the decree On the ground that it had not been a compromise with the consent and authority of the defendants, i....
Teju Kaya and Co. Vs. Gangji Nensey and Co.
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Sep-19-1932
Reported in: AIR1933Bom71; (1932)34BOMLR1629
John Beaumont, Kt., J.1. This is an appeal from a decision of Mr. Justice Mirza, The suit is a suit by the purchasers ofimmoveable property claiming to recover the purchase money which they paid under the contract, on the ground that the vendors did not complete the contract within due time. The contract is dated November 1, 1924 (Exhibit B), The vendors are a firm called Gangji Nensey & Co., which was apparently a partnership in which there were two partners one of them the defendant Premji Bhojpal and the other Paaau Nensey. Under the contract, which is Exhibit B, the vendors agreed to sell to the purchasers certain leasehold property being a godown of the Port Trust, the purchase money being Rs. 30,000, and the contract shows that the whole of the purchase money was paid on the date of the contract and the purchasers were to be given possession. Then the contract says:-As regards the pucca documents we are to gab the same registered etc, in your favour within six months from this da...
In Re: B.G. Horniman
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Sep-19-1932
Reported in: AIR1933Bom59; (1932)34BOMLR1666
Patkar, J.1.This is an application by the petitioner for revision of the order passed by the Presidency Magistrate, Third Court, under Sections 113(2), (3) and (4) of the Indian Railways Act, IX of 1890, directing him to pay Rs. 48-11-0 to the G. I. P. Railway, and further directing that the amount, if not paid, should be recovered as a fine.2. A preliminary objection is raised on behalf of the railway company that the application for revision does not lie and reliance is placed on the decisions in the cases of In re Dalsukhram : (1907)9BOMLR1347 and Secretary of State for India v. Gobindram Jaichandrai (1930) 31 Cri. L.J. 962.3. The proceeding under Section 113 of the Indian Railways Act is not a prosecution for an offence, Section 68 of the Indian Railways Act prohibits travelling without a pass or a ticket, and Section 69 provides that every passenger shall, on the requisition of a railway servant appointed by the railway administration in this behalf, present his pass or ticket to ...
Hamidmiya SarfuddIn Vs. Nagindas Jivanji
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Sep-16-1932
Reported in: AIR1933Bom217; (1933)35BOMLR252
Patkar, J.1. These appeals arise out of suits Nos. 588 of 1924 and 587 of 1924. Suit No. 588 of 1924 relates to two mortgages, (1) Exhibit 160, dated October 31, 1912, in favour of defendants Nos. 1, 2 and 3 for Rs. 15,000 passed by defendant No. 4, the Mutawalli of the properties attached to the Juma Masjid and the dargas of Nasiruddin and Abdul Hamid situated at Navsari, and (2) Exhibit 159, dated March 17, 1910, in favour of defendant No. 1 and father of defendants Nos. 2 and 3 passed by defendant No. 4 for Rs. 1,500. The companion suit No. 587 of 1924 relates to a sale-deed dated July 31, 1918, for Rs. 6,845, Exhibit 124, passed by defendant No. 4 and his mother.2. The plaintiff is now appointed a Mutawalli of the wakf property and plaintiffs Nos. 2 and 3 are the trustees of the mosque in the Baroda territory to which the wakf relates. Defendants Nos. 1 to 3 are the mortgagees under the mortgage-deeds, Exhibits 159 and 160 in suit No. 588, and defendant No. 8 is another mortgagee o...
Lakshman Ramchandra Phatak Vs. Shridhar Waman Joshi
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Sep-15-1932
Reported in: AIR1933Bom118; (1933)35BOMLR135
Murphy, J.1. These are two applications in the same matter, one being for an injunction to prevent the decree-holder putting his decree into execution, and the other for stay of the same decree. They arise in the following circumstances. The applicants, who were the defendants in the original suit, succeeded in the first Court, but failed to prove that they were permanent tenants in the Court of appeal, and possession in favour of the Jahagirdar was decreed against them. They have appealed to this Court, and also made an application for stay of execution, and in view of the ruling of Baker J. in Gangappa v. Mahadevgauda (1931) Civil Appln. No. 343 of 1931, decided by Baker J. on August 21, 1931 (Unrep.) and on the Registrar's initiative, they brought the matter to Court. In that case Baker J. has held that no application for stay of execution can be entertained where execution has not so far been applied for. The authority he relies on is that of Janardan v. Nilkanth I.L.R. (1901) Bom....
Currimbhai AbdulhusaIn Vs. Ahmed Ali Lukmanji
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Sep-13-1932
Reported in: (1933)35BOMLR12
John Beaumont, C.J.1. [After setting out the facts his Lordship proceeded:] The next point which the learned Judge dealt with was the question whether an acknowledgment of the plaintiff's claim made by the Official Assignee in the insolvency of the defendant could take the case out of the Indian Limitation Act. That depends on Section 19 of the Act which provides that where before the expiration of the period proscribed for a suit in respect of any property or right, an acknowledgment of liability in respect of such property or right has been made in writing signed by the party against whom such property or right is claimed, a fresh period of limitation shall bo computed from the time when the acknowledgment was so signed. Now, it is clear that the Official Assignee is not a party against whom any right or property is claimed; the claim is against the defendant, and the only claim which could have been made against the Official Assignee was for a right to prove the debt of the plaintif...
Currimbhai AbdulhusaIn Vs. Ahmedali Lukmanji
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Sep-13-1932
Reported in: AIR1933Bom91
Beaumont, C.J.1. (His Lordship proceeded after stating the facts.) The next point which the learned Judge dealt with was the question whether an acknowledgment of the plaintiff's claim made by the Official Assignee in the insolvency of the defendant could take the case out of the Limitation Act. That depends on Section 19 of the Act which provides that where before the expiration of the period prescribed for a suit in respect of any property or right, an acknowledgment of liability in respect of such property or right has been made in writing signed by the party against whom such property or right is claimed, a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the acknowledgment was so signed. Now, it is clear that the Official Assignee is not a party against whom any right or property is claimed; the claim is against the defendant, and the only claim which could have been made against the Official Assignee was for a right to prove the debt of the plaintiff and to receive...
Jagmohan Surajmal Marwadi Vs. Venkatesh Gopal Ranade
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Sep-05-1932
Reported in: AIR1933Bom105; (1933)35BOMLR89
Murphy, J.1. This is an application made under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code, against the decision of the District Judge of Bijapur, in the matter of an election petition, challenging the validity of the election of a candidate for Ward II of the City Municipality of Bijapur. The proceedings were held and a decision made under Section 15 of the Bombay City Municipalities Act of 1925.2. A preliminary objection is taken that no recourse can be had to this Court, since under Section 15 the District Judge was acting not as a Court but as a persona designata and that we have therefore no jurisdiction, If this is so, then, I think, on the authority of the cases of Balaji Sakharam v. Merwanji Nowroji I.L.R. (1895) Bom. 279 and Gangadhar v. Hubli Municipality (1925) 28 Bom. L.R. 519 the application for revision does not lie.3. Mr. Pradhan's contention is that the law was changed in consequence of the decisions I have quoted above, and he relies on the case of Sholapur Municipality v....
Narayanrao Vithal Sayanna Vs. Solomon Moses
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Sep-02-1932
Reported in: AIR1933Bom108; (1933)35BOMLR9
John Beaumont, C.J.1. This is an appeal from an order of Mr. Justice Rangnekar in which ho dismissed a motion by the appellant to punish the respondents for contempt of Court, The learned Advocate General on behalf of the respondents has taken the preliminary point that no appeal lies, and it is only necessary to state the facts so far as it is necessary to appreciate the preliminary point. The respondents are persons interested in a certain Jewish Educational Society known as the Bombay Israelite School Managing Committee, and it appears that in 1928 the Committee of that school was intending to rebuild the school premises, and they invited tenders, and ultimately accepted the tender for the new buildings of the present applicant. Disputes subsequently arose between the Committee and applicant as regards the work which Was entrusted to the applicant under the contract, and in the result a suit was started in July 1929 between certain officers of the School Committee as plaintiffs and ...
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