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Mumbai Court June 1928 Judgments

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Jun 14 1928

H. Pestongi and Company Vs. Cox and Company

Court: Mumbai

Decided on: Jun-14-1928

Reported in: (1928)30BOMLR1503

Viscount Sumner, J.1. In 1920 the appellants, merchants in Bombay, imported goods from three Manchester firms, Royle & Binns, Davies Black &j; Co., and Wilkinson & Warburton, Ltd. In ordinary course, these sellers drew drafts on the appellants with shipping documents attached and discounted them with the respondents' bank in London. The respondents then sent the drafts to their Bombay branch to be presented to the appellants for acceptance and for subsequent collection. The drafts fell due generally 60 or 90, though sometimes 120, days after sight, and on presentation they were accepted. On arrival at Bombay the goods were cleared by the appellants and warehoused in the bank's name and under its control.2. Of these drafts there are in all 48, to which this appeal refers, 25 drawn by the first-named firm, 20 by the second and 3 by the third. Their aggregate amount was 24,118-10s. The amount of those drawn against goods shipped to Bombay was 19,753 19s. 4d. The rest were drawn against Ka...


Jun 13 1928

The Ahmedabad City Municipality Vs. Vadilal Vakhatchand

Court: Mumbai

Decided on: Jun-13-1928

Reported in: AIR1928Bom376; (1928)30BOMLR1084

Patkar, J.1. This is a revisional application against the order passed in revision by the Sessions Judge of Ahmedabad against the order of the First Class Magistrate passed in appeal, against a notice of demand, under Section 110 of Bombay Act XVIII of 1925. It is urged by Mr. Thakor that no revisional application lies to this Court. Section 110 of Act XVIII of 1925 corresponds to Section 86 of Bombay Act III of 1901, and according to the ruling of this Court in In re Dulsukhram (1907) 9 Bom. L.R. 1347 a Magistrate hearing an appeal under Section 86 of the Bombay District Municipal Act of 1901, was merely an appellate authority having jurisdiction given by the Act to deal with the question of a civil liability, and was, therefore, not an inferior criminal Court, to which alone the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court applied under Section 435 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898. It is urged, on the other hand, by Mr. Divatia that a revisional application lies under s. Ill of Bomb...


Jun 11 1928

In Re: Madhavdas Jethabhai

Court: Mumbai

Decided on: Jun-11-1928

Reported in: AIR1928Bom434; (1928)30BOMLR1114; 113Ind.Cas.619

Charles Fawcett, Kt., A.C.J.1. A preliminary objection has been taken, in this case, by the Advocate General that the application does not lie to the High Court on its appellate side in, the form in which the application has been brought under the provisions of Section 66 of the Indian Income-tax Act. The Advocate General has pointed out that Sub-section (3) of Section 66 is limited to a case of refusal by the Commissioner to state a case on a particular ground, viz., the ground that no question of law arises. If there is such a refusal, then Sub-section (3) enables an application to be made by the assessee to the High Court and the High Court to interfere, if it is satisfied of certain things.2. Mr. Thakor for the applicant contends that Sub-section (3) should be read as covering a refusal on any other ground such as the one in which the Commissioner's refusal was based in this case, viz., that the application to him to refer to the High Court the question of law arising out of this o...


Jun 08 1928

In Re: Laxminarayan Timmanna Karki

Court: Mumbai

Decided on: Jun-08-1928

Reported in: AIR1928Bom390; (1928)30BOMLR1050; 114Ind.Cas.246

Mirza, J.1. The applicant Mr. Karki complains that; while he Karki was holding an enquiry as Second Class Magistrate at Supa into the cause of death of one Rama, the Collector of Kanara instituted a departmental enquiry into all the circumstances connected with the exhumation of the dead body of Rama under the applicant's order and into the propriety of certain alleged acts of the applicant in connection therewith. The result of the departmental enquiry was that the enquiry by the applicant under Section 176 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was interrupted and put an end to, as the applicant was required to give up that enquiry and be present during the departmental enquiry.2. The application came up for admission, before my brother Fawcett and me on February 28, 1928, We admitted the application to the extent that we issued a rule to the Collector to show cause why his order should not be modified or set aside, and directed an interim stay of the proceedings instituted under the Coll...


Jun 08 1928

Gendal Raju Vs. Maganlal Chhaganlal Desai

Court: Mumbai

Decided on: Jun-08-1928

Reported in: AIR1928Bom120; (1928)30BOMLR1111; 113Ind.Cas.618

Charles Fawcett, Kt., A.C.J.1. In this case, we think the main facts found by the two lower Courts are clearly baaed on sufficient evidence, and that there is no basis or the contention that the Courts have unjustifiably inferred collusion between the plaintiffs and the Inamdar Ranchhod in regard to the payment of rents to him, instead of to the representatives of the three branches of the Inamdar family in accordance with the usual practice. There is, in our opinion, ample evidence upon which this finding of collusion could be arrived at; and we see no sufficient reason, even supposing we can go into this question of fact, for coming to a different conclusion. The finding of the lower appellate Court that the payments of rent were made by the plaintiffs according to the old plough-tax system to Ranchhod in collusion with him in order to defeat the other Inamdars' claim to levy the rent according to the Vighoti system is, in our opinion, a perfectly good finding of fact, which is bindi...


Jun 06 1928

Chandikaprasad Deviprasad Agnihotri Vs. Shivappa Shiddappa Davalanavar

Court: Mumbai

Decided on: Jun-06-1928

Reported in: AIR1928Bom425; (1928)30BOMLR1099; 113Ind.Cas.381

Charles Fawcett, Kt., A.C.J.1. A new point has been taken in this Court that it should have been held that the plaintiffs' suit for redemption, which was brought under the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act, is not competent. This is based upon the decision of the Privy Council in Mt, Bachi v. Biekchand (1910) Bom. L.R. 56. The point was not allowed by Macleod C.J., who summarily dismissed the appeal; but a further appeal under the Letters Patent has been admitted in this Court, and the point has now been fully argued before this Bench.2. There is no doubt that the suit as brought is one for redemption of a mortgage bond of 1902. It refers to the subsequent sale-deed by the plaintiffs' uncle Basappa, defendant No. 7, and says that that sale-deed has effect only so far as the defendant No. 7's share is concerned, and that the plaintiffs were entitled to redeem the other half of the mortgage property. The plaintiffs finally pray for an account to be taken under the Dekkhan Agriculturists...


Jun 05 1928

Chintaman Balwant Dharmadhikari Vs. Bhagvan Ganapati Mankeshwar

Court: Mumbai

Decided on: Jun-05-1928

Reported in: AIR1928Bom383; (1928)30BOMLR1095; 113Ind.Cas.378

Charles Fawcett, Kt., A.C.J.1. The plaintiff brought this suit in 1924 to recover possession of a half share of certain property, which had been sold by his father to defendant No. 1 on November 21, 1918. His plaint farther asked that a prior mortgage deed to defendant No. 1, and an award which was based upon that mortgage deed, should be set aside, as well as the sale-deed of 1918. The Subordinate Judge held that the suit was time-barred on the following grounds:-The validity or otherwise of the sale deed of 1918 depends upon the validity of the prior mortgage, etc. It is therefore necessary for the plaintiff to show that the first mortgage passed in 1905 is not binding against him. The cause of action for setting aside this mortgage accrued to the plaintiff in 1905 under Article 126 of the Limitation Act, but he could not then sue for setting it aside as he was a minor. He attained majority on February 2, 1921, or February 25, 1021, He should have therefore died the suit on February ...


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