Mumbai Court February 1928 Judgments
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Hari Janardhan Limaye Vs. Krishnaji Balkrishna Bhate
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Feb-10-1928
Reported in: AIR1928Bom323; (1928)30BOMLR724; 113Ind.Cas.515
Patkar, J.1. [His Lordship, after stating facts as above, proceeded :] The questions arising in this appeal are, firstly, whether the present application is maintainable under Order XXXIV, Rule 6, of the Civil Procedure Code, and, secondly, whether the application is within time.2. Assuming that the application is maintainable, the present application filed on February 10, 1920, would be governed by Article 181 of the Indian Limitation Act, which provides the period of limitation of three years from the time when the right to apply accrues. Section 90 of the Transfer of Property Act has been transferred to the Civil Procedure Code as Order XXXIV, Rule 6, There fore, the application under that rule would be an application under the Civil Procedure Code, and Article 181 would apply. See Pell v. Gregory I.L.R. (1925) Cal. 828, f.b. overruling Biswambhar Shaha v. Ram Sundar Kaibarta I.L.R. (1914) Cal. 294 and Muhammad Iltifat Husain v. Alim-un-nissa Bibi I.L.R.(1918) All. 551.3. Both the l...
Emperor Vs. Lala Raoji Mahale
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Feb-08-1928
Reported in: (1928)30BOMLR624
Fawcett, J.1. The appellant, who was a Range Forest Officer, has been convicted of having committed criminal breach of trust as a public servant under Section 409 read will Section 109 of the Indian Penal Code. He was originally sentenced to three months' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Ks. 300, but on appeal the sentence was reduced to the period of imprisonment already undergone and a fine of Rs. 100.2. In revision it is contended that the facts found do not justify a conviction under Section 409. The appellant was tried with two clerks, Laia Baoji one the Depot Clerk and the other a clerk in his own office, and Fawcett J. it was proved that these two clerks unduly delayed in making certain remittances to the Government treasury. The Sessions Judge has held that there was an understanding between the appellant and his two clerks to keep Government monies as long as possible in the office, and that he must have noticed the fact that accumulated large amounts were sent at intervals...
Dhondi Khandu Choudhari Vs. Appa Raghuji Choudhari
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Feb-08-1928
Reported in: AIR1928Bom269; (1928)30BOMLR720; 113Ind.Cas.523
Patkar, J.1. The plaintiff brought a suit to redeem a mortgage under an unregistered deed passed by plaintiff's father in favour of Radhoji on December 5, 1873. In a partition in the family of the mortgage the property was allotted to the share of Radhoji's son Dhondi. Defendant No. 4 is the son of Govind, one of the sons of Dhondi, and defendants Nos. 2 and 3 are the widows of the other two sons of Dhondi and defendant No. 5 is the step-mother of defendant No. 4. Defendant No. 4 sold the land by a registered deed to defendant No. 14 on November 4, 1921, for Rs. 1,000. In the Record of Rights of the year 1907-1908, Govinda Dhondi was entered as the vahivatdar (vidya-man khatedar) of the land and Khandu bin Pandu was entered as the holder khatedar. In column No. 11, Govinda is said to have been in vahivat for forty years by right of ownership but it could not bo said how the Khata was changed.2. Both the lower Courts held that the unregistered mortgage was proved and that defendant No. ...
Cowasji Muncherji Banaji Vs. the Official Assignee of Bombay
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Feb-07-1928
Reported in: AIR1928Bom507; (1928)30BOMLR1310
Amberson Marten, Kt., C.J.1. [After referring to facts the judgment proceded :] I may now refer to Section 174 of the Indian Contract Act which runs:-The pawnee shall not, in the absence of a contract to that effect, retain the goods pledged for any debt or promise other than the debt or promise for which they are pledged; but such contract, in the absence of anything to the contrary, shall be presumed in regard to subsequent advances made by the pawnee.2. I do not regard that section as being happily drafted, because it seems to me to involve rather inconsistent notions. But I think it amounts in effect to this: you must find a contract allowing you to hold articles for subsequent advances as well as the original advance. Then if you know nothing more than this that there was a pledge for a particular sum, and that then there was a further payment or a further advance, then you may presume, in the absence of anything to the contrary, that the real contract between the parties was that...
Tilakram Chaudhuri Vs. Kodumal Jethanand Wadhwa
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Feb-03-1928
Reported in: AIR1928Bom175; (1928)30BOMLR546; 110Ind.Cas.727
Amberson Marten, Kt., C.J.1. This is an appeal from the judgment of Mr. Justice Rangnekar refusing the defendant's application for a stay of the present Bombay suit, and on the other hand granting an injunction against the defendant from prosecuting a suit brought by him in the Ludhiana Court in the Punjab.2. It appears that the defendant filed his suit first, viz., on May 18, 1925, in the Ludhiana Court. The Bombay suit was filed by the plaintiffs on May 19, 1925. There were two main points argued before the learned Judge, namely, (1) whether the two suits were between the same parties, and (2) whether the matters in issue in the two suits were the same within the meaning of Section 10 of the Civil Procedure Code.3. There was another point to which the learned Judge alluded but on which he did not base his decision, viz., that under the express terms of the several contracts between the plaintiffs who were commission agents in Bombay and the defendant who was their up-country constitu...
Tatya Rowji Vs. Hathibhai Bulakhidas
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Feb-02-1928
Reported in: AIR1928Bom275; (1928)30BOMLR661
Fawcett, J.1. The applicants are plaintiffs in a suit that was filed against the opponents in the Small Causes Court of Bombay for a sum of Rs. 1,725, being the alleged balance due at the foot of an account in regard to certain contracts for the sale and purchase of ground nut seeds. The opponents in their written statement, in addition to objecting to the plaintiffs' claim on its merits, took the point that the suit should be stayed, and the matters in dispute be referred to the arbitration of the Grain Merchants Association, as the parties were members of that Association, and the contracts in dispute contained a provision that they were executed according to the Rules of the Grain Merchants Association, by which each party was bound. Evidence was given to support this last contention, and the learned Judge decided that arbitration was compulsory under a certain rule passed by the Managing Committee of the Association. He, therefore, stayed the suit to enable the parties to comply wi...
Tewari Raghuraj Chandra Vs. Rani Subhadra Kunwar
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Feb-02-1928
Reported in: (1928)30BOMLR829
Viscount Summer, J.1. [The judgment after dealing with other points in the case proceeded :] The last question is 'What in truth is the rule of Hindu law-the personal law of Raja Chandra Shekhar-in its bearing on Krishna Narain's claim to inherit on his death as the senior direct descendant of Eaja Chandra Shekhar's eldest-born brother, It is contended that Hindu law, properly understood, contains nothing which militates against the right of a bora brother to be the brother, whose statutory right of succession is provided for by Section 22(5) of Act III. of 1910. The matter, it is said, does not depend on the rights of succession, as a member of a new family by adoption, which Raja Chandra Shekhar might have had to properties belonging to other members of the house of Sissendi, but on the survival of the blood relationship for the legal purposes of Hindu law between Raja Chandra Shekhar and hi a brothers born. Unless it can be said that in law the effect of the adoption of Raja Chandra...
H. Vs. H.
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Feb-01-1928
Reported in: AIR1928Bom279; (1928)30BOMLR523; 110Ind.Cas.266
Amberson Marten, Kt., C.J.1. This case is another illustration of the difficulties confronted by those who have to administer jurisdiction under the Divorce Act in this country as compared with the Divorce Courts in England. We have already referred in Premchand Hira v. Bai Galal : AIR1927Bom594 as to the course which ought to be adopted by Indian Courts in dealing with these petitions. The present is a nullity suit brought by the wife. Under Section 19 of the Indian Divorce Act the petitioner has to prove that her husband the respondent was impotent at the time of the marriage and at the time of the institution of the suit. She has also to comply with the other provisions necessary to constitute jurisdiction for this Court under the Act. It is clear from the evidence that the husband was not impotent as regards all women, but it is alleged by the petitioner that he was impotent so far as she is concerned, and that in fact the marriage was never consummated. The husband admits that aft...
Mahadev Narayan Nerkar Vs. Narayan Dattatraya Samant
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Feb-01-1928
Reported in: AIR1928Bom248; (1928)30BOMLR530; 110Ind.Cas.343
Fawcett, J.1. In this case, the applicant was defendant No. 2 in a suit for partnership accounts &c;, which was filed against him and two other defendants. The plaintiff alleged that defendant No. 3 had retired in the year 1921 and that he was not liable to account. Defendant No. 2 in a written statement to some extent controverted this allegation. He said that it was not settled at the time of defendant No. 3's retirement what were the amounts outstanding between the different partners, and he added a prayer, which might be taken as covering relief as to the amount due from defendant No. 3 as well as the other partners upon taking accounts, Among the issues that were subsequently raised No. 3 was, 'what were the terms of the partnership business alter defendant No. 3 retired from it,' and No. 5 was, 'what is found due on taking accounts to each of the parties in suit.' Defendant No. 3 did not appear at all in the suit, and it proceeded against him ex parte. The plaintiff and defendant...
Emperor Vs. Naranji Premji
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Feb-01-1928
Reported in: (1928)30BOMLR622
Fawcett, J.1. The first point taken by Mr. Jinnah in this application for bail is that in Sub-section (1) of Section 497 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the words 'if there appear reasonable grounds for believing that he has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or transportation for life' only cover offences punishable with death or in the alternative with transportation for life, such as cases of murder and of waging war under Sections 312 and 121 of the Indian Penal Code, and that they do not include offences merely punishable with transportation for life. Although no authority baa been referred to in the argument before us, there is, in fact, a ruling that does support Mr. Jinnah's contention, viz., Mohammed Eusoof v. King-Emperor I.L.R. (1925) Ran. 538. But that has been overruled by a Full Bench of the same Court in King-Emperor v. Nga San Htwa and others I.L.R.(1927) Ran 276, f.b. In my opinion, this is a construction which cannot be adopted. If one refers to the defin...
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