Mumbai Court August 1927 Judgments
Emperor Vs. Fardunji C. Gora
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Aug-30-1927
Reported in: AIR1927Bom630; (1927)29BOMLR1470
Patkar, J.1. In this case the two accused were charged under Section 12 of the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act, IV of 1887, in the Court of the Honorary Presidency Magistrate, Girgaum, Bombay. [His Lordship, after setting out the facts, continued :]2. The accused were tried by a Bench of Honorary Magistrates consisting of two Honorary Magistrates, Mr. Kapadia and Mr. Turkhud. Mr. Kapadia wrote and signed the judgment aquitting the accused, and subsequently made a remark that he understood from his colleague Mr. Turkhud that he differed from him on points of law as well as of fact, and that he was not bound to record this note of dissent. The accused were, therefore, acquitted according to the judgment of Mr. Kapadia whose opinion as Chairman prevailed. An appeal has been filed by the Government of Bombay against the order of acquittal, and at the time of the admission, the judgment of Mr. Turkhud was sent for in accordance with the prayer in the memo of appeal.3. The first question t...
Tag this Judgment!Shridhar Sadba Powar Vs. Ganu Mahadu Kavade
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Aug-30-1927
Reported in: AIR1928Bom67; (1928)30BOMLR34; 108Ind.Cas.22
Amberson Marten, Kt., C.J.1. The question for our determination in this second appeal is whether the presant redemption suit which was brought in 1921 for the redemption of the mortgage created in 1867 is barred by reason of the fact that a similar redemption suit was brought in 1894 by the same plaintiff and was dismissed for default in 1897. The lower Courts held that under Order IX, Rule 9, or otherwise the plaintiff is prevented from instituting this second suit.2. In our opinion the question turns on the true meaning and effect of Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act, which, after setting out what amounts to a right to redeem, proceeds:Provided that the right conferred by tins section has not been extinguished by act of the parties or by order of, Court. The right conferred by this section is called a right to redeem and a suit to enforce it is called a suit for redemption.3. In the view we take, we think this section means that unless the right to redeem is extinguished by ...
Tag this Judgment!Ganpat Tukaram Mali Vs. Sopana Tukaram Mali
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Aug-26-1927
Reported in: (1928)30BOMLR1
Where, after making a demand, a suit is brought against the maker of a promissory note payable on demand, but the note is silent as to interest and specifies no place for payment, interest at the rate of six per cent per annum is recoverable on the amount of the note from its date, under Section 80 of the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881.Bishun chand v. Babu Audh Behari Lal (1917) 2 P.L.J. 451. and Framroz Edulji v. Mahomed Essa (1925) I.L.R. 50 Bom. 266, s.c. 28 Bom. L.R. 141 followed.Best v. Haji Muhammad Sait (1898) I.L.R. 23 Mad. 18, dissented from.JUDGEMENTMarten, C.J.1. The question submitted to this Full Bench runs as follows :-A suit is brought after demand made on a promissory note payable on demand. The note is silent as to interest and specifies no place for payment. Is interest recoverable? If so, from what date and at what rate?2. I will first consider whether interest can be claimed under the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, This depends primarily on two points arising on...
Tag this Judgment!Jayappa Lokappa Narsinganawar Vs. Shivangouda Dyamangouda Patil
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Aug-25-1927
Reported in: AIR1928Bom42; (1928)30BOMLR19
Crump, J.1. The plaintiff instituted Suit No. 229 of 1917 in the Court of the Additional First Class Subordinate Judge at Dharwar to recover possession of a share of one-third of certain lands. Defendant No. 5 was the brother of plaintiff' and supported plaintiff's claim. The other defendants were members of the same family and it was alleged that defendant No. 6 had been adopted by defendant No 4, the widow of a deceased member named Basvantgouda. The properties in suit were watan properties, and plaintiff and defendant No. 5 claimed to be the nearest heirs under the law applicable to such property. The Court found that plaintiff and defendant No. 5 were the nearest heirs, and that the 'adoption of defendant No. G was not proved, Consequent upon these findings a decree was made giving plaintiff and defendant No. 5 certain shares in the suit properties. A partition was directed, and an order was made directing an inquiry as to the mesne profits due.2. Against this decree defendants Nos...
Tag this Judgment!Bhailal Ntahabhai Vs. Kalansang Gulabsang
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Aug-23-1927
Reported in: (1927)29BOMLR1558
Crump, J.1. [His Lordship held that the defendant was not a permanent tenant and then dealt with the plea of adverse possession thus: -] I now turn to the second question which has been raised in this case, and that is that even though the defendants may have been at one time annual tenants, they may have by adverse possession acquired the rights of permanent tenants. The argument proceeds thus. Before the suit in the Mamlatdar's Court in 1898 the defendants asserted their right to hold as permanent tenants. True those rights were not allowed in those judicial proceedings, but the assertion of those rights made it necessary for the plaintiffs to take some action to assert their title and as they did not do so, the possession being adverse for twelve years, ripened into a title by prescription. Now here again the first answer is to be found in the judgment of the lower appellate Court. It is significant, as I have said before, that the appellant's counsel can point to no assertion of ad...
Tag this Judgment!Emperor Vs. Chhotalal Mansukhram
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Aug-23-1927
Reported in: AIR1928Bom389; (1928)30BOMLR1082
Patkar, J.1. In this case the accused was tried on a charge under Section 123(7) of the Bombay City Municipalities Act, XVIII of 1925, for failure to give the prescribed notice to the Municipality before reconstructing certain walls of the house. The Second Class Magistrate acquitted the accused on the ground that the walls were not proved to have been built on a new foundation. The Magistrate visited the place and came to the conclusion that both the walls repaired and constructed were on old foundations, and therefore the accused was not bound to give notice under Section 123.2. On the question whether the building of a wall amounts to the reconstruction or an erection of a building within the meaning of Section 98 of Bombay Act III of 1901 and Section 33 of Bombay Act VI of 1873, there is a conflict, of judicial opinion in several decisions of this Court. It was held that the building of an isolated wall on an old foundation did not amount to an erection of a building under Section ...
Tag this Judgment!Emperor Vs. Aziz Gaffoor Kazi
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Aug-23-1927
Reported in: (1928)30BOMLR1439
Baker, J.1. This is an application for revision of the conviction by the Fourth Presidency Magistrate of the applicant on a charge under Section 248(1)(c) of the City of Bombay Municipal Act, III of 1888.2. Section 248 of the Act lays down that where any premises are without a water-closet, or privy, or urinal, or bathing or washing place, or if the Commissioner is of opinion that the existing water-closet, or privy, or urinal, or bathing or washing place accommodation available for the persons occupying or employed in any premises is insufficient, inefficient, or on any sanitary grounds objectionable, the Commissioner may, with the previous approval of the Standing Committee, by written notice, require the owner of such premises to provide additional accommodation, or to make structural or other alterations or to substitute water-closet accommodation for privy accommodation3. The facts in this case are that the applicant Aziz Gaffoor Kazi entered into an agreement with Mrs. Hamabai J....
Tag this Judgment!Kaikhushru Kharsedji Tantra Vs. Navajbai
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Aug-18-1927
Reported in: AIR1928Bom34; (1927)29BOMLR1520
Amberson Marten, Kt., C.J.1. A question of practice arises on this motion as to whether the present application should be made before the Chamber Judge or before the appellate Court. An application has already been made to the Chamber Judge, which he has refused. The applicant now comes direct to the Court of Appeal by way of motion. [His Lordship after stating the facts of the case proceeded:]2. Now it is important to observe that the Appeal Court is not seized of the whole administration suit. It is only seized in appeal of certain exceptions to the Commissioner's report, and those only. Therefore for the time being it has nothing whatever to do with any order that may be made for the interim management or the distribution of the estate. With great respect to the learned Chamber Judge we think he must have overlooked this circumstance, and I regret that we have not got the advantage of knowing the reasons for his judgment.3. In our opinion this present question does not arise in this...
Tag this Judgment!G.i.P. Railway Vs. Kashinath Chimnaji
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Aug-17-1927
Reported in: AIR1928Bom1; (1927)29BOMLR1544
Amberson Marten, Kt., C.J.1. We understand that this is the first case to be brought before the High Court under the new Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923. I only hope that it is not going to be the forerunner of a large number of other cases, for, as we know, the English Workmen's Compensation Act has given rise to more litigation and more differences of opinion between various Judges than any legislation of modern times; and with our present overcrowded Hat we are not in a position to stand any substantial increase of litigation.2. The present case is an appeal by the G.I.P. Railway Company under Section 30 of the Act, against an award of a sum of Rs. 750 by the Commissioner as lump compensation to the father and other relatives of the deceased. The question before us is whether the accident arose out of and in the course of the workman's employment within the meaning of Section 3 of the Act. As has been clearly laid down in the English cases dealing with the same words, both those co...
Tag this Judgment!Narayan Balaji Bandivdekar Vs. Govind Sakharam Nimkar
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Aug-17-1927
Reported in: AIR1928Bom28; (1927)29BOMLR1563
Crump, J.1. The plaintiff in this action sued to redeem a mortgage of the year 1807. The first Court held that the suit was within time. The suit was filed on June 18, 1920, that is to say, 113 years after the date of the mortgage. Bat the trial Court held that, by reason of a certain acknowledgment of June 27 1860, the suit, being within sixty years from the date of that acknowledgment, was not time-barred, The lower appellate Court took a different view, and held that the acknowledgment in question was ineffectual to give a fresh starting point of limitation inasmuch as it was not signed by a person who could give an effectual acknowledgment having regard to Section 15 of Act XIV of 1859, which was in force at that date.2. The question which we have to determine is which of these two views is correct. The mortgagee under the mortgage of 1807 was one Bachaji, and though the facts are not very clearly ascertained, it appears that in 1860 the family consisted of Sakharam, the son of Bac...
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