Mumbai Court July 1927 Judgments
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Fatmabai Vs. Sheriff Dewji Canjee
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Jul-14-1927
Reported in: AIR1928Bom102; (1928)30BOMLR137; 108Ind.Cas.510
Rangnekar, J.1. This is a notice of motion taken out by defendants Nos. 1 and 2 for an order that the plaintiff may be ordered to vacate and deliver possession to them of the flats and garages in the Cuffe Parade property in her occupation on or before August 1, 1927, and for certain orders mentioned in the notice of motion.2. The facts are that this was a suit for administration of the estate of the plaintiff's deceased husband and for the ascertainment and payment of her share and interest therein. By a decree on Commissioner's report, dated January 23, 1923, it was ordered that defendants Nos. 1 and 2 as executors of the plaintiff's husband's will should pay to the plaintiff the sum of Rs. 3,000 every month for her maintenance from June 18, 1919. The decree further provided 'that the plaintiff is entitled to occupy as and for her residence the two flats on the first upper floor of the house at Cuffe Parade where the said deceased Dawoodbhoy Fazulbhoy resided during his lifetime and ...
The Secretary of State for India Vs. the Ahmedabad Ginning and Mfg. Co ...
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Jul-13-1927
Reported in: AIR1927Bom638; (1927)29BOMLR1460
Blackwell, J.1. This is an appeal by the 3rd defendant company from a decision of the Assistant Judge of Ahmedabad dismissing an appeal from the Subordinate Judge at Ahmedabad. The facts in the case may be stated very shortly and are not really in dispute. They are as follows :-On June 30, 1921, the plaintiffs delivered 87 bales of piece goods at Ahmedabad to the 1st defendants, the B.B. & C.I. Railway Company, for carriage to Sealdah. The goods were consigned under what is known as risk-note B to which I will presently refer. They were loaded in a waggon No. 32700 belonging to the 3rd defendants, the East Indian Railway Company, who are the present appellants. The goods were carried from Ahmedabad to Agra by the let defendant Company, and thence over the 3rd defendant Company's line via Asansol to Sealdah. They arrived at Sealdah on August 9, 1921, and upon examination it was found that there were 85 bales intact, that one bale was entirely missing, and that there was the outer coveri...
Motilal Hirabhai Vs. Kasambhai Hasanbhai
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Jul-12-1927
Reported in: AIR1928Bom16; (1927)29BOMLR1334
Amberson Marten, Kt., C.J.1. This appeal raises a question of priority between competing mortgagees, viz., the plaintiff and defendant No. 6, Two points have been raised on the appeal, viz, (a) whether the earlier mortgage in favour of the plaintiffs, Ex. 30, dated August 3, 1913, was properly attested according to law, and (b) whether the earlier mortgage of the plaintiff, Ex. 30, was merged in the later security, Ex. 27, taken by him on February 2,8, 1921.2. On the first point it was conceded in argument that if the amending Act No. XXVII of 1926 was retrospective, then on the facts of the present case the appellant-defendant No. 6 must fail on this point. It was, however, contended that the Act was not retrospective, and decisions both before and after that Act were cited, including in particular a Full Bench decision in Girja Nandan Kalwar v. Hanuman Das Marwari I.L.R. (1926) 49 All. 25 referred to by my brother Crump, where by a majority of three Judges to two it was held that tha...
The Secretary of State for India Vs. Abdul Husen Dosaji Godwala
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Jul-12-1927
Reported in: AIR1927Bom601; (1927)29BOMLR1350
Crump, J.1. The facts necessary for the decision of the present ease may be briefly stated as follows.2. The plaintiff purchased certain plot numbers in Survey No. 119 at Santa Cruz, and after his purchase he erected upon a portion of the total area a building covering 146 square yards. The exact area of the whole land need not necessarily be stated in the view which we take of the present case, but it may be said that it was very much larger than that, and that it was only a small portion that was covered by the building. That there was a previously existing structure used for agricultural purposes does not affect the present matter. It is conceded that the erection of this building was, so far as that portion of the land is concerned, a conversion of this agricultural holding to a non-agricultural purpose. Before the lower Court a question arose as to the altered assessment which in those circumstances might be levied under the provisions of a 48 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code. With...
Suraj Bhan Singh Vs. Sah ChaIn Sukh
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Jul-12-1927
Reported in: (1927)29BOMLR1385
Blanesburgh, J.1. It appearing to the Board that this case comes within the principles laid down by the Board in the cases of Krishn Das v. Nathu, Ram(1) and Naimat Rai v. Din Dayal(2) their Lordships, without taking into consideration the facts of the case, will humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal should be dismissed with costs....
Jagmohan Saran Vs. Sahu Deoki Nandan
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Jul-12-1927
Reported in: (1927)29BOMLR1386
Blanesburgh, J.1. As a result of the opening of this appeal by Mr. Dunne, it is possible for their Lordships to dispose of the case on a very short ground. It has been made clear that this action is in truth and substance a suit for a declaration that a particular adoption was invalid. It is plain that the fact that a claim was being made on the basis of this alleged adoption was known to the plaintiff in the suit more than six years before it was instituted, and that he himself had attained majority nearly nine years before the suit was commenced. The suit being in substance one for a declaration to the effect just stated, their Lordships, on these uncontested facts, are of opinion that it is barred by Article 118 of the Indian Limitation Act. In these circumstances no useful purpose would be served by any further examination here and now of the matters in controversy; and for the reason that the suit is out of time their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal by th...
Ramgouda Annagouda Patil Vs. Bhausaheb
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Jul-11-1927
Reported in: (1927)29BOMLR1380
Sinha, J.1. This is an appeal by the plaintiffs from a decree of the High Court of Bombay which modified a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Belgaum made in suit No. 203 of 1919.2. That suit was instituted to recover possession of certain houses and lands from the defendants.3. The properties in suit originally belonged to one Akkagouda who died in 1846. leaving two widows, Lingava and Tayava, and a daughter Kashibai, who was married to one Shivgouda and had a son Shidgouda.4. Lingava died before 1868, but her co-widow lived till 1912, thus surviving her husband for sixty-six years.5. Kashibai, the daughter, died in 1907, a few days after the death of her husband Shivgouda. Shidgouda, her eldest son, died in 1907, leaving an adopted son named Bhau (defendant No 1).6. Kashibai had a second son, Pirgouda (defendant No. 2) who, however, had been given in adoption to another family some years before Kashibai's death.7. The pedigree of the family is as follows :- Sattegouda _______________...
Shri Shushilendratirth Swami Vs. Secretary of State for India
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Jul-11-1927
Reported in: AIR1927Bom616; (1927)29BOMLR1405
Amberson Marten, Kt., C.J.1. This is a dispute between the plaintiff as inamdar of the inam village of Khyad on the one hand, and the Secretary of State and others as owners and occupiers of the Government village of Manneri on the other hand, with reference to the river Malaprabha in the Bijapur District, which was formerly the dividing line between these villages, but which has since changed its course and shifted towards the Manneri side. The substantial question in effect is whether the plaintiff is entitled to follow the river to its present course, and to claim all the intervening lands including the whole of the old river bed.2. The defendants contest this claim, and say that at the most the plaintiff is entitled to the western half of the old river bed. One main point is whether there was a gradual accretion to the land of the plaintiff by gradual alteration of the course of the river to its present position as the plaintiff contends, or whether there was, as the defendants con...
The Vyankatesh Oil Mills Co. Vs. N.V. Velmahomed
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Jul-08-1927
Reported in: AIR1928Bom191; (1928)30BOMLR117
Blackwell, J1. [His Lordship, after stating the facts as above, continued:] In considering the question whether the proposed amendment is to be treated as a correction of a mere misdescription or as a substitution of different parties, it is necessary to bear in mind that by the law of India as well as by the law of. England a firm as such has no separate legal entity. This is very admirably pointed out by Mr. Justice Mulla in Rampratab Gavrishankar (1922) 25 Bom. L.R. 7, where that learned Judge said (p. 10):-To begin with it may be observed that the law of England as well as of British India knows nothing of a firm as a body or artificial person distinct from the members composing it. In this respect a firm differs from a company incorporated under the Companies Acts, such a company being a corporate entity separate from its shareholders, though the latter can control its action by passing resolutions in general meeting. The word ' firm ' is a short, collective name for the individua...
Ravji Andu Nikam Vs. Rama Krishna Mane
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Jul-07-1927
Reported in: AIR1928Bom14; (1927)29BOMLR1346
Amberson Marten, Kt., C.J.1. [His Lordship after setting out the facts of the case proceeded :] That brings me to the position which counsel for the appellants has put before us. Substantially he says the widow had no right to compromise the claim to the estate as against the adopted son, that no matter that the adopted son was not then in existence or at any rate had not been adopted, the true view of the law is she could not make any admission binding on a future reversioner; she could only litigate a case to the bitter end and have the decision in effect of the highest Court. That proposition to my mind is absolutely unsound in law. We fortunately have a decision by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Ramsumran Prasad v. Shyam Kumari , and there it is thus stated (p. 346):Bearing this in mind their Lordships will proceed to consider whether an alienation, which is the result of a compromise, or the mode by which a compromise is carried into effect, should, if the compromise be r...
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