Mumbai Court February 1927 Judgments
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P.D. Shamdasani and ors. Vs. Tata Industrial Bank Ltd.
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Feb-22-1927
Reported in: AIR1927Bom529
Marten, C.J.1. We are here concerned with two items in two bills of costs, one of Messrs. Payne & Co., and the other of Messrs. Little & Co. Each of these items is for 'Instructions for Brief at the trial.' This arises under a judgment of Mr. Justice Pratt passed in the suit on December 14, 1923, when he dismissed the suit with costs and ordered that separate sets of costs as between defendant 1, the Tata Industrial Bank, and defendant 6, the Central Bank of India, Limited, be paid by the plaintiffs. Messrs. Little & Co. are the solicitors for the Tata Bank and Messrs-Payne & Co. for the Central Bank.2. The suit itself was one brought in effect to set aside an agreement between the two companies by which the Central Bank acquired the shares of the Tata. Bank on the basis that one share in the Central Bank of Rs. 50 nominal and Sections 25 paid-up was to be given for every two Tata shares of Rs. 75 nominal and Rs. 22-8-0 paid-up. The plaintiffs contended that the resolutions approving o...
Ratanbai Karsetji Sunavala Vs. Narayandas Prayagdas
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Feb-21-1927
Reported in: AIR1927Bom478; (1927)29BOMLR900
Fawcett, J.1. This is an appeal from a decision of the First Class Subordinate Judge, Dhulia, passing a preliminary mortgage decree in favour of the plaintiffs for the payment of the mortgage money within six months, and directing that in default a final decree might be applied for for the recovery of the decretal amount by the sale of the mortgaged property.2. The mortgage deed was passed by one Karsetji, who had died before the suit was brought, and the mortgagees sued his widow, his six sons and three daughters as his heirs. Only the defendants Nos. 3 and 10, that is to say one of the sons and one of the daughters, appeared through a pleader. The case was heard against the others ex parte. The third defendant admitted the suit bond, but contended that it had been executed by his father through undue influence, and was therefore void. He also pleaded that the mortgage-debt had been satisfied by virtue of a set-off of certain ginning charges said to be due from the plaintiffs in respe...
Tulsi Lalji Vs. Omkar Huna
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Feb-17-1927
Reported in: AIR1927Bom399; (1927)29BOMLR897
Patkar, J.1. In this case the question for decision is whether the respondent is entitled to have the fees of two pleaders taxed in the bill of costs under Section 20 of the Bombay Pleaders Act XVII of 1920. The Appeal No. 347 of 1925 is from a decree deciding on the merits a suit of which the value of the subject-matter exceeds Rs. 5,000. The case would, therefore, fall under Clause (c) of Sub-section 1 of Section 20 of the Act. The section does not make it obligatory that a party should engage more than one pleader but if a party has before the first hearing of a proceeding engaged more than one pleader, the fees of two pleaders may be taxed in the bill of costs in the cases mentioned in the section. Section 20 must be read with Section 18 of the Act which deals with the computation of taxed fees which shall be computed in accordance with the rules in Schedule III unless such fee has been settled for a less amount under Section 17. The Taxing Officer has refused to award two sets of ...
Shridhar Anant Ganpule Vs. Ganu Ragho Gurav
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Feb-15-1927
Reported in: AIR1927Bom422; (1927)29BOMLR891
Fawcett, J.1. This appeal arises out of the decision in Sakharam v. Ganu (1920) 23 Bom. L.R. 125. In that case it was held that a suit brought by certain hereditary Pujaris of a temple near Chiplun against certain Guravs of the temple without compliance with the provisions of Section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code was barred by that section; but it was held that the dispute, which related to the respective rights of the parties to certain offerings at the temple, might be made the subject of an application to the District Court. This was in view of a scheme that had been framed for the management of this temple by a Devasthan Committee. At p. 128 a reference is made to Clause (2) of that scheme, under which the members of that Committee were to conduct the affairs of the Devasthan according to the long established usages thereof, and it is mentioned that the scheme contained no specific reservation for any application to add to, or alter the scheme. But at P. 132 the judgment says that...
Sitaram Laxmanrao Kadam Vs. Dharmasukhram Tansukhram Tripathi
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Feb-15-1927
Reported in: AIR1927Bom487; (1927)29BOMLR1124; 103Ind.Cas.906
Amberson Marten, Kt., C.J.1. We think there is power under Rule 64 or otherwise for the Chief Justice to direct that a point of law be dealt with by a Full Bench, although the suit has only come before a single Judge. We do not think it necessary that on the Original Side the parties should first have a decision of the Judge of first instance and then appeal, and that then the appellate Court (which after all is only the Original Side sitting in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction) should send the case before a Full Bench.2. When this case came on for argument, a question arose as to whether these proceedings, having regard to our rules, could properly be brought by Originating Summons. On close investigation of our Rules, it appears doubtful, to say the least of it whether that could be done. Accordingly, by consent of the parties, these proceedings have been converted with the necessary amendments into a suit begun by a plaint in the ordinary way, and the written statement, wh...
Abdul Rehman Ibrahim Vs. Vinayak Jayavantrao Deshmukh
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Feb-14-1927
Reported in: AIR1927Bom540; (1927)29BOMLR1056
Amberson Marten, Kt., C.J.1. This is one of those unfortunate suits where the period of limitation allowed by the Indian Limitation Act is sixty years and where the litigation is started many years after the date of the material facts. The point before us is as to the effect of a revenue sale of land made so long ago as 1884. At that date there was a mortgage on the land, the mortgagee being in possession. The assessment which had been raised during the course of a few years from Rs. 22-8 to Rs. 149-8 had fallen into arrear. Accordingly under Section 56 of the then Land Revenue Code the land was forfeited by Government, and then sold. It so happens that the purchaser at that sale is alleged to be merely a benamidar for the mortgagee. Let that be so. In fact the mortgagor never did anything. In course of time he died, and I suppose his sons also. And now we have a young grandson aged twenty-one who, with the aid of a pleader's clerk, has started this litigation. We are accordingly asked...
Purshottam Govind Padhye Vs. Isub Mahamad Dingankar
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Feb-11-1927
Reported in: AIR1927Bom513; (1927)29BOMLR1052
Amberson Marten, Kt., C.J.1. This second appeal raises a curious point on which no authority precisely on all fours has been produced. The question in effect is, can a mortgagor at his pleasure bring, say, five separate redemption suits for redemption of a single mortgage debt, where the interest of the mortgagees has been divided by a gift or an assignment between some five co-sharers. In the present case we are dealing with two suits for redemption brought by the same mortgagor for redemption of the same mortgage debt. The one is against one sharer in the original mortgage security and the other suit is against another sharer or other assignees.2. Both the lower Courts have held that the suit will lie because the original mortgagee has deliberately split up his interest amongst these five co-sharers so as to constitute separate shares as between themselves. With all deference to the learned Judges this seems to me to be a fundamental error in principle. This suit is essentially one t...
The Dharamsi Morarji Chemical Co. Ltd. Vs. Ochhavlal Hargovandas Shah
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Feb-09-1927
Reported in: AIR1927Bom480; (1927)29BOMLR981; 103Ind.Cas.540
Crump, J.1. This is an appeal from the decision of the learned Chief Justice in which he has held that part of the plaintiffs' claim is barred by limitation. So far as that portion of the claim is concerned the facts are that a call was payable on April 20, 1922, and that the suit was filed on June 11, 1925. Under Article 112 of the Schedule to the Indian Limitation Act the period of filing such a suit is three years from the date when the call is payable. Therefore prima facie the suit is so far time-barred.2. It is, however, sought to evade this difficulty by invoking Section 4 of the Indian Limitation Act, on the ground that the period of limitation prescribed for the suit expired on a day when the Court was closed. It is said that the Court was closed because the last day on which the suit could have been filed fell within the annual summer vacation of the Court, and that, therefore, as provided by the section the suit could have been instituted on the day when the Court re-opened,...
Emperor Vs. Chhagan Vithal
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Feb-07-1927
Reported in: (1927)29BOMLR494
Fawcett, J.1. The petitioner has been convicted of the offence of wrongful restraint under Section 341, Indian Penal Code, and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 15. The Magistrate found that the accused had put a tin projection over the complainant's compound-wall, so as to hang over his paved court-yard; that the projection was six feet and ten inches above the ground and was high enough for any one to move below it; but that it would be an obstruction, whenever the wall had to be whitewashed or repaired. He held that the case, therefore, fell under Section 341 of the Indian Penal Code. He remarks in his judgment that this projection did not exist before the complainant went away to attend a marriage, and that on his return it was there.2. Two objections have been taken to the conviction. The first is that the complainant was absent at the time the projection was put up, and so there can bo no offence under Section 341, Indian Penal Code. On this point, however, I agree with the view tak...
Vasanji Moolji Vs. Karsondas Tejpal
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Feb-07-1927
Reported in: AIR1928Bom270; (1928)30BOMLR486
Crump, J.1. In the month of August 1924 the defendant desired to raise a loan on three properties, and he employed the plaintiff as a money broker to find a lender. There is some dispute as to what were the terms of employment, but it is really clear enough that the rate of commission payable to the plaintiff was to be two per cent. That this is so is apparent from the defendant's statement in the course of the evidence that he would have paid the plaintiff two per cent, had he succeeded in finding the loan, And the defendant also states that that is the customary rate of commission on loans on mortgages, What the defendant says about the contract is as follows:-I said to Mulraj that I wanted him to get me a loan of four lacs on an equitable mortgage of my three properties. There was no question of a legal mortgage. I gave him the names of the three properties. I did not tell him what they were worth, nor did ho ask. Nothing was said as to the rate of interest, I would have accepted ni...
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