Mumbai Court October 1926 Judgments
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The Central India Spinning Weaving and Manufacturing Co., Ltd. Vs. G.i ...
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Oct-11-1926
Reported in: AIR1927Bom367; 102Ind.Cas.425
Mirza, J.1. This is a Chamber summons taken out by the plaintiffs against the defendants for an order on the defendants to disclose by a supplemental affidavit of documents certain statements made by the defendants' servants with reference to the subject-matter of this suit to the defendants, and which are referred to in certain correspondence of which disclosure has been made. The defendants claim privilege for these documents. When the matter came first before me I made an order on August 27, 1926, ordering the defendants to make a supplemental affidavit disclosing these documents, which were admittedly in their possession and to claim, if so advised, privilege for them. In pursuance of that order the defendants have now filed a supplemental affidavit of documents disclosing these documents, but claiming privilege for them. In the affidavit on behalf of the defendants in showing cause it is stated that these statements are in the nature of evidence exclusively of the defendants case....
Lakhmichand Khetsey Punja Vs. Ratanbai and ors.
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Oct-11-1926
Reported in: 101Ind.Cas.210
Amberson Marten, C.J.1. This case raises important and interesting questions of law as to the liability of a landlord to one of his tenants for the collapse on March 23, 1923, of part of a large building let out mainly in rooms. The suit is brought by the widow and three minor daughters and mother of one Umersey Punja under the Indian Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 (which corresponds to Lord Campbell's Act in England), against the defendant as owner of Anand Building, Broach Street, Bombay, for damages for the latter's negligence in that he 'allowed the same building to remain in ruinous and dangerous condition until by reason of want of repairs it fell and caused the death of the said Umersey Punja and twelve other persons. The defence is a denial of the alleged negligence, or that the defendant owed any duty to Umersey to keep the suit premises in repair. The trial Judge gave judgment for the plaintiffs and awarded them Rs. 6,500 damages. The defendant appeals. The first question to deter...
R.G. Lakhmidas and Co. Vs. Sir Dorab Tata
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Oct-06-1926
Reported in: AIR1927Bom195; (1927)29BOMLR19; 101Ind.Cas.229
Amberson Marten, C.J.1. This is a vendor and purchaser summons taken. out under Rule 212 by the present trustees of a deed of settlement dated March 8, 1889, as vendors to determine (1) whether they had made out a marketable) title to the property sold to the defendants, and (2) whether the defendants should be ordered to specifically perform the agreement between the parties.2. Under Rules 212 and 220 the procedure in force on the Original' Bide with reference to such summonses in a plaint without a prayer, but specifying the appropriate questions, which are afterwards embodied in a separate summons signed by the Judge. But both here and in England it is not open to claim specific performance on an Originating Summons. That must de left to a suit, as must also any question affecting the validity or existence of the contract. Consequently the trial Judge rightly declined to hear question No. 2, although the summons had been signed by the Vacation Judge. As regards question No. 1, unfor...
Janardan Mahadeo Bhase Vs. Ramchandra Mahadeo Bhase
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Oct-05-1926
Reported in: AIR1927Bom240; (1927)29BOMLR312; 101Ind.Cas.393
Fawcett, J.1. In this case plaintiff No. 1 and defendant No. 1 are brothers. Plaintiff No. 2 and defendant No. 2 are cousins, being the son of plaintiff No. 1 and the son of defendant No. 1 respectively. Originally they formed a joint family, but in l921 a deed of partition was executed by the parties. Under this deed a certain house bearing Municipal No. 197 with a well at the back fell to the share of the defendants, while the neighbouring house No. 201 fell to the plaintiffs' share. This latter house has got no Well. There were other properties covered by this partition deed, with which we are not concerned. The deed contained a clause at the end to the following effect:-In the house, Municipal No. 197, in (its) back part, (there) is a well of water. That has exclusively gone to the hare of Janardan and Narayan. Ramchandra and Gopal, not having a well should, out of brotherly affection, be allowed to take the water of the well. They are asking (it), not as a matter of right, hut sim...
Shri Goverdhanlalji Vs. Shri Chandraprabhavati
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Oct-04-1926
Reported in: (1928)30BOMLR126
Mirza, J.1. Mr. Desai, on behalf of the defendant, admits that this application is unprecedented. He relies, however, upon the following remarks of the learned Chief Justice in granting the special leave:The result is that though the defendant may be perfectly right, yet the parties are to be exposed to the serious expense and delay which the trial of the case on its merits will involve, I say this because if the suit is proceeded with it will necessarily involve something in the nature of an account both of capital and income Of the large possessions of the defendant, which are scattered over different parts of India....If, therefore, there is a substantial preliminary issue to be decided, which may render this long and expensive trial quite unnecessary, then with all respect to the judgment of Sir Norman Macleod and Mr. Justice Coyajee, I think it ought to be determined before that expense is incurred. I wish to make it elear that if the defendant's objection succeeds, then the suit ...
Emperor Vs. Aba Farid Bargir
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Oct-01-1926
Reported in: (1927)29BOMLR700; 103Ind.Cas.108
Shah, J1. In this case the order under Section 118, Criminal Procedure Code, was made on October 20, 1920, and the order of imprisonment for one year in consequence of the failure of the accused to give security in pursuance of the order under Section 118 of the Code was made under Section 123, Criminal Procedure Code, on October 29. But between October 20 and 29 the accused was convicted and sentenced to seven years' rigorous imprisonment and that sentence commenced between these two dates. Under Section 120, Sub-section (2), Criminal Procedure Code, the period of the order requiring the accused to give security commenced on October 20; and, if the proper procedure had been followed, the learned Magistrate in this case should not have made any order under Section 123, Criminal Procedure Code, of imprisonment at all at that stage. But in fact he made the order under Section 123, Criminal Procedure Code, on October 29. As the period in respect of which the order under Section 118 was ma...
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