Mumbai Court March 1917 Judgments
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isap Ahmad Mograria Vs. Abhramji Ahmadji Mograria
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Mar-30-1917
Reported in: AIR1917Bom254; (1917)19BOMLR579; 41Ind.Cas.761
Basil Scott, Kt., C.J., Batchelor, Macleod and Marten, JJ.1. The following question has been referred to a Full Bench:-Whether Article 127 of the Second Schedule of Act XV of 1877 can apply to the property of a Mahommedan (or any other person not being a Hindu,) and not having been proved to have adopted as a custom the Hindu Law of the Joint family ?2. The question referred is expressed to relate to the application of Article 127 of the Second Schedule of Act XV of 1877: the reference is however made in a suit brought when the Limitation Act of 1908 had come into operation. Therefore we take the question as relating to Article 127 of the later Act.3. The exact point for determination is whether the three words 'joint family property'' as occurring in Article 127 of the Act of 1908 mean anything but property of a joint family in the sense in which the expression 'joint family' is understood amongst Hindus.4. Of the three words so arranged two constructions are possible.5. Either 'joint...
Mahomedali Adamji Peerbhoy Vs. the Secretary of State for India in Cou ...
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Mar-30-1917
Reported in: AIR1917Bom128; (1917)19BOMLR618; 41Ind.Cas.264
Beaman, J.1. The preliminary point I am asked to determine is in effect this: Whether the decision of a valuation committee appointed by Government under the resumption term of the plaintiff's Sanad must be an unanimous decision of the committee or may be a majority decision The resumption term provides that a just valuation shall be paid and that such a valuation is to be determined by a committee appointed by Government. The defendant's contention in the briefest form is that in all such connections the word 'committee' necessarily connotes a majority. No case can be given, it was argued, of any committee appointed to settle any matter as yet uncertain where by implication it was not intended that a majority decision should be the decision of the committee. On the other hand the plaintiffs contend that notwithstanding the use of the word 'committee' this part of the resumption clause read as a whole provides for an ordinary submission to arbitration.2. The point on a first view would...
isap Ahmed Mograria and ors. Vs. Abhramji Ahmadji Mograria and ors.
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Mar-30-1917
Reported in: (1917)ILR41Bom588
Batchelor, J.1. In this appeal it is candidly admitted by the learned pleader, Mr. Thakor, that he has no prospect of success unless he can be allowed to show that Article 127 of the Indian Limitation Act is not applicable to Mahomedan parties. Unfortunately for the learned pleader's contention there is a long series of decisions by Division Benches of this Court against that argument, and sitting as a single Judge, I am bound, it seems to me, to give effect to those decisions. If Mr. Thakor can carry the matter to a Division Bench on appeal and can induce a Division Bench to refer the point for reconsideration by a Full Bench, that is another matter. But all that I can do is to dismiss the appeal with costs, following the course of Division Bench decisions to which I have referred.2. Cross-objections are dismissed with costs.3. There was an appeal against the above decision under the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent appeal was heard by Beaman and Heaton JJ. on the 8th September 1916...
Emperor Vs. Mallangowda Parwatgowda and anr.
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Mar-30-1917
Reported in: 42Ind.Cas.597
Batchelor, J.1. The first question that arises in these appeals is whether a certain extra-judicial confession said to have been made by the 1st accused to one Kumarapa in the presence of the Sub-Assistant Surgeon in the dispensary is admissible in evidence or should be excluded under Section 26 of the Indian Evidence Act. The learned Sessions Judge tells us that he was at first disposed to exclude the evidence, but on further consideration decided to admit it. I am of opinion that the learned Judge's first impressions were correct and that he erred in admitting the confession upon his record.2. The facts are that while this accused was in the look-up of the Magistrate under trial, he was sent by that Magistrate to the dispensary in order to be treated for a malady which involved an examination of the patient in private. Two policemen took the accused from the look-up to the dispensary. At the dispensary the policemen waited outside on the verandah while the accused was inside undergoi...
Bhicoobai Vs. Hariba Raghuji
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Mar-29-1917
Reported in: (1917)19BOMLR650; 42Ind.Cas.9
Marten, J.1. This is an action in effect to recover out of the immoveable property of the Fulmali caste certain sums of money amounting in all to Rs. 7234 which were paid by the plaintiff in order to set aside a judicial sale of this immoveable property and to satisfy certain other attachments which had been made against this property in suit No. 559 of 1911. The defendants other than defendants 11 and 12 represent the caste under a representation order made in this action under 0rder I, Rule 8.2. The defence in effect is that this judicial sale and the warrants for attachment were all made per incuriam without jurisdiction and are not binding on the caste and that even if they are binding, the plaintiff is not entitled to any charge on the property and is indeed without any remedy, for it is contended that as he is not entitled to a personal decree against all the members of the caste, he cannot by attachments get at the caste property. The immoveable property in question is the Caste...
Emperor Vs. Ibrahim Mir Shikari
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Mar-28-1917
Reported in: AIR1917Bom199; (1917)19BOMLR524; 41Ind.Cas.650
Batchelor, J.1. The applicant before us has been convicted by the learned Magistrate under Clause (b) of Section 3 of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, XI of 1890. The facts upon which the conviction was had are these:-The applicant purchased certain cranes known as saras and was conveying them by rail from Indore to Kolhapur. They were young birds and prior to the applicant's purchase of them their eyes were seeled or stitched up in accordance with the practice which appears to prevail in India, as it certainly prevails, or used to prevail, in England. At the Poona station it was noticed that the birds' eyes were thus stitched up and were bleeding. A complaint was consequently lodged against the applicant.2. Now it may well be, as the learned Magistrate believes, that this process of seeling up the eyes of cranes or hawks is in. itself a cruel practice. But the question before us is not whether that practice is cruel, but whether the requirements of Section 3 (b) of the Act ar...
Emperor Vs. Ibrahim Meer Shikari
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Mar-28-1917
Reported in: (1917)ILR41Bom654
Batchelor, J.1. The applicant before us has been convicted by the learned Magistrate under Clause (b) of Section 3 of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, XI of 1890. The facts upon which the conviction was had are these: 2. The applicant purchased certain cranes known as saras and was conveying them by rail from Indore to Kolhapur. They were young birds and prior to the applicant's purchase of them their eyes were sealed or stitched up in accordance with the practice which appears to prevail in India, as it certainly prevails, or used to prevail, in England. At the Poona station it was noticed that the birds' eyes were thus stitched up and were bleeding. A complaint was consequently lodged against the applicant.3. Now it may well be, as the learned Magistrate believes, that this process of sealing up the eyes of cranes or hawks is in itself a cruel practice. But the question before us is not whether that practice is cruel, bat whether the requirements of Section 3(b) of the Act a...
Emperor Vs. Ranchodlal Amratlal
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Mar-26-1917
Reported in: AIR1917Bom233; (1917)19BOMLR521; 41Ind.Cas.656
Batchelor, J.1. The question before us in this reference from the learned Sessions Judge of Ahmedabad is whether an ordinary wire fence is a building within the meaning of Clause 7 of Section 3 of the Bombay District Municipalities Act of 1901.2. There is not much authority to guide us, but it has been held in this Court that a 'karvi' or reed fencing was not a building within the meaning of that word as used in Section 33 of the Act of 1873: see Queen-Empress v. Janardhan (1880) Unrep. Cr.C. 145. Under the same Act this Court has also held that a mere wattle fence was also outside the definition of building : see In re Salomibai (1888) Unrep Cr.C. 428. It appears, therefore, that consistently with the rulings the wire fence now before us should be regarded as outside the provisions of Clause 7 of the present Section 3. That is confirmed by the definition of the word 'building' in Webster's Dictionary, where it is expressly mentioned that in the popular acceptation of the word it would...
Abraham E.J. Abraham Vs. Sarupchand Hakamchand
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Mar-22-1917
Reported in: (1917)19BOMLR608; 41Ind.Cas.256
Basil Scott, Kt., C.J.1. The plaintiff is a Jewish merchant dealing in various commodities.2. The defendants are a firm of Marwari Shroffs dealing in silver in Bombay.3. On the 13th of July 1914, the plaintiff in the name of his kachha adatia or agent Hiralal Ramgopal and acting by his broker Bholaram, entered into a contract whereby Hiralal Ramgopal agreed to buy and the defendants to sell 50 bars of silver at Rs. 75-5-0 per 100 tolas for the ensuing Shravan vaida.4. The contract was entered into subject to the rules of the Panch Shroff Association whereby it was the duty of the defendants to tender a delivery order by the 12th of August 1914.5. On the 10th of August, the plaintiff tendered to Hiralal the price of the bars and on the 11th Hiralal wrote asking the defendants to send a delivery order.6. No delivery order was given by the 12th.7. The difference in price between the contract rate and the rate prevailing on the 13th was Rs. 3-3-0 which the plaintiff claims from the defenda...
K.P.L.S. Palaniappa Chettiar Vs. Sreemuth Devasikamoney Pandarasannadh ...
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Mar-22-1917
Reported in: (1917)19BOMLR567
Atkinson, J.1. This is an appeal against a decree of the High Court of Judicature at Madras, dated the 18th October, 1910, which reversed a decree dated the 10th August, 1908, of the Additional Subordinate Judge of Madura and restored that dated the 30th June, 1906, of the District Munsiff of Sivagunga, pronounced in the original suit No. 10 of 1905.2. In the village of Kunnakuddy, in the District of Madura, there are several Hindu temples; one of these, styled the Subramanisawamy Devastananam, has been endowed, for the religious service of the idol, with certain lands in and about this village, including a building site situate in one of the streets of the village, upon which site, in and previous to the year 1897, some ruins stood. The Shebait of this temple is represented by the respondent. Should the property, the subject of such an endowment as this, have been formally dedicated to the Deity or the idol for worship in the temple by a deed of endowment it would presumably contain d...
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