Mumbai Court June 1913 Judgments
Shivayagappa Sangappa Kengual Vs. Govindappa Paudappa
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Jun-20-1913
Reported in: (1913)15BOMLR768; 20Ind.Cas.969
Basil Scott, Kt., C.J.1. The question referred to the Full Bench is :- Is a compromise in a suit which comes under the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act bad in law because it is made without compliance with the special provisions of that Act? That question is couched in very general terms, but it may be construed as referring to the special provisions of Section 15B, which are the only special provisions referred to in the statement of the case. The parties have agreed to a compromise of a mortgage suit, under which, upon the failure to pay two instalments the whole of the mortgaged property may be brought to silent and in accordance with the terms of that compromise, which was proved to the satisfaction of the Court under Order XXII, Rule 3, the Court, as it is directed to do by that rule, ordered that the compromise be recorded, and passed a decree in accordance therewith.2. It is now said that the Court has not noticed that it was not a lawful agreement or compromise, and that the ...
Tag this Judgment!Hanmant Rukhmaji Vs. Annaji Hanmant
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Jun-20-1913
Reported in: (1913)15BOMLR765; 20Ind.Cas.966
Basil Scott, C.J.1. The question which has been referred to us is whether the judgment of the first appellate Court is a judgment in accordance with law. The reference is made on the ground that the decision in Tanaji Dagde v. Shankar Sakharam I.L.R (1911) Bom. 116 : 13 Bom. L.R. 1003 seems to conflict with the previous practice of the Court, sappearing from Puttapa v. Yellappa (1903) 5 Bom. L.R. 233; Thakor Takhatsangji Ramsangji v. Dai Sicndarbai (1891) P.J. 58; Khushal Chintaman v. Supdu Tapiram (1891) P.J. 239; and Narayan Lakshmandas v. Lala valad Sandu Patil (1894) P.J. 113. There is much to be said for the reasoning in Tanaji Dagde v. Shankar Sakharam I.L.R (1911) Bom. 116 : 13 Bom. L.R. 1003 upon the materials which were then before the Court. But the Court does not appear to have had in mind the existence of Civil Circular 51, which was published in 1890 under the provisions of the High Courts Act. That Circular provides that ' when an appellate Court dismisses an appeal under...
Tag this Judgment!Hasan Malik Vs. Rasul Malik
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Jun-17-1913
Reported in: (1913)15BOMLR680; 20Ind.Cas.535
Basil Scott, Kt., C.J.1. If we assume that the Deputy Collector was invested with the revenue administration of the Taluka so as to enable him to exercise the powers of the Collector under Section 23 of the Mamlatdars Act, the question is whether he has violated the provisions of that section, which says that there should be no appeal from any order passed by a Mamlatdar under this Act. There is not much dispute that the question turns, as far as the evidence before the Mamlatdar is concerned, upon documents. The Mamlatdar attached great importance to a document described as a ' Vahivati Arj' of 1909. The Deputy Collector for certain reasons, which he seems to think were sufficient, comes to the conclusion that the admission contained in the 'Vahivati Arj' is not binding upon the plaintiff, and then upon other documents, which he discusses, held that the plaintiff has shown title, and therefore he concludes that the plaintiff was in possession, and that the Mamlatdar's decision as to p...
Tag this Judgment!Chhogmal Balkisandas Vs. Jainarayen Kanyialal
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Jun-16-1913
Reported in: (1913)15BOMLR750; 20Ind.Cas.882
Macleod, J.1. The plaintiffs are a firm of Marwari merchants carrying on business in Bombay and elsewhere in India.2. The defendants are sued as a firm carrying on business at Cawnpore.3. The evidence shows that one Kanyialal Jainarayen is the sole owner of that firm and carries on business not only at Cawnpore but also at Delhi, Calcutta and elsewhere.4. The plaintiffs allege in their plaint that in the Maru Saravat year 1965 (A.D. 1908-1909) the defendants employed the plaintiffs to act as their pakka adatias and honour their Hoondies in Bombay on certain terms, viz., the plaintiffs were to charge commission at six annas per cent, and brokerage at 4 annas per cent, on the price of cotton and seeds and commission at Re. 1 per 1000 on the price of silver orders and on Hoondies paid by them on defendant's account, and all out of pocket charges, interest to run on both sides of the account at the rate of 7 annas 9 pies per cent, per mensem.5. That an account was sent up to the 1st Ashad ...
Tag this Judgment!Bhimabai Krishnappa Desai Vs. Tayappa Murarrao Nadgauda
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Jun-13-1913
Reported in: (1913)15BOMLR783
Batchelor, J.1. The suit out of which this appeal arises was brought by the plaintiff to recover certain vatan property on the ground that he was the heir of the last male holder, one Bhogapa. The parties concerned are related in the manner shown in the following tree :-KRISHNAPPA|---------------------------------------| |Ramapa Bhosapa (plaintiff) |Krishnapa=Bhimabai (defendant)Krishnapa, son of Bhogapa died in April 1888. In 1899 Bhimabai, the defendant I, adopted a boy named Bhogapa, who in 1902 died unmarried. In 1904 Bhimabai made another adoption, this time of a boy named Jerav, the 10th defendant.2. The only question which falls to be decided in this appeal is whether this second adoption by Bhimabai is valid or not. The contention for the plaintiff is that it is invalid, Bhimabai's power of adopting being at an end on the death of the first adopted son, Bhogapa.3. As I have noticed, the property in suit is vatan property, and it is admitted that when the adopted boy Bhogapa die...
Tag this Judgment!Emperor Vs. Fattu Mahomed Sher Mahomed
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Jun-11-1913
Reported in: (1913)15BOMLR689; 20Ind.Cas.609
Batchelor, J.1. In this case the two petitioners have been convicted under Section 4 (a) and (c) of the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act (Bombay Act IV of 1887), the petitioner No. 1 'Being the owner or occupier or having the use of a house, room or place and keeping or using the same for the purpose of a common gaming house, and petitioner No. 2 having assisted in conducting the business of such house, room or place.2. The only point upon which the propriety of the convictions is challenged on behalf of the petitioners is whether the particular spot on which the petitioners and the others were found to be gaming may be rightly described as a ' place ' within the meaning of Section 4 (a) of the Bombay Act.3. The facts are that this particular spot resembles in all essentials what is usually known in this country as a chok. It is a small open space surrounded by houses on all sides and is accessible only by a narrow lane on which is a sign board pointing to the chok. Of this space the ...
Tag this Judgment!Emperor Vs. Fattoo Mahomed Sher Mahomed and ors.
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Jun-11-1913
Reported in: (1913)ILR37Bom651
Batchelor, J.1. In this case the two petitioners have been convicted under Section 4(a) and (c) of the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act (Bombay Act IV of 1887), the petitioner No. 1 being the owner or occupier or having the use of a house, room or place and keeping or using the same for the purpose of a common gaming house, and petitioner No. 2 having assisted in conducting the business of such house, room or place.2. The only point upon which the propriety of the convictions is challenged on behalf of the petitioners is whether the particular spot on which the petitioners and the others were found to be gaming may be rightly described as a 'place' within the meaning of Section 4(a) of the Bombay Act.3. The facts are that this particular spot resembles in all essentials what is usually known in this country as a chok. It is a small open space surrounded by houses on all sides and is accessible only by a narrow lane on which is a signboard pointing to the chok. Of this space the first ...
Tag this Judgment!Bhaiya Janki Pershad Singh Vs. Bhaiya Dwarka Pershad Singh
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Jun-10-1913
Reported in: (1913)15BOMLR853
Ameer Ali, J.1. These are two consolidated appeals from a judgment and decree of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh, dated the 8th of September 1909, and arise out of a suit brought by the plaintiff Dwarka Pershad in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Barabanki, for partition of certain properties known as Taluqa Ranimau, in which he claimed a share as a member of a joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara Law.2. The two defendants to this action were the plaintiff's elder brother Janki Pershad and their mother Marjad Kuar, and as the mother, under the Mitakshara Law, is entitled on the partition of ancestral property to an equal share with the sons for her life, the plaintiff asked for a decree in respect of a third share in the entire property included in the list attached to the plaint.3. The defendant Janki Pershad alone contested the suit, the ground of his defence being that the Taluqa sued for was, under the provisions of Act I of 1869, as also by custom gove...
Tag this Judgment!Emperor Vs. Hari Tanaji
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Jun-06-1913
Reported in: (1913)15BOMLR700; 20Ind.Cas.618
Basil Scott, Kt., C.J.1. In this case the accused was charged with yoking to his Tonga a pony which was not licensed and thereby committing an offence under Section 2 of the Public Conveyances Act (Bombay Act VI of 1863), which provides that no person shall keep or let for hire any public conveyance without having a license in force for the same. The learned Magistrate found that no offence had been committed because there is nothing in the Act which makes the yoking of an unpassed pony to a licensed tonga an offence punishable under the Act.2. The question of the licensing of conveyances under this Act was very fully discussed by this Court in Gell v. Taj a Jvoorai (1903) 5 Bom. L.R. 133. It was urged in appeal in that case that the requirements of Section 6 of the Act extended only to the equipment of conveyances and that the words 'otherwise unfit' must be construed as relating only to defects ejusdem generis with defects in equipment and that neither of the expressions used would p...
Tag this Judgment!Emperor Vs. Keshav Narayan Manolkar
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Jun-05-1913
Reported in: (1923)25BOMLR248
Basil Scott, Kt., C.J.1. There are three other documents which the learned Sessions Judge has admitted as evidence against accused No. 1 but we are of opinion that they have all been wrongly admitted. Two of them are letters written by Gore to third persons which indicate his ignorance of the existence of the will, and one of which contains a statement that Manolkar, accused No. 1, had said that there was a will, thereby showing that Manolkar had guilty knowledge of this forged will soon after the death of Parvatibai. The statements in these letters are, as far as the Court is concerned, purely hearsay evidence, because Gore was not called. They were admitted apparently under Section 10 of the Indian Evidence Act as evidence of a conspiracy. But as far as Gore is concerned there is no evidence that he was a conspirator, because if he had been a conspirator at the time of the fabrication of the will he would presumably have been present or had some hand in the fabrication. But it is not...
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