Mumbai Court August 1907 Judgments
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R.D. Sethna Vs. Mirza Mahomed Shirazi (No. 3)
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Aug-16-1907
Reported in: (1907)9BOMLR1044
Beaman, J.1. The question being whether a counsel who has conducted his clients' case can be called and allowed to give evidence as to material facts which occurred before he was retained, I think the answer must be given not with reference only to the provisions of the Evidence Act, but upon general principles and with special reference to the prestige and responsibilities of the bar. What earlier English lawyers thought of the practice is made plain enough by the language used by Lord Campbell, in describing what was done at the trial of Sir Thomas More (1535) How. St. Tr., 386, 390 where he said, with reference to the Solicitor-General offering himself as a witness and being allowed to testity, that it was an ' eternal disgrace to the Court who permitted such an outrage on decency. '2. The same point arose in Stones v. Byron (1846) 4 Dow. & L. 393 and this was made a ground for ordering a new trial. The same principle was confirmed in a later case of Deane v. Packwoodi. (1847) 4 Dow...
In Re: Framji Cawasji Markar; in Re: Costs of Crawford and Co.
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Aug-15-1907
Reported in: (1907)9BOMLR1014
Davar, J.1. On the 25th of July 1907 Messrs. Crawford Brown & Co., Solicitors of this Court, obtained a Summons calling upon the respondents to show cause why their bills of costs should not be lodged for taxation and be taxed by the Taxing Master of this Court. The respondents are some of them executors and trustees under the will of the late Mr. Pramji Cawasji Markar and some of them trustees under two Settlements known as the Charity and the Family Settlements made on the 29th of May 1888.2. Some of the respondents did not appear when the matter was brought on for argument before me on the 12th instant. Mr. Runchordass appeared for the respondent Kaikhoshru Framji Markar and supported the application for taxation of the bills referred to in Mr. Tenant's affidavit and enumerated in the list annexed to that affidavit and marked A. The respondent Dinsha Framji Markar appeared for himself and as a duly constituted attorney for his mother Dossibai and objected to any order being made aga...
Govind Dattu Lonari Vs. Yesuji Khandoji
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Aug-15-1907
Reported in: (1908)10BOMLR492
Chandavarkar, J.1. The judgment of the District Judge appealed from is not clear as to the facts found. The learned District Judge says at the outset that he quite agrees with the findings of the lower Court on the questions of fact. We turn to these findings and it appears from the judgment of the Subordinate Judge, Mr. Dikshit, that his finding on the question of facts in the case was that the sale relied upon by the plaintiff from the defendants 1 and 3 was a colourable transaction not intended to operate as a real sale. That was a distinct finding of fact. Whether it was correct or not, it is not for us, sitting in second appeal, to say. But the real controversy arising out of the pleadings in the case was centered in the question whether the sale was a real transaction or whether it was a sham transaction never intended by the parties to have any effect but intended only to protect the property from the creditors of the defendant. Among other circumstances the Subordinate Judge re...
Emperor Vs. Vyankatsing Sambhusing
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Aug-14-1907
Reported in: (1907)9BOMLR1057
ORDER1. Assuming without deciding that this reference lies, having regard to Clause 3 of Section 269 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Court thinks that the case should be sent back to the Judge who tried it, with a direction that he should pass orders and dispose of it as in a case tried by him with the aid of assessors on the minor charges against the accused under Section 325 of the Indian Penal Code. This is the course suggested by accused's counsel and agreed to by the Government Pleader. The Court is not satisfied with the reasons given by the Sessions Judge that the charge was really a single one, because as a fact there were two distinct charges to each of which the accused were called on to plead and that brings the case clearly within the provisions of Clause 3 of Section 269, Criminal Procedure Code....
N.C. Macleod Vs. Haji Sajan Lalji
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Aug-13-1907
Reported in: (1907)9BOMLR1006
Davar, J.1. Previous to the 14th of October 1903, Hashambhoy Visram, Fazulbhai Visram and Hajibhai Visram were carrying on business as merchants in Bombay in the name of Vishram Ebrahim and Company. The firm was involved in monetary difficulties and on the 14th of October Hashambhai and Hajibhai filed their petition in the Court for the relief of Insolvent Debtors and a Vesting Order was made on the same day whereby all their property vested in the plaintiff who was then the Official Assignee. On the following day, on the petition of a creditor, Fazulbhoy was adjudicated an insolvent and on that day, a similar Vesting Order was made in favour of the plaintiff in respect of his property. Pending their insolvency the plaintiff filed a suit being suit No. 76 of 1904 challenging certain trust as being in fraud of the creditors. After the filing of this suit it seems that the insolvents arranged certain terms of settlement with the plaintiff and on the 15th of June 1904 Hashambhoy and Hajib...
R.D. Sethna Vs. Mirza Mahomed Shirazi (No. 2)
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Aug-12-1907
Reported in: (1907)9BOMLR1042
Beaman, J.1. The question being whether the plaintiff in a former suit had certain knowledge it is proposed to affect him with it by certain parts of the proceedings of that case and to that course no objection is taken. But when pursuant thereto it is proposed to put it in conclusion his counsel's address to the Court or so much of it as would show or might show the requisite knowledge, it is objected to, as I understand on two grounds. (1) That what counsel says in those circumstances is not in any sense an admission of his client's; that what counsel knows his client need not necessarily know. (2) That there is no proof that counsel did say what the presiding judge noted that he did. The judge is not bound to note counsel's address and it is no part of the record. I do not think either ground of objection can be sustained. For the limited purpose to which the evidence is led I do not think it can be seriously argued that counsel's knowledge is not his client's knowledge. And as to t...
Laxmawa Basappa Vs. Ramappa Yellappa
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Aug-08-1907
Reported in: (1907)9BOMLR1054
Chandavarkar, J.1. There are no doubt observations in the judgments of this Court in the two cases Ningawa v. Ramappa 1903 5 Bom. L.R. 308: I.L.R. 28 Bom. 94 and Shivram v. Krishnabai : (1906)8BOMLR89 referred to by the District Judge which support the view that Article 119 of Schedul 11 to the Limitation Act does not apply to a suit in which the fact as distinguished from the validity of an adoption has been denied. But those observations in each of the judgments in question are mere obiter dictd, and, having reconsidered them more carefully we have come to the conclusion that there is no difference in point of principle between Articles 118 and 119 and the considerations that have been held by the Full Bench in Shriniwas v. Hanmant I L R (1899) 24 Bom. 264 : 1 Bom. L.R. 429 to apply to the former article apply equally to 'the latter. We agree with the decision to that effect of the Madras High Court in Ratnamasari v. Akilandammal I L R (1902) Mud. 291. One of the learned Judges who d...
Fatmabibi BudruddIn Vs. Ganesh Ballal Joglekar
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Aug-07-1907
Reported in: (1907)9BOMLR917
1. The question submitted for our decision is whether Sections 12, 13 and 71 A of the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act apply to suits instituted before that Act came into force in the particular district in which the suits arc instituted.2. We are of opinion that Sections 13 and 71 A have no such application and that Section 12 must be allowed retrospective effect only in so far as it regulates the procedure of the Court. To obviate the possibility of misunderstanding, we add that in this view of the law it appears to us advisable to specify the last sixteen words of the main paragraph of the section, 'And secondly, with a view to taking an account between such parties in manner hereinafter provided' as the particular passage to which retrospective effect must be denied.3. In this connection we invite attention to the recent ruling of a Division Bench of this Court in Pannalal v. Kalu : (1906)8BOMLR798 which we read as indicating a similar construction of the law....
Emperor Vs. A.M. Jeevanji
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Aug-07-1907
Reported in: (1907)9BOMLR967
Chandavarkar, J.1. This is an application by the petitioner, A.M. Jeewanjee, for a revision of the judgment of the Chief Presidency Magistrate, convicting him of the offence under Sub-section 1 of Section 107 of the Indian Emigration Act of 1883, as amended by Act No. X of 1902. Under that provision, 'whoever without having first obtained the permission of the Local Government referred to in Section 107, Sub-section 1, enters or attempts to enter into an agreement purporting to bind any Native of India to depart by sea out of India for any of the purposes specified in the Sub-section ... shall, on conviction by a Magistrate of the First Class, be punishable with fine which may extend to Rs. 250 for each Native of India in respect of whom the offence is committed.'2. The learned Chief Presidency Magistrate has held that the petitioner Jeewanjee entered into such an agreement (which i Ex. T in the case) with one Shaik Ismail Shaik Jamal, on the 23rd of January 1907, without having first ...
Khodabhai Sartansing Vs. Chaganlal Kishordas
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Aug-07-1907
Reported in: (1907)9BOMLR1122
Louis P. Russell, Acting C.J.1. In our opinion the decree of the lower appellate Court is correct.2. It appears that the father of these minors, one Sartansing, was the assignee of a certain mortgage debt from one Talakshi Chika and the former subsequently by Exhibit 2(i mortgaged that debt to the plaintiff in this suit.3. The point raised is that, having regard to Section 31 of the Talukdari Settlement Act, VI of 1888, which says, ' No encumbrance on a Thalukdar's estate or on any portion thereof made by the Talukdar after this Act conies into force shall be valid beyond the Talukdar's natural life unless as therein provided' the incumbrance created by the Talukdar without the sanction of Government is not good beyond the lifetime of the Talukdar.4. We are of course bound by the decision in Parshotam v. Bai Punji (1902) 4Bom. L.R. 817, that the words 'Talukdar's estate' are different from and imply more than 'Talukdari estate' But that case is only an authority to that extent; what we...
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