Mumbai Court January 1883 Judgments
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Chena Pemaji Vs. Ghelabhai Narandas
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Jan-29-1883
Reported in: (1883)ILR7Bom301
Melvill, J.1. Section 230 of Act X of 1877 leaves it to the discretion of the Court executing a decree to refuse execution at the same time against the person and property of the judgment-debtor; but the law appears to allow an appeal against such an order of refusal, and we are, therefore, bound to consider whether the lower Court's discretion has been properly exercised. In the present case we are of opinion that the lower Court was not justified in refusing a warrant of arrest) for no other reason than because a warrant for attachment of property had been issued. The decree was passed in 1878, and under it the judgment-creditor claims more than Rs. 6,000, but has never been able to recover more than Rs. 301. On the 1st October, 1880, the judgment-debtor asked for a month's time to enable him to raise money by sale or mortgage, and pay off the debt, and three months were granted him for that purpose; but he appears to have taken no steps to raise the necessary funds. When the present...
Sankana Kalana Vs. Virupakshapa Ganeshapa and
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Jan-22-1883
Reported in: (1883)ILR7Bom146
Kemball, J.1. Assuming that the District Judge was justified in going behind the decree obtained by Sankana against Ningana, it is clear that he was wrong in holding under Section 134 of the Contract Act that Sankana's omission to sue the principal Mohidin discharged the surety Ningana. Section 134 is qualified, as held in Hajarimal v. Krishnaram I.L.R. 5 Bom. 647 by Section 137, which obviously governs the present case.2. It is contended, however, on behalf of the respondent Virupakshapa that the decree obtained by Sankana was not binding on him, he not having been a party to the suit, and that, on the authority of the numerous decisions of this Court--see the cases of Pandubhat v. Balaji Printed Judgments for 1878 p. 54; Ganesh Sadashiv v. Balkrishna Gopal Printed Judgments for 1879 p. 28; Radhabai v. Shamrav Vinayak Printed Judgments for 1881 p. 219; Dayabhai Jaichand v. Maganlal Kalidas Printed Judgments for 1881 p. 232; Wasudev Balaji v. Narayan Krishna See supra p. 131; Rupchand ...
Kuvarbai, Widow of Bomanji Vs. Mir Alam Khan
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Jan-22-1883
Reported in: (1883)ILR7Bom170
Kemball, J.1. Two points a rise in this case as it now presents it self before us first as to the validity of the assignment of the property in dispute by Padshah Begam to Mir Ruhulla which it was for the plaintiff to establish, and, second, (assuming that the property had validly passed to Mir Ruhulla) as to the mala fides of the quasi consent decree obtained by Bomanji, the husband of the plaintiff, against Mir Ruhulla, the burden of proof being on the defendant.2. The first question turns on whether the document just referred to was a deed of gift or a will, for it was conceded in the Court below and admitted here (on the authority of a case recently decided in this Court) thai if it was a deed of gift, then plaintiff's case must of necessity fail. The District Judge has found that the document was a deed of gift, and 'as such admittedly was invalid', but he refused to apply the general rule to the case, as defendant had no right to the property in dispute, save what he derived from...
Jagjivan Amirchand Vs. Hasan Abraham and ors.
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Jan-18-1883
Reported in: (1883)ILR7Bom179
Charles Sargent, Kt., C.J.1. We do not think the application is barred. See Khodabux v.Budree Narain Singh I.L.R. 7 Cal 137....
Magandas Khemchand Vs. Ramchandra Hiraji
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Jan-16-1883
Reported in: (1883)ILR7Bom137
Charles Sargent, Kt., C.J.1. The document is apparently a bond, and properly stamped, with a two-anna stamp....
Umed Dholchand Vs. Pir Saheb Jiva Miya and ors.
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Jan-16-1883
Reported in: (1883)ILR7Bom134
Charles Sargent, Kt., C.J.1. The question referred to us by the Judge of the Small Cause Court of Ahmedabad is, whether it was incumbent on the plaintiff to unite the claims on the two bonds in the same suit. Section 43 of the Civil Procedure Code requires that 'every suit shall include the whole of the claim which the plaintiff is entitled to in respect of the same cause of action.' There can be no doubt that the two bonds and the default in payment of them constitute, in any view of the expression 'cause of action', two distinct causes of action, and there is nothing, we think, in the language of the Section (which would appear to have been mainly designed to discourage multiplicity of suits) which would justify the Court in going behind the bonds to consider the circumstances out of which they sprung, albeit those circumstances might themselves at the time have constituted a cause of action. A case of two promissory notes passed under similar circumstances to the present bond, and d...
Harmukhgauri Vs. Harisukhprasad
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Jan-16-1883
Reported in: (1883)ILR7Bom191
Melvill, J.1.We think that the District Judge is correct in his opinion that Article 132, Schedule II of Act IX of 1871 applies to suits which are brought by a 'hakdar' against the person originally liable for payment of the 'hak', and not to suits by one sharer in a vatan against another sharer, or alleged sharer, who has improperly received the plaintiff's share of the 'hak.' A suit of the latter description is a suit for money received by the defendant for the plaintiff's use, and the period of limitation is three years, as proscribed by Article 60. It is true that this is not the view which was expressed in the case to which the District Judge refers--Chhaganlal v. Bapubhai I.L.R. 5 Bom. 68 but it is to be observed that the question raised and argued in that case was whether the 'hak' in dispute was moveable or immoveable property, and whether the period of limitation was six years, as alleged by the defendant, or twelve years as contended by the plaintiff. It was never argued that...
In Re: Bhavanibai Widow of Bala Maharaj
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Jan-16-1883
Reported in: (1883)ILR7Bom194
Charles Sargent, Kt., C.J.1. When the lady adopted a son, her gift in future became inoperative. The donee now claims under a gift from the adopted son, and if that instrument of gift be duly stamped, it will constitute a sufficient title-deed. The instrument should be stamped with a single stamp as an instrument of gift under Article 36, Schedule I, Act I of 1879....
The Bombay Tramway Company Limited Vs. Khairaj Tejpall
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Jan-12-1883
Reported in: (1883)ILR7Bom119
Charles Sargent, Kt., C.J.1. We think the questions put to us by the First Judge of the Small Cause Court must be answered in the affirmative, and that the proprietor of the buggy is liable in this suit.2. In Fowler v. Locke L.R. 7 C.P. 285 Willes. J., stated that the effect of the corresponding Acts in force in England upon the subject was to recognize and stamp upon the transaction the character of an employment in which the cabman is a servant, and to make the proprietor liable for 'him as such.' The question is whether there is any material difference between the English Acts and the Bombay Act VI of 1863 which would justify us in holding that the relationship established here between the proprietor and the driver of a cab is different from that existing in England.3. In Powles v. Hider 25 L.J.Q.B. 331 Lord Campbell considered the effect of the English Statutes, and referred particularly to Sections 23, 24, 27 and 28 of Stat. 6 and 7 Vic., c. 86, as showing that the driver of a cab...
Empress Vs. Baibaya
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Jan-11-1883
Reported in: (1883)ILR7Bom126
Melvill, J.1. The conduct of the accused does not constitute the offence of which she has been convicted. In order to constitute the offence of mischief it is not sufficient to show that the accused was guilty of carelessness in allowing her goat to stray. The prosecution was bound to show that there was an intention to cause wrongful loss or damage. The same view has been taken by the Calcutta and Madras High Courts in cases reported in 6 Bengal Law Reports, Appendix 3, and 6 M H C R 36. The Court, therefore, reverses the conviction and sentence, and directs the fine to be returned to the accused....
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