Mumbai Court February 1878 Judgments
imperatrix Vs. Gowdapa BIn Venkugowda
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Feb-28-1878
Reported in: (1878)ILR2Bom534
Melvill, J.1. In this case Gowdapa bin Venkugowda was accused before a First Class Magistrate, Mr. Ramchandra Bapuji, of an offence triable by the Magistrate, and was discharged by him under Section 216 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The District Magistrate thereupon called for the record of the case; and, not being satisfied with the reasons given for the order of discharge, sent the record to another First Class Magistrate, Mr. Campbell, with an order directing him to try the case afresh. Mr. Campbell convicted the accused; but, on appeal to the Sessions Court, the conviction was reversed, on the ground that it was not competent to the District Magistrate to revive the proceedings, after Gowdapa had been discharged by Mr. Ramchandra Bapuji. In support of this conclusion the Sessions Judge relied on the decision of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Mohesh Mistree and another I.L.R. 1 Cal. 282.2. The District Magistrate professes to have acted under Section 142 of the Criminal Pr...
Tag this Judgment!Shamavahoo Vs. Dwarkadas Vasanji and ors.
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Feb-26-1878
Reported in: (1888)ILR12Bom202
C. Sargent, J.1. This suit came before the Court for further directions on the 26th February last, in order that a finding might be recorded on certain questions arising out of the will of the late Gokuldas Tejpal, and which have since been raised in the following issues numbered 33, 34, 35 in this suit:2. Whether the infants Sundardas and Narrondas, sons of Dwarkadas Vasanji, or either of them, take any and what interest in the residuary estate of the late Gokuldas Tejpal in the event of their not being adopted?3. Whether Shamavahoo is bound to accept the infant Sundardas in adoption upon the conditions mentioned in the petition of Mathuradas Lowji?4. Whether, in the event of her refusing to adopt upon such conditions, the Court can and (if so) will execute the trust (if any) reposed in Shamavahoo?5. The question raised by the first of these issues turns upon the construction to be put upon the fifteenth clause of the will, which is in the following words:During my lifetime, or subseq...
Tag this Judgment!In Re: Tukaram Vithal
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Feb-21-1878
Reported in: (1878)ILR2Bom527
1. The Court concur in the ruling and the reasons given for it by the Second Class Magistrate of Nasik, Rav Saheb Shridhar Gundo, viz., that Clause 1 of Section 74 of the Municipal Act, Bombay, No. VI of 1873, applies only to the second clause of Section 39 of the same Act....
Tag this Judgment!Mirza Ally Bebanee Vs. Syed Hyder Hoosein
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Feb-19-1878
Reported in: (1878)ILR2Bom449
Pinhey, J.1. By the first clause of Section 108 of the Code of Civil Procedure an application may be made to set aside a decree passed ex parte against a defendant under Section 100, and by the second clause of the section it is provided that 'if it be proved to the satisfaction of the Court that the defendant was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing when the suit was called on for hearing, the Court shall pass an order to set aside the decree.' In the present case I am satisfied that the defendant was prevented by sufficient cause from appearing when the suit was called on for hearing on the 12th February. The defendant has sworn in his affidavit in support of the application that he was not in Bombay when the plaint in this suit was filed on the 21st January last, as he went, four months ago, to his native place, Moradabad, in the North-West Provinces, for the recovery of his health, or, at least, for change of air. And it seems from the plaint that the plaintiff was unce...
Tag this Judgment!L.A. Wallace and ors. Vs. F.G. Jefferson
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Feb-15-1878
Reported in: (1878)ILR2Bom453
Charles Sargent, J.1. In Bustros v. While (L.R. 1.Q.B.D., 423) it was decided by a Court of Appeal consisting of eight Judges that, under Order XXXI, Rule 11, of the English Judicature Act, a Judge has no discretion as to refusing to allow the production of documents in possession of a party to the suit relating to the matter in question, provided the documents are not privileged. Section 130 of the Civil Procedure Act of 1877 would appear to have been copied from the above rule, and we think, therefore, it is advisable to adopt the English ruling as to its construction. As the defendant's affidavit admits that the documents in question relate to the matter in dispute, the only question to be determined is, whether they are privileged. They consist of two or three telegrams and letters, all of which passed between the plaintiffs in London and Mr. Richardson, who manages their business in Bombay. It was said that they were confidential communications between principals and their agents....
Tag this Judgment!imperatrix Vs. Bhawani BIn Panduji and Sakharam BIn Khundoji
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Feb-14-1878
Reported in: (1878)ILR2Bom525
1. This case depends upon the 4th and 5th clauses of Section 263 of the Criminal Procedure Code. These clauses are not very clearly drawn; but taking them together, as we are bound to do, in order to ascertain the meaning of the Legislature, we think that the 'dissent,' spoken of in the 4th clause, must be such a complete dissent as to lead the Judge to consider it necessary for the ends of justice to submit the case to the High Court. There being no such complete dissent in this case, we think that the conviction and sentence must stand. This decision is not in conflict with our decision in Imperatrix v. Hari Ghanu, where we held that Government might appeal against an acquittal by a jury where the Judge differed from the jury, but did not consider it necessary for the ends of justice to refer the case to the High Court....
Tag this Judgment!Govinda and anr. Vs. Premaji and ors.
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Feb-11-1878
Reported in: (1883)ILR7Bom73
M.R. Westropp, Kt., C.J.1. In such cases as the present, where one party alleges a transaction to be a mortgage, and the other alleges it to be a sale, the question which presents itself for consideration is whether or not there continued to be a debt from the former to the latter--see Goodman v. Grierson 2 Ball and Beatty 279 Bapuji Apaji v. Senavaraji I.L.R. 2 Bom. 231; Murphy v. Taylor Ir. Chan Rep. 92; Subhabhat v. Vasudevbhat I.L.R. 2 Bom. 113. The exhibits 8 and 9 are relied upon by the defendant Jesha Premaji as deeds of sale, whereby the lands therein respectively mentioned were conveyed to him absolutely. But the form of the instruments is not conclusive. If it appear aliunde, as, for instance, by the conduct of the apparent vendee himself, that the deeds were intended as mere securities for money, and that he so treated them, a Court of Equity will deal with them as such accordingly. Now the books of the defendant, Jesha Premaji, have been produced by him on the requisition o...
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