Mumbai Court December 1875 Judgments
Tarachand Pirchand Vs. Lakshman Bhavani
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Dec-22-1875
Reported in: (1877)ILR1Bom91
West, J.1. Haibati's son Bhagu, it is clear, passed to the Mamlatdar a razinama of the land in dispute in favour of the defendant Lakshman. Tarachand, as subsequent purchaser of Haibati's rights, now seeks to eject Lakshman, asserting that, as the land is miras, the resignation by Bhagu conferred no more than a precarious right of occupation terminable at the will of Haibati or of the successor to Haibati's interest. It is plain, however, that Bhagu gave up possession of the land in dispute to Lakshman. Lakshman's possession is prima facie evidence of complete ownership throwing the burden, according to Section 110 of the Indian Evidence Act, of showing that it is held on some inferior title, upon him who seeks to dislodge the possessor. Under the English Common Law 'if the defendant pleads livery and seizin from the plaintiff, the plaintiff cannot reply that the livery was conditional without showing the deed, inasmuch as the plaintiff is estopped to defeat his own livery by a naked a...
Tag this Judgment!Babaji Hari Vs. Rajaram Ballal and anr.
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Dec-20-1875
Reported in: (1877)ILR1Bom75
West, J.1. The first point that arises for disposal is, whether a pauper respondent is entitled to present objections at the trial of an appeal without payment of stamp duty under the Court Fees Act VII of 1870. Section 16 of that Act says absolutely that the Court shall not hear such objections until the respondent shall have paid the additional fee due under the Act. No exception is made in favour of pauper respondents. It has been argued by Mr. Ghanasham that a pauper respondent is, when he presents an objection, a pauper appellant, and entitled to the indulgence in that character; but the grammatical construction of the Act does not allow this indulgence to him, and the reason for this probably was that he already had the opportunity of directly making an appeal without expense for court fees, and that an inquiry into his pauperism at the last stage of the case would involve great delay and inconvenience. We do not think, therefore, that there is any good reason for departing from ...
Tag this Judgment!Balkrishna Bhalchandra Vs. Gopal Raghunath
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Dec-15-1875
Reported in: (1877)ILR1Bom73
West, J.1. The District Court has confirmed the order of the Subordinate Judge, limiting the amount, recoverable as interest by the judgment-creditor, to a sum equal to the principal sum awarded by the decree. This decision is based on the rule of the Hindu Law which limits the amount recoverable at one time by way of interest to the amount of the principal. But there is no authority for limiting the amount recoverable in execution of a decree by any such rule. As regards purely private transactions, the law for the protection of the weaker party controls his freedom of contract in the way to which we have referred, or, at least, refuses to enforce the debtor's engagement by means of a duty imposed on the Courts of exercising their powers of coercion to give effect to what it presumes to be an extortionate or unduly rigorous bargain. But the same reason, it is obvious, does not apply to the execution of a decree of a Civil Court. In making such a decree the Judge is not liable, as the ...
Tag this Judgment!Shankar Ramchandra Vs. Vishnu Anant
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Dec-14-1875
Reported in: (1877)ILR1Bom67
West, J.1. The appellant urges that the deed of partition, on which he sues, is excluded from the operation of Section 17 of Act XX of 1866 by being amongst those enumerated in Section 18, Article 7,* as optionally registrable. We do not think that an instrument, to which one of the terms in that article may be applicable, is freed by that circumstance from the necessity of registration under Section 17, if such necessity otherwise exists. If the instrument is one properly falling under Section 17, apart from the provisions of Section 18, Article 7, it ranks amongst the documents before provided for; and the specific provision, imposing a necessity for registration, is not superseded by a general provision for optional registration which is satisfied by applying it to instruments such as those affecting only moveable property not included within the scope of Section 17. The more specific rule, regard being had to the purpose of the Act, is that in Section 17 which applies only to some ...
Tag this Judgment!Reg. Vs. Devama and Somshekhar
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Dec-08-1875
Reported in: (1877)ILR1Bom64
1. The accusation made against the accused in this case constituted it a warrant-case falling under the provisions of Section 213 et seq. of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Magistrate, Mr. Middleton, after an arrangement had been come to between the parties, divided the property between them and dismissed the complaint. By 'dismiss the case' we understand the Magistrate to have meant the same thing as is indicated by Section 215 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, where it says that the Magistrate, if he finds that no offence has been proved against the accused person, shall discharge him.' 'Dismissal of a complaint' is a phrase properly applicable only to a summons case under Chapter XVI of the Code, and incapable of being applied, as Section 212 shows, to any complaint, 'except in so far as it refers to a summons case.' The provisions of Section 215 are highly useful in many cases. They enable a Magistrate, when circumstances make it expedient, to dispose of an accusation without ...
Tag this Judgment!Jibhai Mahipati and anr. Vs. Parbhu Bapu and anr.
Court: Mumbai
Decided on: Dec-06-1875
Reported in: (1877)ILR1Bom59
West, J.1. The application in this case was presented for execution of a decree, the last prior application for execution of which had been made in February 1868. Upon that earlier order, partial execution had been obtained and proceedings sufficient apparently to bar limitation under the Act of 1859, had been going on till 30th September 1871. The application made to the Court on that day was not one which, according to the case of Gouree Sunkur Tribedee v. Arman Ali Chowdhry 21 Cal. W.R. 309 Civ. Rul), could bar limitation under Act IX of 1871. It was, indeed, merely a request or suggestion that the Collector should be directed to carry out a direction sent to him in 1868 in a particular way; but if it had been an application of a kind which in itself could serve as a bar to limitation, it was then already too late on the day when it was made, which was more than three years after February 1868, and, being thus inadmissible, could not mark a point of time from which a fresh period of...
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