Kolkata Court March 1901 Judgments

A.B. Miller, Official Assignee of Bengal and Assignee to the Estate of ...

Court: Kolkata

Reported in: (1901)ILR28Cal419

Maclean, C.J.1. Two points arise upon this appeal. The facts stated shortly, are these: In 1895 the decree-holder, in a suit to enforce his mortgage, attached certain immoveable property. In 1898, one of the judgment-debtors was declared an insolvent. On the 6th of May 1898 a vesting order was duly made in the insolvency proceedings. Subsequently an order for sale of the property attached was made, and on the 3rd of October, 1898, the Official Assignee intervened, and on the 18th of February 1899, the First Subordinate Judge of 24-Pergunnahs passed the order, which is the subject of the present appeal. By that order he held that the decree-holder had priority in respect of the attached property over the Official Assignee. The latter has appealed. A preliminary objection is taken that no appeal lies in this case, on the ground that the appellant, the Official Assignee, is not the 'representative' of the judgment-debtor within the meaning of Clause (c) of Section 244 of the Code of Civil...

Mati Mahto Vs. H. C. Studd and ors.

Court: Kolkata

Reported in: (1901)ILR28Cal334

1. These appeals arose out of suits brought by the plaintiffs respondents in the Court of the Munsif of Mozafferpur praying that certain deeds of Navistakbhand (or agreements to cultivate certain of their land with indigo), which purported to have been executed by them in favour of the proprietors of the Dhooli Indigo Factory, should be declared by the Court to be fabricated and spurious, that the plaintiffs were not bound by them as they were wholly invalid and null, and that the Court would also cancel and set aside the deeds. The plaintiffs in each case put in their plaints stamped with the ad valorem stamps calculated on the value of the lands, and one of the first objections taken by the defendants in their written statements in each case was that 'the Court fee paid by the plaintiff is insufficient in law, and unless the plaintiff pays sufficient Court fee required by law, the suit cannot be proceeded with.' The Munsiff does not appear to have taken up this objection, until he de...

Amirul HossaIn Vs. Khairunnessa and anr.

Court: Kolkata

Reported in: (1901)ILR28Cal567

1. This is an appeal against a decision of the Subordinate Judge of Patna, dated the 14th of February 1901, rejecting a plaint under Section 54, Clause (6) of the Code of Civil Procedure. 2. The plaintiff instituted this suit to obtain a declaration that the defendant No. 1 is his lawfully married wife according to Mahomedan law, and he prayed that a decree might be passed in his favour directing the defendant No. 1 to live with him and that a decree might also be given him against the defendants for restitution of conjugal rights.3. The plaintiff stamped his plaint with a Court fee of Rs. 25, and the learned pleader, who appears on his behalf in this Court, explains that he paid this stamp on this computation, namely, Rs. 10 for a declaratory decree, Rs. 10 for an injunction, and Rs. 5 under Article 15 of Schedule II of the Court Fees Act, for a suit to obtain possession of a wife. At the same time the plaintiff valued his suit for the purposes of jurisdiction at one lakh and 26 rupee...

Lala Suraj Prosad (Minor) and anr. Vs. Golab Chand

Court: Kolkata

Reported in: (1901)ILR28Cal517

Maclean, C.J.1. This is a suit by one Lala Suraj Prosad, who is a minor suing by his next friend, and also by his step-mother, against one Golab Chand, and the object of the suit is to have it declared that a certain mortgage-bond for Rs. 6,900, dated the 4th of April 1893, executed by Lala Chander Koylash, who was the father of the minor plaintiff and the husband of the co-plaintiff, is not binding upon and cannot be enforced against the joint properties mentioned in the bond, and for consequential relief. 2. The case is governed by the Hindu Law of the Mitakshara School; and the facts, so far as they are necessary for the purposes of the questions we have to decide, may be briefly stated. The father of the minor plaintiff one Lachchanji succeeded his father in 1875 or 1876. At that time he was a minor; he attained his majority in November 1890, and then took over charge of the joint-family estate left by his father, the joint-family estate of a Hindoo family governed by the Mitakshar...

Tekait Mon Mohini Jemadai Vs. Basanta Kumar Singh

Court: Kolkata

Reported in: (1901)ILR28Cal751

Ghose, J.1. The appeal arises out of a suit for enforcement of conjugal rights.2. The plaintiff and the defendant were married on the 9th Falgun 1292 Amli, corresponding to the 18th February 1885, at a time when they were both minors. The defendant is the daughter of the Rajah of Kattikari in the district of Midnapur. The Rajah was then dead, and the defendant was given away in marriage by her mother. The plaintiff's parents agreed that their son should be married to the defendant, and at the time of the marriage an agreement, described in this suit as pratijna patra, was executed by them, and it ran as follows:That we solemnly promise that you, having decided to keep my eldest son Sriman Rai Basanta Kumar Singh Babajiban in your own house, after having married your eldest daughter to him, and having asked for my permission and that of my wife thereto, we both give our consent thereto and execute this pratijna patra, to the effect that neither I nor my wife shall ever propose to take o...

Khadem HosseIn Vs. Emdad Hossein

Court: Kolkata

Maclean, C.J.1. The question submitted for our decision is 'whether in an appeal against the final decree in a partition suit it is open to the appellant to question the correctness of the preliminary order or decree for partition when no appeal was preferred against such order within the time allowed by law.'2. The first point to consider is whether the preliminary order or decree is a decree within the meaning of Section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Full Bench case of Dulhin Golab Koer v. Radha Dulari Koer (1892) I. L. R. 19 Cale. 463 is a distinct authority to the effect that such an order is a decree within Section 2, and this view is clearly supported by the recent case of Bhup Indar Bahadur Singh v. Bijai Bahadur Singh (19O0) I. L. R. 43 All. 152 before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, in which judgment was given on the 21st July 1900. There it was held that an order upon an issue, 'For what period are mesne profits recoverable' was final and not interlocutor...

Durga Churn Law Vs. Hateen Mandal

Court: Kolkata

Reported in: (1902)ILR29Cal252

Hill and Brett, JJ.1. These appeals have been preferred against the orders passed by the Subordinate Judge of the 24-Parganas setting aside the order of the Munsif of Baraset dismissing the suits brought by the plaintiffs respondents and remanding them to the Munsif for retrial on the merits. The suits, as well as the appeals, were heard together and were decided by single judgments. These two appeals have been heard together and will be governed by this judgment.2. The appellants are the zemindars of Taraf Chaurashi, Thana Howrah, and a survey of the lands of that estate appears to have been made under the provisions of the Bengal Tenancy Act. In the course of the proceedings, the appellants, the landlords, put in petitions to the Settlement Officer, under Section 104 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, praying that he would, under the second clause of that Section, settle fair and equitable rents in respect of the lands hold by the respondents as tenants. Similar applications were made with r...

Sheoprakash Singh and ors. Vs. W.D. Rawlins

Court: Kolkata

Reported in: (1901)ILR28Cal594

1. This rule was issued calling upon the Magistrate of the District to show cause why the conviction of, and sentence passed on, the petitioners should not be set aside, on the ground that the accused were not allowed by the Sub-Divisional Officer of Beguserai to cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution, who were summoned for the 20th December, and who were present on that date, or why such other order should not be I made, as to this Court may appear fit and proper.2. As we pointed out to the learned Advocate-General in the course of his arguments, in granting the rule we had in view the provisions of Section 257. We may observe at the very outset that, in our opinion, the work of this Court would be appreciably lightened, if the Subordinate Magistrates, in dealing with the law relating to the rights of accused persons, would construe it in a less technical spirit than they are sometimes accustomed to do. In the inferior Courts the right principle is occasionally reversed, and ...