Kolkata Court February 1893 Judgments
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Alta Soondari Dasi Vs. Srinath Saha
Court: Kolkata
Decided on: Feb-20-1893
Reported in: (1893)ILR20Cal641
Macpherson and Beverley, JJ.1. This is an appeal from an order by which the appellant, who had obtained a certificate under Act XXVII of 1860, was directed to furnish security to the extent to which the security originally furnished had been diminished by the sale of a portion of the property. We think that neither under Act XXVII of 1860 nor under the provisions of the present Act, VII of 1889, does an appeal lie from such an order. It is not an order relating either to the granting, refusing or revoking of a certificate.2. The appeal is rejected with costs....
Brojendra Nath Das Vs. the Budge-budge Jute Mill Company, Limited
Court: Kolkata
Decided on: Feb-17-1893
Reported in: (1893)ILR20Cal527
W. Comer Petheram, C.J.1. I am of opinion that the Small Cause Court has no jurisdiction to try the set-off, inasmuch as the same amounts to Rs. 2,738-4-0, which is beyond the jurisdiction of the Court.2. A series of cases in all the Courts in India has established that what is called an equitable right of set-off exists in this country when both the claim of the plaintiff and that of the defendant arise out of the same transaction, though the claim sought to be set off is not within the provisions of Section 11l* of the Civil Procedure Code, and this being so, this claim for damages could no doubt be set off in the present action, if it were one which the Small Cause Court had jurisdiction to try, but this, I think, it certainly had not. It is a claim to recover Rs. 2,738-4-0 as damages for the breach of a contract to deliver goods, and the defendants seek in this action to recover the whole of that sum, in the sense that they say that when they have established their right to it, the...
Ramdeo and anr. Vs. Cassim Mamoojee
Court: Kolkata
Decided on: Feb-16-1893
Reported in: (1894)ILR21Cal173
W. Comer Petheram, C.J.1. The question which we are asked in this case is, whether or not the plaintiffs' first refusal of the delivery order and their letter of the 5th September 1891 entitled the defendant to rescind the contract. In my opinion the answer to that question is, that it did not so entitle him. The facts of the case are fully set out in the reference of the learned Small Cause Court Judge; and, therefore, it is not necessary to recapitulate them here. It is sufficient to say that I agree with the Small Cause Court Judge in thinking that upon this contract the defendant had no right to call upon the plaintiffs to accept the delivery order of the whole of the goods at that time. In addition to that, I do not think that the letter of the plaintiffs was such repudiation of the contract as to entitle the other party to say that it was at an end. I think the Small Cause Court Judge was right in the view he has taken of the case. This answer will be sent to the Small Cause Cour...
Thako Moni Debi and ors. Vs. Hem Chunder Ghose and ors.
Court: Kolkata
Decided on: Feb-10-1893
Reported in: (1893)ILR20Cal533
Macpherson and Beverley, JJ.1. The appellants before us are persons who intervened and were made defendants in the Court of First Instance. It has been found that the mortgaged property, consisting of 2 bighas of raiyati land within specified boundaries, was the ijmali property of the mortgagor, the father of the first seven defendants, and of the appellants; that the appellants' share of it was 3 annas 3 gundas 1 cowrie 1 kranti, and that subsequent to the execution of the mortgage bonds there was a partition under a decree of Court by which the 2 bighas in question, with the exception of a small portion which was left joint, was allotted to the appellants. The latter were not concerned in the mortgage, and the mortgagee was not a party to the partition suit.2. Both the Courts have held on those facts that the mortgagee was not affected by the partition, and that the mortgaged property, with the exception of the appellants' share, should be sold in satisfaction of the mortgage debt ju...
Jugal Das Dalal Vs. Queen-empress
Court: Kolkata
Decided on: Feb-09-1893
Reported in: (1893)ILR20Cal665
Prinsep and Ameer Ali, JJ.1. In these cases the accused were charged under Sections 283 and 290, Indian Penal Code, that is to say, with doing an act which caused danger, obstruction or injury to any person in a public way, viz., a particular tidal khal; and secondly, with causing a public nuisance. They have been convicted of the first offence under Section 283 and have been sentenced to fine.2. A rule was granted to consider the legality and propriety of the sentence.3. We have considered the case on the evidence before us and on the arguments addressed to us by the learned Counsel on both sides. Mr. Kilby, who appears in support of the conviction, has cited the case of In the matter of the petition of Umesh Chandra Kar, I.L.R. 14 Cal. 656, as an authority for his contention that the mere fact of an encroachment on a tidal navigable river necessarily amounts to a public nuisance so as to render the person causing that obstruction liable to punishment under Section 290. We may, howeve...
Queen-empress Vs. Mukunda Chunder Chatterjee
Court: Kolkata
Decided on: Feb-06-1893
Reported in: (1893)ILR20Cal654
Prinsep and Ameer Ali, JJ.1. This is a case under the Bengal Municipal Act of 1884, in which the accused has been convicted and sentenced to fine, under Section 344 of Bengal Act III of 1884, for having permitted his land to be used as a market for the sale of provisions as therein specified without a license.2. The Sessions Judge has referred the matter to us on revision, recommending on various grounds that the order should be set aside as illegal and improper. We have had the advantage of hearing learned Counsel on both sides, and have given the fullest consideration to their arguments, for though the case is apparently a petty one, the points raised are of some importance to the general community.3. The case of Moran v. The Chairman of the Motihari Municipality I.L.R. 17 Cal. 329, which proceeded on facts almost exactly the same as in the present case, has been cited to us. That was a suit for damages in consequence of the closing of a market by order of the Municipal Commissioners...
The Queen-empress Vs. Gobind Chandra Das and ors.
Court: Kolkata
Decided on: Feb-03-1893
Reported in: (1893)ILR20Cal520
Prinsep, J.1. After trying a case of murder, the Sessions Judge of Backer-gunge passed the following order:The District Magistrate should at once direct proceedings to be taken under Chapter XII, Code of Criminal Procedure, in respect of immoveable property, possession of which is disputed between the Bhuttacharjees and Summadars of Baghda on the one hand and the Dasses of Goila on the other, to put an end to further breach of the peace between the parties.2. What order was thereupon passed by the District Magistrate we have been unable to ascertain from the record or from the learned Counsel or pleaders who have represented the four parties to the proceedings taken. It, however, appears that a Police enquiry was ordered, and that thereupon the police represented that four sets of persons representing various titles and claims to possession, were in dispute regarding certain lands. The possession of these lands was, we may take it, in some degree the origin of the dispute out of which ...
Baijanath Pandey Vs. Gauri Kanta Mandal
Court: Kolkata
Decided on: Feb-03-1893
Reported in: (1893)ILR20Cal633
Prinsep and Ameer Ali, JJ.1. The complaint originally made before the Magistrate indicated the commission of what is known as a Sessions case, probably dacoity. The Magistrate, in dealing with the case, proceeded under Section 209 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which declares that if the Magistrate should find that there are not sufficient grounds for committing the accused for trial, he should discharge him, unless it appears to the Magistrate that such persons should be tried before himself or some other Magistrate, in which case he shall proceed accordingly. The Magistrate found that no sessions offence was prima facie established, and he, accordingly, proceeded to hold the trial himself, that is to say, he proceeded under Section 254 of the Code, and he framed a charge in writing against the accused, of the offence of theft in a building under Section 380, and criminal trespass under Section 448, Indian Penal Code. Finally, the Magistrate acquitted the accused and, under Section 1...
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