Kolkata Court April 1891 Judgments
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Chogemul and ors. Vs. the Commissioners for the Improvement of the Por ...
Court: Kolkata
Decided on: Apr-10-1891
Reported in: (1891)ILR18Cal427
W. Comer Petheram, Kt., C.J.1. The facts of this case are so fully and clearly set out in the judgment of the Judge of the Small Cause Court that it is not necessary to re-state them.2. The two questions which have to be considered are, first, whether the liability of a carrier of goods by railway in India was, between the passing of the Railways Act of 1879 and the passing of the Railway Act of 1890, that of insurer against everything but what is known as the act of God, or was that of a bailee as defined in the Contract Act; and second, if the liability was that of an insurer, whether this particular loss was caused by the act of God within the legal meaning of the term3. In order to answer the first question, it is necessary to ascertain what has been the history of the law relating to carriers by railway, in this country. The first legislation on the subject is that contained in Act XVIII of 1854, Section 11 of which is as follows: 'The liability of such Railway Company for loss or...
Kazem Ali Vs. Azim Ali Khan
Court: Kolkata
Decided on: Apr-07-1891
Reported in: (1891)ILR18Cal383
Prinsep and Banerjee, JJ.1. This matter arises out of an order by the District Judge under Section 18 of Act XX of 1863, refusing to give leave to the petitioner to institute a suit having reference to a Mahomedan endowment.2. The first question raised for our decision is, whether there is any right of appeal. There is no such right conferred by the Act, but it is argued that, under the new definition of a decree given in the Code of Civil Procedure of 1882, a right of appeal against such an order is given, because such an order would amount to a decree.3. We are not prepared to accept such an interpretation of this definition of a decree. The order in question is a refusal to give leave to institute a suit. It does not come within the definition of the term 'decree,' either as amounting to a formal expression of an adjudication upon a right claimed, or as amounting to an order rejecting a plaint. The order, as we understand it, merely determines that there are no prima facie grounds f...
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