Kolkata Court August 1883 Judgments
Ram Coomar Ghose Vs. Prosunno Coomar Sannyal and anr.
Court: Kolkata
Decided on: Aug-31-1883
Reported in: (1884)ILR10Cal106
Richard Garth, C.J.1. We think that the District Judge was right in allowing to the respondents the costs of translation and printing in the High Court. These costs do undoubtedly form a necessary part of the costs of the appeal to the Privy Council; and we find that in practice the Privy Council have been in the habit, when they allow the costs of an appeal, of leaving the amount to be ascertained by the High Court. The only costs which are assessed in the Privy Council Office are those which are incurred in England.2. This is explained in the case decided by Mr. Justice Markby; Saroda Prasad Mullick v. Lachmiput Singh 9 B.L.R. Ap. 23 : 18 W.R. 89 which seems to be a direct authority in favour of the respondents.3. The appeal will be dismissed with costs, which we assess at two goldmohurs....
Tag this Judgment!Arzan Vs. Rakhal Chunder Roy Chowdhry and the Secretary of State for I ...
Court: Kolkata
Decided on: Aug-30-1883
Reported in: (1884)ILR10Cal214
Richard Garth, C.J.1. The plaintiff has a dwelling house in Burrisaul, in which he and his family have lived for a great many years; and he claims a right of way in respect of that house to and from the high road which runs from east to west through the village.2. On the 2nd of Assin 1285 (17th September 1878) the defendant No. 1 obstructed this right of way by commencing to erect a pucca stable upon the land, whereupon the plaintiff took proceedings in the Criminal Court; but the Magistrate refused to interfere, because he considered it a question to be tried in the Civil Court.3. The defendant No. 1, who is the lessee of the land under the Government, denies the plaintiff's right of way, and the Collector who appears for the Secretary of State, the defendant No. 2, also virtually denies it.4. It appears that the land over which the alleged way passes belongs to one Sherif Hossein. He let it upwards of thirty years ago to one Ijjutullah, and Ijjutullah, after holding it for some six o...
Tag this Judgment!Hurry Churn Chuckerbutty and anr. Vs. the Empress
Court: Kolkata
Decided on: Aug-22-1883
Reported in: (1884)ILR10Cal140
Prinsep, J.1. The two appellants before us, Hurry Churn Chuckerbutty and Gopal Chunder Chuckerbutty, gomasfchas of two co-sharer zamindars, have been tried on charges of culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 804 of the Indian Penal Code, voluntarily causing grievous hurt under Section 325, and voluntarily causing hurt under Section 323. The jury unanimously acquitted them of the offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, and by a majority of three to two convicted them on the second charge. The Judge, in accepting this verdict, expressed his disapproval of the acquittal on the first charge, but in view of the unanimity of the jury in respect of that acquittal accepted the verdict under both heads, and accordingly sentenced the prisoners to the extreme sentence of imprisonment allowed by the law, and also inflicted a fine.2. There are many objections which have been taken to, and are indeed patent in, the Judge's proceedings, both as regards those during the...
Tag this Judgment!Srinath Kur and ors. Vs. Prosunno Kumar Ghose
Court: Kolkata
Decided on: Aug-16-1883
Reported in: (1883)ILR9Cal934
Richard Garth, C.J.1. We think that the rule which was laid down under the Limitation Act of 1859 is no longer the law under the Acts of 1871 and 1877.2. A reversioner who succeeds to immoveable property has now twelve years to bring his suit from the time when his estate falls into possession. (See Article 1411 of the Act of 1871, and Article 140 of the Act of 1877.) Under the Act of 1859 the language was very different. The suit under that Act must have been brought within twelve years from the time when the cause of action arose; and as it was considered by the Full Bench of this Court that the cause of action arose at the time when the owner of the inheritance was first dispossessed, they held that a twelve years dispossession, which barred the owner of the inheritance for the time being (although a female), barred also the reversioner. See Nobin Chunder Chuckerbutty v. Guru Pershad Doss B.L.R. Sup. Vol. 1008 : s.c. 9 W.R. 505.3. The provision in the present Act., as well as that i...
Tag this Judgment!Deo Prosad Sing Vs. Pertab Kairee
Court: Kolkata
Decided on: Aug-15-1883
Reported in: (1884)ILR10Cal86
Mitter, J.1. This is a suit for possession of land covered by a kobala, dated the 31st October 1867; executed in favour of the plaintiff. The lower Courts find that the period of limitation in this case must be counted from the date of the kobala. This finding has not been questioned before us.2. The suit was brought on the 14th April 1881, i.e., more than twelve years from the date of the kobala, and unless the time during which another suit relating to the subject-matter in dispute was pending be deducted, the claim is clearly barred by limitation.3. It appears that the plaintiff, on the 2nd September 1869, brought a suit against the defendant and several other persons, for the recovery of possession of a plot of land, including the land in suit, and obtained a decree in the Court of First Instance. On appeal it was found that the plaintiff had joined together several causes of action. The Appellate Court, on the 30th March 1881, confirmed the decree as regards one of these causes of...
Tag this Judgment!Raghoo Pandey and anr. Vs. Kassy Parey and ors.
Court: Kolkata
Decided on: Aug-15-1883
Reported in: (1884)ILR10Cal73
Mitter, J.1. This is suit for redemption of certain share of Brit Jugmanka. It is a right ot officiate as priest at funeral ceremonies of Hindus. The Munsif awarded a decree in favour of the (plaintiffs) appellants. The lower Appellate Court has reversed that decree, holding that under Article 145+ of the present Limitation Act (No. XV of 1877), the claim is barred. It is of opinion that the right claimed is in the nature of moveable property.2. It is contended in appeal that the right claimed is in the nature of immoveable property, and therefore the present suit falls under Article 148,++ and not under 145.3. There is no doubt that the right in question ranks amongst immoveable property according to Hindu law. We need not here refer to the texts of the Hindu law bearing upon this question, as they are all collected in the two judgments of the Bombay High Court cited below, one of which was cited before us in the course of the argument, Krishnabhat bin Husgange v. Kapabhat bin Mahalbh...
Tag this Judgment!Deo NaraIn Singh Vs. Karoo Singh
Court: Kolkata
Decided on: Aug-15-1883
Reported in: (1884)ILR10Cal80
Mitter, J.1. The question for decision in this case is, whether an application for review of judgment upon a ground other than those mentioned in Section 624 of the Civil Procedure Code, if presented to the Judge who delivered it, and who thereupon directs notice to be given to the opposite party, may be heard and disposed of by his successor.2. The learned pleader for the appellant contends that this question should be answered in the negative, and relies upon the provisions of Section 624 as construed in Puncham v. Jhinguri I.L.R. 4 All. 278. The decision cited fully supports him. But with deference to the opinion of the learned Judges who decided that case we are unable to concur in the view taken by them. The learned Judges have pointed out the inconvenience and hardship which may ensue in certain cases if their interpretation of the section be adopted, but they nevertheless felt themselves bound to adopt it as they could not get over the plain language of the section. It appears t...
Tag this Judgment!Kristo Kamini Dasi Vs. the Maharajah of Burdwan and ors.
Court: Kolkata
Decided on: Aug-14-1883
Reported in: (1883)ILR9Cal931
1. We are of opinion that in this case the notice was insufficient.2. If there is a cutcheri upon the land of the defaulting patnidar, (by which expression we mean the land of the taluk in question), we think that the notice must be published at that cutcheri.3. If there is no such cutcheri, the notice must be published at the principal town or village within the taluk.4. We think also that the mere delivery of the notice to the patnidar, or one of his amlas, is not sufficient; but that it must be published in the manner required by the section. The necessity for accurately conforming to both provisions of the Regulation is laid down authoritatively by the Judicial Committee in the case of the Maharajah of Burdwan v. Tara Soondery Debia L.R. 10 I.A. 19: s.c. ante p. 619....
Tag this Judgment!Peacock and ors. Vs. Byjnath and ors.
Court: Kolkata
Decided on: Aug-12-1883
Reported in: (1884)ILR10Cal58
Pigot, J.1. Ordered the suits to be set down and heard together: commission to be varied and to be considered as taken in both suits. Both parties to be at liberty to adduce such witnesses as they may be advised; plaintiffs to furnish defendants, and defendants to furnish plaintiffs in second suit, with list of documents duly verified by the plaintiffs' agents within ten days. Inspection to be given immediately of all documents so set out, and, if necessary, order to be transmitted by plaintiffs; plaintiffs, if requested by defendants, to transmit order by wire to enable inspection of such documents as may have been transmitted to England at all reasonable times and places. Costs reserved, in dealing with which it should be considered whether plaintiffs were in default in not including all causes of action in one suit, or whether their conduct is susceptible of explanation....
Tag this Judgment!Hurbuns Sahay and anr. Vs. Thakoor Persad
Court: Kolkata
Decided on: Aug-10-1883
Reported in: (1884)ILR10Cal108
Tottenham, J.1. We think this appeal should be dismissed with costs upon the preliminary ground taken by the pleader for the respondent, viz., that the Judges of the Division Bench, having concurred in the final decree, no appeal lies under the Letters Patent.2. The fact that one of the Judges was inclined to let the whole case be reopened on review, while the senior Judge thought that it should be limited to one point, does not entitle the parties to an appeal from the order so limiting it; and it appears to us that we have no authority to pronounce any opinion as to the correctness or otherwise of that order....
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