Kolkata Court April 1882 Judgments
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Ashruff HossaIn and anr. Vs. Wahid Ali
Court: Kolkata
Decided on: Apr-21-1882
Reported in: (1882)ILR8Cal732
Richard Garth, C.J.1. We think that this case must be decided upon a point which appears too have been improperly considered by the Court below.2. (After stating the facts as above, his Lordship continued):3. The defendant denies the right of the plaintiff's to dispossess him of the endowment. He denies that he is in any respect unworthy of the post, or has misappropriated any part of the property; and he also denies the plaintiffs' right to bring this suit. He further says, that the plaintiff Ashruff Ali is himself an improper person to be mutwali.4. The lower Court has found in favour of the plaintiffs. It has decided that Wahid Ali has mismanaged the endowment and is otherwise an improper person to hold the office of mutwali. It also finds that Mussamut Bibi Pearunnessa, being the lineal descendent of Khoda Buksh, had a right to be mutwali herself, and to depute the plaintiffs, by the deed of 1878, to be mutwalis in her place. Now, if the question had been simply, whether the defend...
Hyder Ali Vs. Elahee Bux Maloom and ors.
Court: Kolkata
Decided on: Apr-21-1882
Reported in: (1882)ILR8Cal1011
White, J.1. This is an appeal against a decision of the Subordinate Judge of Chittagong, allowing an appeal against a decree of the Munsif. The appeal was allowed on a preliminary ground, that ground being that, under Section 265 of the Contract Act, the suit ought to have been brought in the Court of the District Judge, and not in the Court of the Munsif. A proviso to that section directs that where a partnership is determined, and a suit is brought to wind up the business of the firm, the Court in which the suit is to be brought shall be the Court of the District Judge. This provision, which relates to the forum in which partnership suits of the above description are to be tried, has nothing whatever to do with the subject-matter of the rest of the Code in which it is found, but was probably introduced with a view to secure, as far as possible, that such partnership suits should be properly tried.2. Some Division Benches of this Court are said to have differed as to the construction ...
issur Chunder Doss Vs. Juggut Chunder Shaha and ors.
Court: Kolkata
Decided on: Apr-21-1882
Reported in: (1883)ILR9Cal79
White, J.1. The lower Appellate Court has decided the question of limitation correctly, and has correctly applied Article 49 of the second schedule of the Limitation Act. It appears that the specific property sought to be recovered is specific moveable property, and came into the possession of Chunder Moni Shaha, the first defendant, in the year 1871, under an order of Court, which directed that he should hold that property on giving security subject to the order of the Court. On the 19th August 1873, the same Court ordered that he should deliver up the property to the plaintiff or his vendor. This order he disobeyed. Up to the date of this order, it may be taken that his detention of the property was lawful. But from the moment the latter order was made, his possession of the property became unlawful. Article 49 says, that in a suit for specific moveable property the period of limitation is three years running or commencing from the time that the obtainer's possession became unlawful....
Abasu Begum Vs. Umda Khanum and anr.
Court: Kolkata
Decided on: Apr-20-1882
Reported in: (1882)ILR8Cal724
Field, J.1. In this case one Umda Khanum has been required to give rupees one thousand as recognizance and two sureties in rupees five hundred each to keep the peace for the term of one year, and one Bahadoor Lall has been required to give rupees two hundred as recognizance and two sureties in rupees one hundred each to keep the peace for the same term.2. The Sessions Judge of Gya has referred the case to this Court to have the order quashed, on the ground that the summons issued under Sections 491, 492 of the Code of Criminal Procedure did not, as it should have done, specify the amount of the recognizance, the number of sureties required, and the amount in which they were to be bound respectively.3. Section 492 distinctly provides that the summons shall set forth the substance of the report or information on which it is issued, the amount of the bond, and the term for which it is to be enforced, and, if security is called for, the number of sureties required and the amount in which t...
In Re: Petition of Gopal Chunder Sirdar. Gopal Chunder Sirdar Vs. Fool ...
Court: Kolkata
Decided on: Apr-20-1882
Reported in: (1882)ILR8Cal728
McDonell, J.1. In this case one Shib Chand Bhandari was charged with extortion, the extortion being said to consist in taking Rs. 15 from a woman by threatening to bring a charge of theft against her.2. The petitioner before us, Gopal Chunder Sirdar, was the village chowkidar, and he has been convicted of abetment of the extortion committed by Shib Chand Bhandari.3. The Deputy Magistrate says in his judgment, 'though it does not appear that he (Gopal Chunder Sirdar) said or did anything in particular, his presence during the occurrence, added to the fact of his not having disapproved of the accused Shib Chand's words and conduct and action, sufficiently indicate the abetment on his part.'4. We think that the omission on the part of Gopal Chunder Sirdar to disapprove of the conduct of Shib Chand Bhandari, cannot, under the circumstances, be said to amount to abetment. The only portion of the definition in Section 1071 of the Penal Code which can be supposed to apply is the third clause,...
In Re: Petition of Protap Chunder Ghose Vs. Protap Chunder Ghose
Court: Kolkata
Decided on: Apr-20-1882
Reported in: (1882)ILR8Cal848
Prinsep, J.1. In this case Protap Chunder Ghose, the proprietor of certain property in the 24-Parganas, applied, under Section 38 of Beng. Act VIII of 1869, to the Civil Court in that district, to have a survey made and the tenures and under-tenures recorded according to the provisions of the Rent Law.2. This application was admitted, and a copy of the order was transmitted to the Collector, directing him to undertake the survey. When the papers came in from the Ameen, an objection was raised by Jadub Chunder Ghose, one of the tenure-holders, as to whether the record was such a record as was contemplated under the Act, and it was urged that, before the record could be considered complete, a khatean should be prepared, from which the parties interested could obtain knowledge of the amount of land recorded in their names, so as to enable them to raise any objection that they might deem necessary against the survey. Several orders were passed on this subject, but it is only now necessary ...
In Re: Petition of Dinendro Nath Shanial
Court: Kolkata
Decided on: Apr-20-1882
Reported in: (1882)ILR8Cal851
McDonell, J.1. We are of opinion that the provisions of Section 47 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as amended by Section 6 of Act XI of 1874, are wide enough to empower the Magistrate of the District to withdraw a case falling under Section 491 of the same Code.2. Were it otherwise, it is not suggested, and we are unable to see, that the person concerned has been in any way prejudiced by the course which has been taken; and we think that this reference in the matter of an interlocutory order was unnecessary in the interests of justice....
Roushan Bibee Vs. Hurray Kristo Nath and anr.
Court: Kolkata
Decided on: Apr-20-1882
Reported in: (1882)ILR8Cal926
Richard Garth, C.J.1. We are under the necessity of remanding this case to the lower Appellate Court for retrial, inasmuch as the District Judge appears to have decided it upon Section 62 1 of the Contract Act, which, so far as we can see, has nothing to do with the matter. In fact, the Judge seems quite to have misapprehended the meaning of that section.2. The suit was brought by the plaintiff against the two defendants, father and son, alleging that the father was his tenant up to the year 1281; but that, in that year, the other defendant, the son, gave him a kabuliat at an increased annual jama of Rs. 69; that thus both defendants became his tenants at the higher jama, and paid it for one year; but that, they having since failed to pay it for the years 1283 and 1284 and part of the year 1282, he brought this suit to recover the rents of those years with damages, road cess, house tax, &c.;3. The defendants denied not only that a kabuliat was ever given, but that the relationship of l...
Huro Pershad Roy Vs. Gopal Das Dutt and ors.
Court: Kolkata
Decided on: Apr-20-1882
Reported in: (1883)ILR9Cal255
R.P. Collier, J.1. In this case, the sole question is as to the application of the Law of Limitation. The claim is for rent from April 1866 to June 1872. The terms of the 29th Section of Act VIII of 1869 of the Bengal Council are these: 'Suits for the recovery of arrears of rent shall be instituted within three years from the last day of the Bengal year, or from the last day of the month of Jeyt of the Fashi or Willayatti year in which the arrear claimed shall have become due.' It is admitted that in this case the suit was not instituted within three years from the end of the year when the last rent became due, and, therefore, prima facie, it is barred by the Law of Limitation. This prima facie case is endeavoured to be answered in this way: The plaintiff says that in 1874, that is to say, two years after the last instalment of the rent sued for had accrued due, the Statute ceased to operate because he instituted a litigation which had the effect of preventing it from running, and that...
Mon Mohun Buksee Vs. Gunga Soondery Dabee
Court: Kolkata
Decided on: Apr-17-1882
Reported in: (1883)ILR9Cal181
White, J.1. The Court below held that the execution was not barred by the law of Cooch-Behar, but that it was so by the law of British India, that being the law of the Court in which the judgment was sought to be enforced, and the law defining the limitation for suits being part of the lex fori.2. On appeal before us it is argued, that, assuming the question to be determinable by the Limitation Act now in force in British India (Act XV of 1877), yet by that Act the execution is not barred, for the plaintiff (the decree-holder) is a minor, and as such under disability, and therefore time does not run against him during his minority. It is not disputed that the decree-holder is a minor; and accordingly, under Section 7 of the Act, until his minority has ceased, he is not affected by the law of limitation. It is contended, however, for the respondent that, upon the true construction of Section 7, the minor must wait until he attains majority before suing out execution, and that, until the...
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