Kolkata Court August 1880 Judgments
Run Bahadoor Singh Vs. Lucho Kooer
Court: Kolkata
Decided on: Aug-30-1880
Reported in: (1881)ILR6Cal406
Pontifex, J.1. (who, after going into the merits of the case at some length, and stating the facts material to the question of res judicata, continued):2. The question we have now to determine is, whether the prior decisions affect the present suit and the title set up by the plaintiff as res judicata. It is to be observed that only a special appeal could be preferred to the High Court against the judgment of the Subordinate Judge (though, as a matter of fact, no special appeal was preferred), and that this rent-suit related to only one mouza, or part of a mouza, held under one only of the mokuraris.3. But, on the other hand, the two mokuraris, though separate, were exactly similar titles; and it has never been part of the plaintiff's case, that different parts of Bishen Singh's property are governed by different circumstances. Indeed the evidence in the rent-suit applies generally to the commensality or separation of the plaintiff and Murlidhur; and that was the issue which the plaint...
Tag this Judgment!Chatraput Singh Vs. Grindra Chunder Roy and anr.
Court: Kolkata
Decided on: Aug-27-1880
Reported in: (1881)ILR6Cal389
White, J.1. The appellant was the plaintiff in the lower Court, and that Court dismissed his suit without going into evidence. The question, therefore, to be determined upon this appeal is, whether in his plaint he stated a case which, if proved, would entitle him to the relief which he sought against the defendants. The following are the material allegations in his plaint:---That, on the 9th of December 1878, he purchased an eight-anna share of a large zamindari under a decree that was obtained against the defendants; that, after that date, a large sum of money became due in respect of the third quarter's Government revenue for the year 1878-79, and also in respect of the road cess and public works cess for the same quarter; that on the 13th January 1879, the last day for paying the same, he paid the entire amount into the Government treasury; that, prior to the date of his auction-purchase, he had no right in the property which he had bought; that the defendants, down to the 8th of D...
Tag this Judgment!In Re: Shrish Chunder Mookhopadhya and anr.
Court: Kolkata
Decided on: Aug-25-1880
Reported in: (1881)ILR6Cal161
White, J.1. This is an appeal against the order of the Judge of the 24-Pargannas, declining to sanction a lease, which sanction was applied for by Nitumbini Debi, as guardian of her two infant sons, under Section 18 of Act XL of 1858.2. The case was opened to us as one in which the Court had refused to go into the question of whether the proposed lease was for the advantage of the infants or not; but the order, when read, shows that the Judge merely declined to sanction the lease, and having regard to the materials that were put before him in the petition, we cannot say that he was wrong.3. In applications under Section 18 the Court is bound to go into the question, whether or not the proposed sale is one which it is for the benefit of the infant that the guardian should be empowered to execute. On this point we may adopt the language used by the present Chief Justice in Sikher Chund v. Dulputty Singh (I. L. R., 5 Cal., 363, at p. 381) where he says:---'The Civil Court has now not only...
Tag this Judgment!Sheetanath Mookerjee Vs. Promothonath Mookerjee and anr.
Court: Kolkata
Decided on: Aug-25-1880
Reported in: (1881)ILR6Cal303
White, J.1. I think that the Judge, Mr. DICKENS, was right in his view, both of the law and of the facts in this case.2. Under Act XXVII of 1860 the Court is to determine the right to the certificate, subject to an appeal to this Court.3. It appears to me, having regard both to the language and also to the authorities upon the construction of the Act, that when there are two claimants for the certificate, and they dispute between themselves as to the right to the certificate, the Judge ought to determine between those two claimants which of them has the preferential right to the certificate. So also, if one of them only claims the certificate, and the other merely opposes the grant, there is no difference made in the duty of the Judge by the fact, that the opponent alleges himself to be the adopted son of the deceased, and the claimant is the man who would be the heir of the deceased if the adoption had not been made. In the present case the certificate was applied for by the man who w...
Tag this Judgment!Soobhul Chunder Paul Vs. Nitye Churn Bysack
Court: Kolkata
Decided on: Aug-21-1880
Reported in: (1881)ILR6Cal663
Wilson, J.The plaintiff obtained a decree against one Kristo Chunder Chowdry; and, in execution of that decree, he attached a house of his judgment-debtor. The defendant held a mortgage of the house. The plaintiff in this suit claims to redeem that mortgage.The case came on for settlement of issues. The first question that arises is, whether an attaching-creditor is entitled, as such, to redeem a mortgage subsisting prior to his attachment. If this question be answered in the negative, it is unnecessary to consider any of the other questions of law or of fact which have been raised.The position of an attaching-creditor and his rights with respect to the land are dependent entirely upon certain Sections of the Civil Procedure Code. The governing Section is Section 276: 'When an attachment has been made by actual seizure or by written order duly intimated and made known in manner aforesaid, any private alienation of the property attached whether by sale, gift, mortgage or otherwise, and ...
Tag this Judgment!Nubbi Buksh Vs. Chasni
Court: Kolkata
Decided on: Aug-11-1880
Reported in: (1881)ILR6Cal168
White, J.1. This is an appeal against an order of the Officiating Judge of Dacca, refusing an application, on behalf of Nubbi Buksh Bepari, to be declared an insolvent under Section 351 of the Code of Civil Procedure.2. A preliminary objection is taken, that the appeal does not lie : first, on the ground that the order being one of refusal is not made under Section 351; and secondly, because, if made under that section, no appeal lies against an order of refusal, but only against an order granting the application.3. Section 588, Clause 17, of the Code gives an appeal against an order under Section 351 in these words---'orders in insolvency matters under Section 351.' Now, as regards the first objection, I think that the order under appeal, although one of refusal, was made under Section 351. This is the only section under which the District Court can deal with an application by an insolvent judgment-debtor to be made an insolvent. Neither that section, nor any other section in the chap...
Tag this Judgment!T. F. Brown and anr. Vs. G. M. Cutts and anr.
Court: Kolkata
Decided on: Aug-11-1880
Reported in: (1881)ILR6Cal328
Mr. Phillips.1. It was not necessary to obtain the leave of the Court under Section 44, Rule (a) of the Civil Procedure Code, to join the different causes of action upon which the plaintiffs rely. A suit for the specific performance of an agreement to sell a share in a house is not a 'suit for the recovery of immoveable property' within the meaning of that section. Possibly this might be held to be a 'suit for land or other immoveable property 'within Section 12 of the Charter, but those words are more comprehensive than the words used in Section 44, Rule (a). The defendants contend that the plaintiffs cannot obtain specific performance of the agreement until they have performed certain terms and conditions which are not stated in the agreement. Those terms and conditions would have to be proved by parol evidence, and the case of Daimoddee Paik v. Kaim Taridar (I. L. R., 5 Cal. 300) is an authority to show that parol evidence cannot be given to vary the terms of the written agreement.2...
Tag this Judgment!Gobind Lall Seal and ors. Vs. Debendronath Mullick and ors.
Court: Kolkata
Decided on: Aug-11-1880
Reported in: (1881)ILR6Cal311
Pontifex, J.1. There are two questions to be considered in this:--1st was the house in dispute an absolute gift from Mutty Lall Seal (who died in 1854) to Shumbhoonath Mullick and 2nd, if it was not an absolute gift, conveying the property, are the plaintiffs barred by limitation from recovering the house ?2. With respect to the first question there is no direct or contemporaneous evidence that can be relied on; and it must, consequently, be determined by the conduct of the parties and the probabilities of the case.3. The title-deeds of the house remained in the possession of the Seals; the property continued to stand in their names; when Beng. Act VIII of 1876 was passed, the Seals were registered as proprietors; the Seals have all along paid the rates, taxes, and assessments payable in respect of the house; the Seals have all along done the repairs when requested by the Mullicks; and when some five or six years ago, the defendants desired a poojah-dalan to be built, on account of the...
Tag this Judgment!Monindro Bhoosun Biswas Vs. Shosheebhoosun Biswas and ors.
Court: Kolkata
Decided on: Aug-09-1880
Reported in: (1880)ILR5Cal866
Wilson, J.1. Refused to order the applicant to pay the costs of the commission, or to order her to pay the estimated costs into Court, and ordered the commission to issue. Costs to be costs in the cause....
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