Kolkata Court February 1878 Judgments

The Empress Vs. Amiruddeen

Court: Kolkata

L.S. Jackson, J.1. It has been pressed upon us in this appeal that the prisoner has not been duly convicted under Section 217 of the Indian Penal Code, because there was not before the Court upon the present trial any evidence to show that in point of fact an offence had been committed, still less that such offence bad been committed by the person in respect of whom the wrongful act of the Police Officer, the prisoner, had been done. What appears is, that a person named Adhari Dhopa was charged before the Court of Session, and was tried and acquitted, of an offence, the offence charged being the cutting off somebody's ear; and it appears that the particular act which the prisoner in this case had committed, and which amounted to knowingly disobeying a certain direction of the law as to his conduct as a public servant, had a tendency to save a person, namely, the person charged, as first stated, from legal punishment. It appears to me quite sufficient, for the purpose of a conviction un...

The Empress on the Prosecution of Johardi Sheik Vs. Hematulla

Court: Kolkata

L.S. Jackson, J.1. The Deputy Magistrate was bound, under Section 215 of the Criminal Procedures Code, to hear all the witnesses for the prosecution. We direct that he do this, and then pass such order on the case as the evidence appears to him to call for....

Hemendro Coomar Mullick Son of Rooplall Mullick Vs. Rajendrolall Moons ...

Court: Kolkata

Reported in: (1878)ILR3Cal354

Richard Garth, C.J.1. This suit was brought against the defendants to recover the amount of a promissory note, which was alleged to have been made by them jointly with one Gourhurry Shaw. It appeared from the plaint, that a former suit had been brought by the plaintiff against Gourhurry Shaw and the defendants; but as the note was signed by Gourhurry alone, professing to act for himself and the defendants, and as the plaintiff did not prove at the trial that Gourhurry had authority to act for the defendants in making the note, the plaintiff obtained a decree against Gourhurry alone, leave being reserved to the plaintiff by the learned Judge to bring another suit upon the note against the present defendants.2. No satisfaction of the debt having been obtained against Gourhurry under the former decree, the plaintiff brought the present suit; but the defendants' object in the first instance, that as the liability upon the note was a joint one, the judgment obtained against Gourhurry is a b...

In Re: Umbica Nundun Biswas (an Insolvent)

Court: Kolkata

Richard Garth, C.J.1. We allowed the case to proceed in the hope that, as the parties have already incurred so much expense and trouble, we might have arrived at some satisfactory solution of it, which might obviate the probability of any further litigation. But the further we proceeded the more difficult and complicated the matters in dispute became; and we could no longer doubt that both as regards the facts and the law, some very serious questions of title and otherwise are at issue between the parties.2. Under these circumstances, we felt that in the exercise of our discretion, we should be wrong in attempting to settle so serious a dispute in a summary proceeding under Section 26 of the Insolvent Act.3. We behave that it has always been the practice of this Court to abstain from deciding difficult questions of title under that section and to leave the parties to settle such questions by a regular suit, and we entirely approve of that practice; see the case of In re Dwarkanath Mitt...

Manick Chunder Dutt Vs. Bhuggobutty Dossee

Court: Kolkata

Markby, J.1. In this case the plaintiff, appellant, claims to have been adopted by the late Rajkrishna Dutt in his lifetime, and he brings this suit to have it declared that this adoption is valid, and that as such adopted son he is sole heir to his adoptive father. Mr. Justice Kennedy held upon the authority of the case of Upendra Lal Roy v. Rani Prasannamayi 1 B.L.R. A.C. 221 (i) that the adoption, if made, was invalid, because the plaintiff, at the date of the alleged adoption, was the only son of his father, and (ii) that no adoption had in fact taken place.2. The case comes before us upon appeal from this decision, and the first question for consideration is, whether the adoption of an only son is invalid under the Hindu law. If this question is answered in the affirmative, there will be no necessity for deciding the second, which is one of fact.3. I have gone carefully through all the authorities that we were referred to and that I have discovered, and 1 am surprised to find, how...

Mothoormohun Roy Vs. the Bank of Bengal

Court: Kolkata

Richard Garth, C.J.1. The Bank was also at one time under the impression that even during the currency of the bills, when the Bank had no present right to sue Radha Gobind upon them, they could still, under the 17th section of the Act (XI of 1876) refuse to register the transfer. But this is clearly not so. The language and the evident intention of that section points to a present debt only as conferring a right upon the Bank to refuse either to register a transfer, or to pay dividends; and this view is strongly fortified by the English case of In re The Stockton Malleable Iron Co. L.R. 2 Ch. D. 101, in which it was held that the words 'due' and 'indebted' in the Articles of Association of a trading company, which gave to the company a lien upon shares similar to that given by this Act to the defendants, must he taken to refer to debts presently payable.2. With reference, however, to the demand of registration alleged to have been made on film 31st of July, it has been distinctly prove...

Wood Vs. Wood

Court: Kolkata

Richard Garth, C.J.1. In this case the parties were married in September 1856, the petitioner being then about 15 years of age. They lived together, in Calcutta, for some years after the marriage, but had no children. In October 1864, the petitioner discovered that the respondent had committed adultery with her ayah. She did not on this account withdraw from cohabitation with the respondent, but from that time the respondent treated her with neglect. About this time she began to support herself by teaching in a school, and in 1869, in consequence of his constant absence until a late hour at night, she ceased to have sexual intercourse with him. They continued, however, to live together, and there is no reason to suppose that the husband was desirous of renewing the intercourse. On the contrary, she states, and this is not denied, that at this time her husband wholly neglected her. During this time also the respondent contributed nothing to the support of the petitioner, and frequently ...

Bussun Lall Shookul Vs. Chundee Dass and ors.

Court: Kolkata

Reported in: (1879)ILR4Cal692

Richard Garth, C.J.1. The Judges of the Division Bench having differed in opinion, and the judgment of the senior Judge having prevailed, this case comes before us on appeal from his decision.2. The suit was brought by the plaintiffs to obtain a decree declaring that certain lands, which they hold as tenants to the defendant at a rent of Rs. 105, comprised an area of 8 drones, 7 kanis, and 2 gundas.3. The Division Bench were agreed that, upon the facts proved, the plaintiff's were entitled to the relief which they prayed. But the objection made by the defendant, upon which the learned Judges differed in opinion, was, that in a suit, No. 308 of 1874, which was brought by the present defendant against the present plaintiffs for arrears of rent, an issue was distinctly raised between the parties, whether the land held by the plaintiffs at the rent of Rs. 105 was 4 drones, 7 kanis, and 19 gundas, as the then plaintiff contended, or 8 drones, 7 kanis, and 2 gundas, as the then defendants co...

Sajidabanoo Vs. Mahomed Arshad Chowdhry

Court: Kolkata

Reported in: (1878)ILR3Cal703

Kemp, J.1. It is admitted by the defendant that the plaintiff, as widow of the late Nawab Ali Chowdhry, is entitled to a four-anna share; but it was at first alleged by him in his written statement that she was in possession of that four-anna share. That contention was subsequently abandoned in the course of the argument by the learned Counsel who appears for the appellant, and it is clear that the plaintiff has been dispossessed even of the share to which she is by the admission of the defendant entitled under the Mahomedan law. That brings us to the question raised in this case as to whether the plaintiff is entitled to succeed to anything beyond a four-anna share in the estate of her late husband Nawab Ali Chowdhry. The learned Counsel for the appellant quoted a Privy Council decision in the case of Mussamut Hurmut-ool-Nissa Begam v. Allahdia Khan 17 W.R. 108; Hajee Hedayut; Baillie's Mahomedan Law 2nd edition, pp. 10, 11, 44, 77, 79; Macnaghten's Mahomedan Law p. 93; and also a pas...