Kolkata Court January 1878 Judgments

Birchunder Manickya Vs. Hurrish Chunder Dass

Court: Kolkata

Richard Garth, C.J.1. We think that, in this case, the lower Court is in error, through misconstruing the meaning of the Full Bench decision--Beer Chunder Munick Bahadoor v. Ramkishen Shaw 14 B.L.R. 370 : S.C. 23 W.R. 128.2. The plaintiff sued the defendant for rent due for the year 1279 at the same rate which had been decreed to him for the previous year 1278, in a suit which he had brought against the same defendant for rent of the same property, and the plaintiff relied upon that former decree as almost conclusive evidence of the proper amount due to him from the defendant.3. It seems that this decree for the rent of 1278 was obtained by the plaintiff ex parte, the defendant not appearing at the trial; and it is admitted that no execution had ever been taken out by the plaintiff upon the decree, and that his right to take out execution had been barred by limitation.4. The Court of first instance held that this former decree was evidence against the defendant in the present suit, and...

Radhica Prosonno Chunder Vs. Zoolfun Bibee

Court: Kolkata

Reported in: (1878)ILR3Cal561

L.S. Jackson, J.1. Against the latter part of the judgment the plaintiff appealed to the District Court, and the effect of the District Judge's judgment was this--that although the defendant might have held this land and paid the rent for twelve years and more, yet that, as she was not paying to the plaintiff, but held the land as a portion of a different estate, the right of occupancy, which the Kent Law recognizes and affirms, could not grow up in such circumstances. He says: 'The defendant's jote is in the mudur land, and her encroachment on julpai land, over which neither she nor her vendor had any right, cannot give her a right of occupancy: she was simply a trespasser.' He went on: 'The finding of the lower Court, that the land is part of the julpar estate, is tantamount to a finding that the defendant is only a trespasser. The respondent's pleader argues that as she was acknowledged as a tenant by her lessor, she cannot be treated as a trespasser and ejected, but the party whose...

Chunder Sekhur Mookerjee and ors. Vs. the Collector of Midnapore on th ...

Court: Kolkata

L.S. Jackson, J.1. We do not think it necessary to call upon the Government vakeel in this case, because we are of opinion that the judgment of the Court below is substantially correct. The terms of the kabooleut, which were read to us from page 7 of the paper-book, and which, it may be admitted, are binding on the Government as well as the zemindar, are extremely vague, and it would he dangerous to impose upon the Government, on the strength of such terms as 'the excavation of the silt of khals, the closing of the mouth of Khalsai,' so extremely onerous an obligation as the plaintiffs seek to impose in the present case. But in addition to that there is an objection on principle, to requiring the Government, or any person whom it is sought to bind by such words, not to do that which may, upon a proper consideration of the whole subject, carry out the purpose obviously intended, but to do a particular thing, because that particular thing was once done in view of that same object. The Go...

Sobha Bibee Vs. Mirza Sakhamut Ali and ors.

Court: Kolkata

White, J.1. The appellant in this case applied, under Section 208 of the Code of 1859, for leave to execute a decree, which she alleged she had purchased at an auction sale. The Court below, taking into consideration a certain judgment that had been passed by this Court in a suit to which the present appellant was a party, has decided that she is not entitled to take out execution of the decree, and, accordingly, has refused her application.2. Now, by the 364th section of the Code, no appeal lies against this order, unless an express provision can be found in the Code which allows of an appeal. The only express provision is contained in Section 283 of the Code. This section has been repealed by Act XXIII of 1861, and Section 11 of the latter Act has taken its place. Hence, unless the appellant has a right of appeal under Section 11 of Act XXIII of 1861, she cannot carry the case further so far as the present suit is concerned. The only part of Section 11 which we need consider is that ...