Kolkata Court December 1877 Judgments
In Re: Thomson's Policy
Court: Kolkata
Decided on: Dec-21-1877
Reported in: (1878)ILR3Cal348
Markby, J.1. Even if we assume that the transfer of a policy of insurance is a conveyance of property situate in British India so as to be prima facie chargeable under Article 15, Schedule I of the Stamp Act (as to which we express no opinion), still the difficulty arises with regard to the endorsements which the Board of Revenue consider ought to be stamped as conveyances, that it is impossible to say that any specific sum was paid as consideration for either of these transactions.2. Under Section 34--q. v. supra I.L.R. 3 Cal. 347 vendor and purchaser, in cases of sale, are both required to set forth truly in words the full consideration-money directly or indirectly paid or secured, &c.;, &c.;, under certain penalties for failure to do so. Section 11 is restricted in its application to bonds, mortgage-deeds or settlements; and in the case of a conveyance, an option as to the amount of stamp to be used with a corresponding limitation of the rights secured by the instrument, is not allo...
Tag this Judgment!Chutterdharee Lall Vs. Rambelashee Koer and ors.
Court: Kolkata
Decided on: Dec-21-1877
Reported in: (1878)ILR3Cal319
Ainslie, J.1. It appears to us that this case is clearly distinguishable from the cases of Ram Kishen Doss v. Hurkhoo Singh 7 W.R. 329 and Gujendro Narain Roy v. Hemanginee Dassee 13 W.R. 35 in which it was held that Section 204[1] I does not apply to parties who have become sureties after the decree. In the present case the security was demanded and taken under Section 342 before the decree, for the purpose of securing to the respondent his costs in the event of his being successful.2. The case must, therefore, go back to the Subordinate Judge in order that he may allow execution to proceed against the sureties; but before doing so, it will, of course, be necessary that the decree-holder should give the surety notice of his intention to proceed against him instead of proceeding against the original judgment-debtor; he should be served with notice to show cause why the decree should not be executed against him.3. We may also observe that in this case the original surety appears to be d...
Tag this Judgment!Rughooburdyal Vs. Sham NaraIn Singh
Court: Kolkata
Decided on: Dec-21-1877
Reported in: (1878)ILR3Cal508
Kennedy, J.1. In this case there is an appeal from the judgment of the Judge of Patna reversing the decision of the Subordinate Judge. As I understand, three points have been argued on behalf of the special appellant. The first question which he raises is with respect to the nature of the property which is claimed by the plaintiff. The special appellant contends that, in truth, this is not ancestral immoveable property. We are, however, of opinion that it must be treated as being ancestral immoveable property.2. The ancestor, Brij Lall, acquired this property by a deed of conditional sale. Now it has been held, and I have no hesitation in saying with perfect correctness, that up to the time of the foreclosure becoming absolute, the interest of the vendee by the conditional sale amounts only to securing his money. He has the land, he has it simply as security. One must remember, however, that from the beginning it was not so. Originally it was really a conditional sale, which became abs...
Tag this Judgment!Womda Khanum Vs. Rajroop Koer
Court: Kolkata
Decided on: Dec-20-1877
Reported in: (1878)ILR3Cal336
Ainslie, J.1. In this case we think that the Subordinate Judge has taken a wrong view of the so-called instrument of mortgage. We consider that it did not amount to a mortgage at all, but that it was merely a covenant not to alienate any property of the debtor until payment of the money advanced. The case decided by the Full Bench--Rajkumar Ram Gopal Narayan Singh v. Ram Dutt Chowdhry 5 B.L.R. 264 which has been relied upon by the respondent, is, in our opinion, an authority in favour of the view which we now take. The instrument before the Court in that case referred to a specific property by name; and there were expressions in the instrument which led the Court to think, that the parties intended that property to be pledged. But the Chief Justice in that case expressly says, that if the question there had been whether a bond for payment of money, with a simple covenant not to alienate the obligor's property until payment, constituted a mortgage, he thought that question should be ans...
Tag this Judgment!The Empress and Vs. Sashi Bhusan Chuckrabutty
Court: Kolkata
Decided on: Dec-18-1877
Reported in: (1879)ILR4Cal623
Ainslie, J.1. The provisions of Section 90 of the Criminal Procedure Code and Section 176 of the Indian Penal Code ought not to be used for purposes of vexation, but in order to secure due information to Magistrates and the Police of offences committed within their jurisdiction: Provided that information is conveyed to the nearest Magistrate or Police officer by one of the parties bound to give such information; it is not reasonable that every other person who may possibly be bound to give information should be prosecuted for not having done so. A Police officer is not better off when he has half-a-dozen copies of the same report than when he has the first. In the present instance it appears as a matter of fact, from the record which has come up to us, that the petitioner did not himself get any information regarding the theft until the fourth day after its occurrence, and that, in the meantime, an account of the theft had been duly reported to the Police by another gomashta and a punc...
Tag this Judgment!In Re: Bhoobuneshwar Dutt
Court: Kolkata
Decided on: Dec-14-1877
Reported in: (1878)ILR3Cal621
Markby, J.1. It appears to us that this conviction must be set aside. The charge against the petitioner was, that lie had refused to give a receipt for a summons. This has been held by the High Court of Bombay in Reg v. Kalya bin Fakir 5 Bom. II. C. Rep. Cr. Cases 34 not to be an offence under Section 173 of the Indian Penal Code, which is the section under which this conviction has been made. We concur in that decision.2. This conviction will, therefore, be sot aside; and the fine, if paid, will be refunded. If the petitioner is in jail, ho will be released....
Tag this Judgment!Gunno Singh Vs. Latafut HossaIn and ors.
Court: Kolkata
Decided on: Dec-10-1877
Reported in: (1878)ILR3Cal337
Richard Garth, C.J.1. In this case we think that the Subordinate Judge has taken a wrong view of the so-called instrument of mortgage. We consider that it did not amount to a mortgage at all, but that it was merely a covenant not to alienate any property of the debtor until payment of the money advanced. The case decided by the Full Bench--Rajkumar Ram Gopal Narayan Singh v. Ram Dutt Chowdhry 5 B.L.R. 264 which has been relied upon by the respondent, is, in our opinion, an authority in favour of the view which we now take. The instrument before the Court in that case referred to a specific property by name; and there were expressions in the instrument which led the Court to think, that the parties intended that property to be pledged. But the Chief Justice in that case expressly says, that if the question there had been whether a bond for payment of money, with a simple covenant not to alienate the obligor's property until payment, constituted a mortgage, he thought that question shoul...
Tag this Judgment!Krishna Mohun Bose Vs. Okhilmoni Dossee
Court: Kolkata
Decided on: Dec-08-1877
Reported in: (1878)ILR3Cal332
Markby, J.1. In this case plaintiff sues to recover Rs. 1,750 on account of arrears of maintenance at Rs. 50 a month. The person whom she sues is her husband's brother. It has been found that the father of the plaintiff's husband, and of the defendant, died, leaving certain property, which had descended to him from his father; and the first Court held that the plaintiff was entitled to an allowance of Rs. 16 a month out of this property, and gave her a decree for Rs. 560. This decree was appealed against, but the appeal was dismissed. The defendant has now brought the case here on special appeal.2. Before us it is not denied that the plaintiff, upon the death of her father-in-law, became entitled to maintenance out of the ancestral estate, but it is contended that, under the circumstances of this case, that right was extinguished by the operation of the law of limitation as interpreted in India. It is conceded that, having regard to the peculiar words of Article 128, Schedule II of Act...
Tag this Judgment!Ram Lal Mookerjee Vs. Mahtab Chunder Bahadoor, Maharajah of Burdwan
Court: Kolkata
Decided on: Dec-07-1877
Reported in: (1878)ILR3Cal351
Mitter, J.1. In this case two objections have been raised before us in appeal: First, that the judgment of the lower Court is wrong in allowing interest upon costs when the decree does not expressly award it. Secondly, that the lower Court was not right in awarding interest upon the principal sum decreed after the 18th September, 1876, when the judgment-debtor deposited the money due from him in the Collector's office, and that at any rate the lower Court should not have awarded interest after the date when the Collector of Burdwan by a roobocary informed the Court that he had no objection to pay the money deposited to the decree-holder.2. As regards the first question, although it seems that the practice of the Court was not uniform for some time upon this matter, the later decisions establish that this Court has refused to allow interest upon costs in cases where the decree is silent about it. Of these latter cases Ulfutunnissa v. Mohan Lal Sukal 6 B.L.R. App. 33 and Ameeromiissa Kha...
Tag this Judgment!Golokemoney Dabia and ors. Vs. Mohesh Chunder Mosa and anr.
Court: Kolkata
Decided on: Dec-06-1877
Reported in: (1878)ILR3Cal548
Markby, J.1. In this case we think that the decision of the Munsif and of the District Judge was wrong, and that execution ought to have been allowed to issue.2. Now the Full Bench have laid down in a case 4 B.L.R. F.B. 82 : S.C. 13 W.R. F.B. 3, and that decision is binding upon us, what the true construction of the section is which imposes a term of limitation of three years upon a judgment-creditor when applying for execution. The effect of that decision is stated in the judgment of Mr. Justice Macphehson, who says that 'the words should he considered as meaning that execution shall not issue unless a proper application for execution is made within three years from the date of the judgment.' That I understand to be the decision of the majority of the Judges of the Full Bench. That being so, the real question which we have to determine in this case is whether the proceeding of the 17th March 1876 was a new and substantive application for execution, or whether it was merely a step take...
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