Chennai Court January 1943 Judgments
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Vemuri Nagiah and anr. Vs. Vasi Reddi Venkata Satyanarayana Prasad and ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jan-21-1943
Reported in: AIR1943Mad355; (1943)1MLJ262
Alfred Henry Lionel Leach, C.J. 1. This is an appeal from an order passed by Chandrasekhara Ayyar, J., dismissing a petition asking for the adjudication under the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act of the respondents. The learned Judge considered that the petition had been presented mala fide and that it amounted to an abuse of the process of the Court. We share in full this opinion.2. On the 19th June, 1942, one A. Suryanarayana filed an application for the adjudication of the respondents. This is not the application which has given rise to this appeal, but in order to appreciate the situation it is necessary to examine in some detail what preceded the present application. The third respondent is the mother of the first and second respondents. They live at Bezwada where they own a cinema theatre. Suryanarayana was a creditor of theirs. They owed him the sum of Rs. 1,045. In his petition Suryanarayana alleged that they had a dwelling house and office at No. 2/355, Mint Street, Madras. Thi...
Thommandra Venkata Siddayya Vs. Ediga Sanjappa and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jan-21-1943
Reported in: AIR1943Mad479; (1943)1MLJ321
Wadsworth, J. 1. This appeal involves a question of the applicability of what is commonly known as the damdupat rule in Sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 8 of Madras Act IV of 1938 to a debt which is the result of the clubbing together of pre-existing debts due to the same creditor by the same debtor when payments have been made towards the separate debts before the clubbing took place. We are not aware of any decision of this Court which has laid down the correct method of dealing with such cases under these provisions.2. The facts, established are that on 15th April, 1914, the appellant who is the creditor advanced Rs. 300 on a mortgage bearing interest at 18 per cent. under Ex. B. On 22nd May, 1916, he made a further advance of Rs. 200 on a mortgage Ex. C bearing interest at 24 per cent. On 1st November, 1925, he advanced a sum of Rs. 50 on a promissory note which has not been exhibited. The rate of interest according to the defendants' evidence was either 12 or 15 per cent. On 16...
Vaithilinga Naidu Vs. Narayanaswami Naidu
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jan-21-1943
Reported in: AIR1943Mad457; (1943)1MLJ323
King, J.1. The question which arises in this appeal is one of limitation. There was an execution petition filed by a decree-holder in March, 1939. This was his second execution application, the first one having been dismissed in July, 1933. The interval between these two dates is obviously more than three years, but he contended that a large part of the interval was covered by the language of Section 14 of the Limitation Act and it has been held by the lower appellate Court that this contention is valid. The appeal is by the judgment-debtor who holds that Section 14 cannot properly be applied. The other relevant dates and facts in the case are these : In June, 1933, before the first execution petition had in fact been dismissed, the decree-holder applied to adjudicate the appellant as an insolvent. His application was made in the Court of the District Judge of South Arcot who in December, 1933, transferred it to the Subordinate Judge of Cuddalore. There the judgment-debtor was adjudica...
Nallathambi Pillai Alias Nallasami Pillai and ors. Vs. Rahumath Bivi a ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jan-20-1943
Reported in: AIR1943Mad581; (1943)1MLJ375
ORDER1. This is an application for leave to appeal to the Privy Council by the appellant in A.S. No. 350 of 1937 decided by us. It is beyond doubt that the subject-matter of the suit exceeds Rs. 10,000 and it is a confirming judgment. The appellant, however, contends that the appeal involves a substantial question of law. It is unnecessary for us to recapitulate the history of this case which is set out in our judgment and in that of the lower Court. It will be sufficient if we state the two grounds on which this application has before us been based. They are to be found in the first and the second grounds of appeal. They are,(1) The learned Judges ought to have held that the introduction of partners by the first defendant into a business though of the same kind as the business conducted by the father individually and without partners deprived the newly constituted partnership business of its character as an ancestral business.(2) The learned Judges erred in holding that the fact of th...
Ramaswami Sastrigal and anr. Vs. R. Subramania Ayyar and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jan-20-1943
Reported in: AIR1943Mad588; (1943)1MLJ410
Chandrasekhara Ayyar, J.1. The lower Courts have taken the view that an application by the father for conciliation of his debt under the Madras Debt Conciliation Act is a bar to the suit not only as regards the father who is the applicant but also his sons who did not go before the Board with any such application for conciliation. This view is based upon Section 19 of the Debt Conciliation Act.2. Much could be said in its favour if the debt was a debt of the father alone for which the sons were also liable under the Hindu law theory of pious obligation as then their liability would be entirely dependent and derivative. But where as in this case the debt was borrowed for family necessity by the father in his capacity as managing member of the family, the sons are liable equally with the father for the debt not because there is any pious obligation on their part to discharge the debt borrowed by the father but because as members of the joint family the debt borrowed for necessity is as m...
Orupulasseri Manakkal Karnavan and Manager Bhavadasan Nambudripad Vs. ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jan-19-1943
Reported in: AIR1943Mad550; (1943)1MLJ328
Wadsworth, J. 1. The first of these cases arises out of a suit by the appellant, who is the jenmi, for redemption of a kanom and eviction of the tenant. The second case arises out of an application by the tenant for renewal under the provisions of the Malabar Tenancy Act XIV of 1930. The cases have been placed before a Bench because they involve a question of some difficulty, relating to the interpretation of Clause 3 of Section 25 of that Act. There is no doubt about the facts. On the 14th July, 1914, the plaintiff's predecessor granted a kanom demise to the predecessor of defendants 1 to 3. The term for the redemption of this kanom expired on 14th July, 1926, but nothing was done and the tenants continued in possession on the basis of the kanom without the question of renewal being raised. In 1936, after the Malabar Tenancy Act came into force the jenmi filed a suit for redemption and there was a corresponding application by the tenant for renewal. The Court ordered a renewal, the te...
Ramachandra Naidu Vs. Muthu Chettiar and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jan-18-1943
Reported in: AIR1943Mad340; (1943)1MLJ236
King, J.1. The question in this appeal is whether an execution application filed in 1940 is in time or not. The final decree was passed in December, 1929, and the application now under consideration is the fifth in order of time. The real question in the case depends upon an examination of the dates and orders on the first execution petition. This was presented on the 7th November, 1932, and was returned on more than one occasion for the production of sale papers. 'Finally, on the 19th January, 1933, a further fortnight's adjournment was asked for by the decree-holder but refused by the Court, which thereupon passed an' order dismissing the application. It is argued in support of this appeal that that order is not a final order within the meaning of Article 182 of the Limitation Act. It is not denied that when the application was presented in November, 1932, it was in accordance with law and presented to the proper Court.2. The matter seems to me almost too clear for argument. When a C...
In Re: Muthupalaniappa Chettiar
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jan-18-1943
Reported in: (1943)2MLJ428
ORDERByers, J.1. Three points have been urged in seeking the admission of this revision petition. The first of them is that a 'latrine' does not come within the scope of Section 39(1) of the Madras Public Health Act. This point does not appear to have been raised in the trial Court. The learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate considered that the term ' sanitary convenience ' was sufficiently wide to include a latrine. As the point was not taken in the trial Court, I see no sufficient reason for interfering with his finding.2. The second point is one of limitation, Mr. Narayanaswami Iyer contending that as Section 39(1) of the Act does not contemplate any period within which the notice must be complied with, as in the case of Section 39(2), the offence must be deemed to have been committed immediately the service of the notice is followed by disobedience. It seems obvious that the construction of a latrine or other type of sanitary convenience requires a certain amount of time and instantaneo...
Juje D'Silva Vs. Kashmir D'Silva
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jan-15-1943
Reported in: AIR1943Mad335; (1943)1MLJ165
Byers, J.1. The case which has given rise to this reference arose under Section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. By a preliminary order issued under that section the owner of two trees was called upon to show cause why he should not be directed to take certain steps to prevent them from damaging a house close by. One of the trees is a cocoanut tree and the notice issued under Section 133 of the Code contemplated either cutting it or securing it with a wire. Eventually, the Stationary Sub-Magistrate ordered the respondent in the proceedings to cut the tree, giving him no option to secure it with wires as he found that this remedy would not serve the purpose on account of the heavy winds prevailing at certain times of the year. The reference has. arisen on the contention that it was beyond the power of the learned Magistrate to modify the provisional order.2. The order has been made absolute under Section 137 (3) of the Code, which directs that if the Magistrate is not satisfied th...
In Re: Srinivasa Ayyangar and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jan-13-1943
Reported in: AIR1943Mad347; (1943)1MLJ176
ORDERByers, J.1. The petitioners are the owner and the driver of a motor bus which was found carrying goods contrary to the conditions of its permit and they were convicted and fined under Section 42(1) read with Section 123(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act. The convictions and sentences were upheld on appeal. The correctness of the conviction of the driver has been attacked on the ground that it is no part of a driver's duty when there is a conductor present to supervise the loading of the vehicle. Objection has also been taken to the admission of certain evidence in proof of the carriage of the goods, Mr. Jayarama Aiyar contending that the only evidence let in on this point was hearsay and, if this be excluded, there is no proof that goods were in fact being carried.2. Dealing with the first point, Section 123 (1) of the Motor Vehicles Act imposes liability on any person driving a motor vehicle otherwise than in accordance with the conditions of its permit, but it is contended that the r...
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