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Chennai Court September 1942 Judgments

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Sep 16 1942

A. Venkataramayyar Vs. A.S. Ayyasami Sastrigal and ors.

Court: Chennai

Decided on: Sep-16-1942

Reported in: AIR1943Mad194; (1942)2MLJ676

Wadsworth, J.1. This appeal raises a question of the interpretation of Proviso C to Section 3(2) of Madras Act IV of 1938. The appellant was the plaintiff in a suit on a mortgage and the only question now remaining is whether the respondents the mortgagors, have been rightly held entitled to the benefits of Act IV of 1938 as being agriculturists. That they have a saleable interest in agricultural lands is not denied, but it is contended that they are disqualified because as members of a joint family they are assessed to property or house-tax under the Madras District Municipalities Act, 1920, on property the aggregate annual rental value of which is more than Rs. 600. It appears that in the name of the 1st defendant there are two houses, the gross rental value of which was estimated by the municipality at Rs. 460 per annum and the net value at Rs. 423, after deducting 10 per cent. as laid down in Section 82 of the District Municipalities Act. In the name of the 2nd defendant, who is th...


Sep 15 1942

Madhurakavi Ayyangar Vs. Chinnasami Chetti and ors.

Court: Chennai

Decided on: Sep-15-1942

Reported in: AIR1943Mad134; (1943)1MLJ137

Wadsworth, J.1. These two matters arise out of the execution of an ancient mortgage decree passed on a mortgage of 1913. The preliminary decree was passed in 1918 and the final decree in 1919. The present appellant and petitioner claims under the seventh defendant in the mortgage suit. The seventh defendant was a puisne mortgagee who subsequently purchased part of the property in discharge of his own mortgage. In 1929, a portion of the mortgaged property was sold in execution of the decree. In 1932, after the present first respondent had been recognised as an assignee decree-holder, the second lot was proclaimed for sale. Thereafter the seventh defendant put forward an uncertified adjustment and claimed that the decree was satisfied except for a small amount. This application was eventually withdrawn in 1936. In April, 1937, the seventh defendant mortgaged items 28 and 29 to the present appellant and petitioner. The seventh defendant died shortly thereafter. In July, 1937, a fresh proc...


Sep 02 1942

Palaniandi Muthirian and ors. Vs. Ramaswami Reddi

Court: Chennai

Decided on: Sep-02-1942

Reported in: AIR1942Mad724; (1942)2MLJ545

ORDERHorwill, J.1. The petitioners were convicted under Section 426 of the Indian Penal Code for sending their cattle to graze on the bund of a tank belonging to the complainant, and the convictions were confirmed in appeal.2. In a somewhat similar case that came before Curgenven, J., in Raghupathi Aiyar v. Narayana Goundan : AIR1929Mad5 . the learned Judge expressed the opinion that,destruction of any property within the meaning of Section 425, Indian Penal Code, carried with it the implication that something should be done to the property contrary to its natural use and serviceableness.He added by way of illustration:It may be mischief to throw the contents of a pot of food upon the fire; but it is not mischief, though it may be theft, to eat the food.He applied the illustration to the case before him and said,And so, here, since the graziers, by allowing their goats to graze, did no more than put the grass to its normal use, by the same reasoning their act would not amount to mischi...


Sep 02 1942

In Re: Bola Achanna Kamthi

Court: Chennai

Decided on: Sep-02-1942

Reported in: AIR1943Mad178; (1942)2MLJ554

ORDERHorwill, J.1. The petitioner filed a complaint before the Stationary Sub-Magistrate of Karkal, charging the accused with certain offences for which the accused could be tried only under the warrant procedure. Notice was ordered to the accused, and the case was posted to a certain date for the appearance of the accused. On that day, the petitioner was absent, and so the Magistrate exercised his jurisdiction under Section 259 of the Criminal Procedure Code and discharged the accused. The petitioner thereupon filed another complaint which the Magistrate refused to accept for two reasons; one was that the complainant appeared at 5 p.m., which was after the hour at which papers are received in Court, and the other was that an application to receive a complaint was tantamount to a review application, which the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to grant.2. As the accused was only discharged, there was nothing to prevent the complainant from filing a fresh complaint; and if he does so, the c...


Sep 01 1942

Examiner of Local Fund Accounts Vs. C. Subramania Mudaliar and ors.

Court: Chennai

Decided on: Sep-01-1942

Reported in: AIR1943Mad208(1); (1942)2MLJ667

1. There is a preliminary objection to the maintainability of these appeals, based upon the fact that when the applications were filed in 1938 no right of appeal existed. This objection is supported by the Full Bench Judgment in Vasudeva Samiar, In re (1928) 56 M.L.J. 369 : I.L.R. 52 Mad. 361. , That was no doubt a case in which during the pendency of certain proceedings a right of appeal was taken away; but in our opinion there is no logical distinction between a right of appeal and a right to a final judgment without an appeal. Both are equally vested rights. We hold accordingly that the principles of Vasudeva Samiar, In re (1928) 56 M.L.J. 369 : I.L.R. 52 Mad. 361. , applies to this case, and we see nothing in the rule establishing the right of appeal that 'expressly or by necessary intendment' gives it retrospective effect.2. We do not think the rulings cited by the learned Government Pleader are of any assistance to him. In Guruswami Pillai v. Veerabhadra : AIR1929Mad497 . great s...


Sep 01 1942

The Burmah-shell Oil Storage and Distributing Company of India Limited ...

Court: Chennai

Decided on: Sep-01-1942

Reported in: AIR1943Mad244; (1942)2MLJ661

Abdur Rahman, J.1. Stripped of further details the only question to be decided in this case is whether a debtor, the debt due from whom has been assigned over to a third person, can, even after the notice of the assignment of the debt, pay a portion of that debt under the orders of Court in a case to which the assignee was not a party and in such a manner as to protect him from paying it over again to the assignee when called Upon so to do.2. The facts out of which the above question emerges are quite simple and may be briefly stated. The joint family firm, which may be described as a P. S. Firm, had a deposit with the Burma Shell Company. This P. S. Firm assigned the deposit to another firm, which may be described for the sake of facility as R. P. D. Firm. Notices of assignment of the deposit were given to the Burma Shell and Company (Exs. E and F) both by the assignor and the assignee. After this assignment of the debt, members of the E. P. D. Firm were adjudged insolvents. Two credi...


Sep 01 1942

In Re: Chinnappa Chetty and anr.

Court: Chennai

Decided on: Sep-01-1942

Reported in: AIR1943Mad209; (1942)2MLJ686

Horwill, J.1. The first accused (appellant in C.A. No. 312 of 1942) was convicted by the Sessions Judge of Coimbatore of an offence punishable under Section 380, Indian Penal Code, and the second accused (appellant in C.A. No. 286 of 1942) of an offence punishable under Section 411, Indian Penal Code, in connection with the same stolen articles.2. The trial was with jury; and I do not think that much can be said against the charge to the jury; but there seems to have been a misjoinder of charges. Both the appellants were charged with regard to two offences in which they were alleged to have been jointly connected alternatively under Section 380 or 411, Indian Penal Code. Section 234 read with Section 239, Criminal Procedure Code, permits of the joinder of more offences than one of the same kind committed within the space of 12 months; but it has been more than once laid down that offences under Sections 380 and 411 are not of the same kind. They are not even punishable with the same ma...


Sep 01 1942

In Re: Pasupuleti Venkata Subbayya

Court: Chennai

Decided on: Sep-01-1942

Reported in: AIR1943Mad418; (1943)1MLJ192

Horwill, J.1. The appellant was convicted by the Sessions Judge of Kistna of an offence punishable under Section 379, Indian Penal Code and sentenced to three years' rigorous imprisonment.2. The appellant was tried by jury. It was doubted at the time of admission whether the pointing out of the complainant by the accused was admissible in evidence against him; but in view of the Full Bench decision of this Court in Emperor v. Ramanuja Iyengar(1934) 68 M.L.J. (Supp.) 73 : I.L.R. Mad. 642 there can be no doubt that if a complainant is discovered as a result of a statement made by the accused, that statement is admissible; for the material fact discovered as a result of that statement is the theft from the complainant.3. The appellant was sentenced to three years' rigorous imprisonment because of a previous conviction. The accused admitted the previous conviction, but stated that it had been set aside in appeal. The learned Sessions Judge seems to have disregarded that statement altogethe...


Sep 01 1942

In Re: Grandhe Sarabhayya and ors.

Court: Chennai

Decided on: Sep-01-1942

Reported in: AIR1943Mad408; (1943)1MLJ255

Horwill, J. 1. The third accused (appellant in C. A. No. 206 of 1942) has been convicted by the Sessions Judge of Kurnool of an offence punishable under Section 467, Indian Penal Code and sentenced to two years' rigorous imprisonment. Accused 1 and 2 (appellants in C. A. Nos. 205 of 1942 and 206 of 1942, respectively) have been found guilty of abetting that offence and have been sentenced to three years' rigorous imprisonment.2. The document which is said to be forged is a karar or relinquishment deed; and it is the prosecution case that this document was forged in order to support the title of the second accused--and incidentally that of the first accused's father-in a dispute between the second accused and his brother, P. W. 1.3. The principal evidence that this document is forged is that of P.W. 2, supported by P. Ws. 3 and 4, that this karar which purported to have been executed five years before was shown to P. W. 2 and he was asked to attest it. Fortunately for him and for the co...


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