Chennai Court February 1932 Judgments
In Re: Supputhayammal and Two ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Feb-12-1932
Reported in: AIR1932Mad453; (1932)62MLJ624
ORDER1. A question has been raised in this second appeal under Section 12(2) of the Court Fees Act that the appellants in the Lower Appellate Court who are two of the three appellants in this Court did not pay proper Court-fees on their appeal to the Cower Appellate Court and should now be ordered to pay the deficiency.2. The suit was by a co-sharer against his co-sharers for accounts. A preliminary decree declaring the liability of the defendants to account and giving directions to take the account was passed. The defendants appealed to the Lower Appellate Court against that decree paying ad valorem Court-fee on the amount at which the plaintiff valued his relief. Subsequently accounts were taken and a smaller sum than that at which the suit was valued was awarded by the final decree. Pending the appeal against the preliminary decree the defendants appealed to the same Court against the final decree and paid a Court-fee of only Re. 1. The question is whether they should have paid ad v...
Tag this Judgment!In Re: Athi Ambalagaran and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Feb-12-1932
Reported in: 137Ind.Cas.761; (1932)62MLJ717
Waller, J.1. Criminal Appeal No. 570 of 1931 is an appeal by seven persons against an order of the Sessions Judge, West Tanjore, directing their prosecution for perjury. They were to be prosecuted for having made contradictory statements before himself and before the Committing Magistrate. As a measure of precaution the Committing Magistrate also directed their prosecution. Seven appeals were presented against his order to the Sub-divisional Magistrate, Pattukottai, and they have been called up to this Court for consideration with the other appeal2. The main contention is that both of the Courts have acted without jurisdiction. No Court, it is argued, can direct a prosecution for perjury committed in another Court. In other words, such a prosecution as this--for making contradictory statements--can be ordered only when the statements have been made in the same Court or by a Court to which appeals lie from both of the Courts in which the contradictory statements were made. It: followsth...
Tag this Judgment!Krishna Kurup and anr. Vs. Mammad and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Feb-12-1932
Reported in: (1932)63MLJ672
Krishnan Pandalai, J.1. This second appeal arises from a suit to recover by sale of the mortgaged property and from the 1st defendant personally Rs. 747-10-4, made up of Rs. 600, the principal due on a mortgage and Rs. 147-10-4, arrears of rent with interest thereon due under a contemporaneous counterpart of a lease (marupat) both executed by the 1st defendant to the plaintiffs' predecessor-in-title. The defendants' chief contentions were : (1) that the personal remedy was barred by limitation, which both the Lower Courts upheld and which is no longer in question, and (2) that the claim is barred by Order 2, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which both Courts overruled and which the defendants press again in this second appeal.2. The mortgage, Ex. A, is a usufructuary mortgage, dated 6th March, 1915, for Rs. 600 of the mortgagor's kanom kuzhikanom interest in three gardens held under a jenmi. It provided for three years' possession by the mortgagee during which he was to pay the j...
Tag this Judgment!Puthanpurayil Nittookandi Kappalli Krishna Kurup and anr. Vs. Kottikol ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Feb-12-1932
Reported in: AIR1932Mad466; 137Ind.Cas.651
Pandalai, J.1. This second appeal arises from a suit to recover by sale of the mortgaged property and from defendant 1 personally Rs. 747-10-4 made up of Rs. 600, the principal due on a mortgage and Rs. 147-10-4, arrears of rent with interest thereon due under a contemporaneous counterpart of a lease (marupat) both executed by defendant 1 to the plaintiffs' predecessor-in-title. The defendants' chief contentions were: (1) that the personal remedy was barred by limitation, which both the lower Courts upheld and which is no longer in question, and (2) that the claim is barred by Order 2, Rule 2, Civil P.C., which both Courts overruled and which the defendants press again in this second appeal.2. The mortgage Ex. A is a usufructuary mortgage dated 6th March 1915 for Rs. 600 of the mortgagor's kanom kuzhikanom interest in three gardens held under a jenmi. It provided for three years' possession by the mortgagee during which he was to pay the jenmi's michavaram and obtain receipts and appro...
Tag this Judgment!Rathinam Pillai Vs. Emperor
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Feb-12-1932
Reported in: AIR1932Mad427
ORDERSundaram Chetty, J.1. The point raised in this case is one of jurisdiction. The charge seems to be that the first accused has given false information to the District Superintendant of Police, Tanjore, with intent to cause injury to another person--an offence Under Section 182, I. P. C. The letter, containing the alleged false information was posted at Kumbakonam and reached the District Superintendant at Tanjore. The first of the offence Under Section 182 is the giving of the information, so as to cause the public servant to act on it. The offence is completed, when the information reaches the public servant. If for some reason, the information has not at all reached the public servant, there will be no offence Under Section 182 though by reason of posting such a letter, the accused, may be charged for having attempted to commit such an offence. But here, the charge is not for an attempt to commit the offence mentioned above. The decision in Krishnamurthi Ayyar v. Parasurama Ayyar...
Tag this Judgment!In Re: Rathinam Pillai
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Feb-12-1932
Reported in: 137Ind.Cas.333
Sundaram Chetty, J.1. The point raised in this case is one of jurisdiction. The charge seems to be. that the first accused has given false information to the District Superintendent of Police, Tanjore, with intent to cause injury to another person--an offence under Section 182 of the Indian Penal Code. The letter containing the alleged false information was posted at Kumbakonam and reached the District Superintendent at Tanjore. The gist of the offence under Section 182, is the giving of the information, so as to cause the public servant to act on it. The offence is completed, when the information reaches the public servant. If for some reason, the information has not at all reached the public servant, there will be no offence under Section 182 though by reason of posting such a letter, the accused may be charged for having attempted to commit such an offence. But here, the charge is not for an attempt to commit the offence mentioned above. The decision in Krishnamurthy Aiyar v. Parasu...
Tag this Judgment!In Re: Syamo Maha Patro and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Feb-11-1932
Reported in: 137Ind.Cas.9; (1932)62MLJ742
Reilly, J.1. In connection with Referred Trial No. 173 of 1931 the following question has been referred to us, vis.:Does the expression 'statement made by any person' in Clause (1) of Section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code include statements by persons accused of the offence under investigation?2. The reference has been made: because objection has been taken at the hearing of the Referred Trial to the admission of evidence that certain statements were made by the accused which the learned judges, Waller and Krishnan Pandalai, JJ., describe as statements made 'to the Police directly or indirectly through strangers in the presence of the Police' in the course of the Police investigation of the case when the accused were not in custody. In Sheik Kalesha v. Emperor (1931) 62 M.L.J.71 Jackson and Cornish, JJ., decided that a statement made by an accused person to the1 Police in the course of their investigation of the case could not be used at the trial for any purpose. In that case the...
Tag this Judgment!Poornananthachi Vs. T.S. Gopalaswami Odayar and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Feb-08-1932
Reported in: (1932)62MLJ665
ORDER1. This is an application for an extension of time by two months for furnishing security for costs. Leave to appeal to the Privy Council was granted on the 16th October, 1931, and the petitioner was directed under Order 45, Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure to furnish security for costs of the respondent within six weeks from the date of the granting of the certificate. The last day for furnishing security was the 27th November, 1931. By that date the petitioner had been unable to furnish the security and on the 30th November, 1931, she presented this petition praying for an extension of time by two months.2. The petition is supported by the affidavit of the kariasian of the petitioner. The two reasons for the granting of the petition set out in that affidavit are: (1) the inability of the petitioner to furnish the security owing to her difficulty in getting the necessary funds, and (2) because the petitioner is an old widow and for the two months previous to the presentation:...
Tag this Judgment!Nannier and anr. Vs. Dasalier
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Feb-04-1932
Reported in: AIR1932Mad505; (1932)62MLJ738
ORDER1. The petitioners in this case were accused 1 and 2 in a criminalxase before the First Class Bench, Salem, which took up thfs case on file for summary trial. From the register of summary trials kept by that Bench, it would appear that a charge was framed against the accused under Section 323, Indian Penal Code and explained to the accused to which they pleaded not guilty. This was done on 23rd March, 1931. Later on, this case appears to have been transferred to the file of the Second Class Magistrate, Salem, in August, 1931. The Second Class Magistrate has no jurisdiction to try this case summarily and there is no doubt that he has to try it in the ordinary way provided for the trial of warrant cases. When the case was so pending before him, it was called on for hearing on 4th September, '1931, to which it had been posted. The complainant not being present either in person or by any pleader, the Magistrate discharged the accused under Section 259, Criminal Procedure Code. Subsequ...
Tag this Judgment!S.K.M. Sivasubramania Nadar Vs. S.S.K. Subramania Nadar and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Feb-04-1932
Reported in: AIR1932Mad409
Sundaram Chetty, J.1. Having seen the report of the District Munsif, it cannot be deemed that the plaintiff's advocate made any statement to the effect, that the case of tenancy set up in the plaint would be given up. Moreover one of the issues framed would be unnecessary if the case of tenancy were given up. That being so the question is whether any admission or concession on the part of a pleader on a pure question of law, would estop the party from questioning it in appeal or revision. The trend of the authorities is against any such estoppel.2. It is in this view, that the question of law has been allowed to be argued here. This is a suit falling Under Section 7, Clause 11(cc), Court-fees Act, if regard be had to the frame of the plaint. The court-fee payable has to be determined on the nature of the allegations in the plaint and not on what is set up or pleaded in the defence. There is a denial of plaintiff's title in the written statement. But in a suit of this kind based on the ...
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