Chennai Court March 1927 Judgments
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In Re: Virumandi thevan and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-28-1927
Reported in: 105Ind.Cas.831a
1. The appellants have been convicted under Section 394, Indian Penal Code, and sentenced to five years' rigorous imprisonment, by the Sessions Judge of Ramnad Division. The appellants were tried for an offence under Section 395 and the charge as read out to them is in the following terms: 'That you along with others numbering five and more on or about the 9th day of June, 1926, at Virudunagar during night did commit dacoity and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 395, Indian Penal Code, and within my cognizance. The Jury found that five people did not take part in the] occurrence and their verdict was that both the accused were guilty of robbery in which hurt was voluntarily caused. The contention of Mr. Vaz for the appellants is that the conviction, on a charge which was not specifically placed before the Jury and to which the accused were not asked to plead is irregular. The learned Public Prosecutor contends that the offence under Section 394 is a minor offence an...
Murugan and ors. Vs. Gutha Rami Naidu
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-25-1927
Reported in: AIR1927Mad351; (1927)53MLJ455
ORDERJackson, J.1. The petitioners seek to revise an order by the Sub-divisional Magistrate of Ranipet staying further proceedings in a case upon his file brought under Section 211, Indian Penal Code. The order might be set aside on the short ground that the Sub-divisional Magistrate has no power to stay proceedings in his own Court. Under Section 344, Criminal Procedure Code, he may adjourn a case from time to time but that is not what he has done in the present instance. The counter-petitioner has been charged with having falsely accused certain persons of theft before the Village Headman, an offence punishable under Section 211. The case was duly reported by the Headman to the Police who referred it as false. Then the counter-petitioner being apprised of that fact put in a complaint before the Sub-Magistrate and the Sub-Magistrate recorded a written statement upon it. He allowed the prayer of the Police to strike the case off their file, but apparently passed no further orders on th...
Chettiammal and ors. Vs. Collector of Coimbatore
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-25-1927
Reported in: AIR1927Mad867
1. This is an appeal in a land acquisition case. The land acquired was held as a widow's estate by one Nanjammal. An award was passed for a sum of Rs. 2,107, to which she did not object. A reference was, however, made to the Court under S.18, of the Act at the instance of her two daughters and their sons, who claimed compensation to the amount of about Rs, 20,000. The Subordinate Judge raised the compensation to over Rs. 4,000 and the daughters and their sons appeal.2. A question has been raised whether the reversioners had such an interest in the land as to entitte them to claim a reference. A similar question was raised in the case reported Gopayya v. Deputy Collector of Tenali A. I. R. 1922 Mad. 100 but was not decided for there the widow had surrendered her estate to the reversioner after her claim but before the reference. It .has been held in Brij Kishore Lal v. Pratap Narain [1919]4 Pat. L. J. 360 that a reversioner has an interest which entitles him to protect the corpus of the...
Salai Muhammad Haji Ibrahim and Co. Vs. Ayya Nadar and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-25-1927
Reported in: AIR1927Mad944
Ramesam, J.1. The respondent takes a preliminary objection and contends that no revision petition lies in this case. He relies on Shankar Sarup v. Mejo Mal [1901] 23 All. 313.The scheme of Section 295, Civil P. C., is rather to enable the Judge, as a matter of administration to distribute the price &c.;2. On this sentence I do not understand the Judicial Committee to say that the act of a Court in passing an order under Section 295, Civil P. C., 1882, (Civil P. C., 1908, Section 73), is a ministerial or non-judicial act. The reasoning underlying the contention is that the work of administration of assets is administrative. I think there is a fallacy in passing from the noun to the adjective in this manner. On this reasoning, all the orders of Courts under the Succession Act and the Probate and Administration Act and Hindu Wills Act, relating to the administration of the assets of deceased persons are administrative and not judicial which is absurd. The learned vakil for the respondent ...
Thoongan Vs. Chinna Alagu Kudumban
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-25-1927
Reported in: AIR1927Mad910
Jackson, J. 1. The defendant in S. C. No. 625 of 1924 on the file of the District Munsif's Court of Satur seeks to revise his judgment and decree. This suit was originally referred to arbitration and upon one of the two arbitrators reporting that his colleague was fabricating false records the learned district munsif recalled the suit from the file of the arbitrators and proceeded with it. The point taken in this revision petition is that he had no jurisdiction to do so. There is no provision in Sch. 2 of the code for a revocation at this stage, and as observed by the Judicial Committee in Sadiq Husain v. Nazir Begum [1911] 33 All. 743 all that the Courts in India can do is to take advantage of the sections of the code which enable them to keep the machinery of arbitration going. A Court acting under Sch. 2 can only revoke an arbitration in the cases specified in paras. 5, 8 and 15. No doubt, in the present case, if the matter had reached an award, para. 15 might have been applicable, ...
B. Govinda Ayyar and anr. Vs. B. Srinivasa Iyer and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-25-1927
Reported in: AIR1927Mad1181
Ramesam, J.1. This second appeal arises out of a suit for partition. The common ancestor of the parties is one Narayana Iyer and a pedigree of the family appears at p. 4 of the pleadings paper at the end of the plaint. Narayana Iyer died early in 1867. His eldest son Appaswami alias Rama Iyer died in 1906. The second son Veeraswami Iyer died in 1904. The plaintiff's father Venkatasubba Iyer died in 1872 and plaintiff is said to be his posthumous son by his second wife. The plaintiff was, therefore, 45 at the time of the suit in 1917. Ranga Iyer died in 1885 or 1886. The eldest Appaswami had three sons; Srinivasa Iyer, defendant 1, Narayana Iyer, defendant 3, and Subramania Iyer, defendant 5. It is important to mention that Narayana Iyer and Subramania Iyer claim to be adopted respectively by Ranga Iyer and Veeraswami Iyer. The District Munsif found against these adoptions and the District Judge recorded no finding about them. The defendants pleaded a partition 50 years ago. It takes us...
In Re: Srinivasulu Naicken and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-25-1927
Reported in: AIR1928Mad21
ORDERJackson, J.1. Three points are raised: (1) That having eliminated Section 325, I.P.C. the learned Sessions Judge should hove reduced the sentences accordingly. The Public Prosecutor concedes that the three years under Section 325 should give place to two years under Section 352. as set forth in para, 11 of the Assistant Sessions Judge's judgment as regards accused 1.2. As regards 'the other accused 3, 4, 7, 9, 10 and 12 now that they are acquitted under Section 325 their culpability seems to be less and their sentence is reduced to nine months rigorous imprisonment; and that of the 13th accused to one year and nine months and fine.(2) The charge against accused 6 that he was a member of this unlawful assembly on 30th October is an illegality vitiating the whole trial. It is a question of fact, not of law. The trial Court found that the charge was unsubstantiated and acquitted him. If the facts as charged had been proved there would have been no illegality.(3) It is urged that Sect...
Suppayyan Pillai and anr. Vs. Lakshmanna Pattar and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-25-1927
Reported in: AIR1928Mad474
1. The facts which give rise to this appeal are simple. The shop in dispute belonged to a Pandaram family. It was mortgaged to one Saradambal in 1905 under Ex. 1. It was then attached by a simple money decree-holder in execution of the decree he got against the Pandarams. A decree was obtained by a third person against the Pandarams and that decree was assigned to defendant 1 in the present suit. He purchased the property in execution of the decree in 1907 and got possession. In 1910 a suit for partition was filed by one of the members of the Pandaram family, O.S. 45 of 1910, in the Subordinate Judge's Court against the other members of the family, and the present; defendant 1 was defendant 10 in that suit. One of the items of property of which the partition was sought was this shop. The plaintiff's case was that the purchase by the present defendant 1, (defendant 10 in that suit) was benami for the family. In the meantime the present defendant 1 discharged the mortgage debt due to Sar...
Ramaswami Naicker and ors. Vs. Chinnathayammal
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-25-1927
Reported in: AIR1928Mad604
Srinivasa Ayyangar, J.1. There are no merits whatever in this second appeal, because it is, as admitted frankly, merely an attempt on the part of the appellants to escape liability for payment of costs in appeal decreed by the appellate Court. The argument for the appellants may be briefly put thus: In all mortgage suits for sale whatever costs may be ordered should be realized in the first instance only by the sale of the mortgaged property and it is only if after the sale of the securities it should be found that the sale proceeds are insufficient to pay up the whole amount inclusive of cost to the decree-holder, that the decree-holder can apply for execution against the person of the judgment-debtor. In this case satisfaction of the original decree was entered up by payment of the amount for which the sale was ordered. As satisfaction of the decree for she has been entered up, the property cannot now be brought to sale, and if the argument of the appellants should be accepted that t...
P.C. Muthu Chettiar Vs. Rengappa Naidu and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-24-1927
Reported in: AIR1927Mad945; (1927)53MLJ453
Wallace, J.1. The point for decision is what is the Article of Limitation applicable to the cause of action against 3rd defendant. He was a surety on a simple money bond for the payment of the suit mortgage debt by defendants 1 and 2. He undertook to pay 'if the principal and interest be not paid as per that bond,' i. e., Ex. A. Under Ex. A the period of the mortgage was ten months, but by a residuary clause it was stated that in default the mortgagor will pay the principal and the accruing interest 'whenever you demand'. It is pleaded that, as the mortgagor was bound to pay ' on demand ' at any time, the surety is equally liable. But plaintiff never at any time pleaded that he made any demand under this clause, and in his, plaint has clearly stated only one date for his cause of action, viz., the date of expiry of the mortgage period. Hence there has been no breach of the contract to pay on demand, no failure by the mortgagor to pay as per that clause in the bond and therefore no liab...
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