Chennai Court February 1926 Judgments
Sornam Pillai Vs. Tiruvazhiperumal Pillai and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Feb-26-1926
Reported in: AIR1926Mad857; (1926)51MLJ126
1. This Civil Miscellaneous Second Appeal arises out of an application in execution filed by the 1st respondent for delivery of the properties sold to him by the decree-holder who had herself purchased the properties in execution of a mortgage decree in O.S. No. 507 of 1911 on the fileof the District Munsif's Court of Srivaikuntam. The Court sale was held on the 12th of September 1919 and was confirmed on the 15th of October, 1919. The 1st respondent who held a mortgage over the suit properties was not a party to O.S. No. 507 of 1911. Having obtained a decree on his mortgage in a suit in which the prior mortgagee-decree-holder was not impleaded as a party, he filed an application under Order 21, Rule 90 of the Civil Procedure Code to set aside the Court sale on the 15th October, 1919. That application was dismissed on the same date. A day after the aforesaid Court sale and two days before the said application, the 1st respondent instituted O.S. No. 494 of 1919 on the file of the Distri...
Tag this Judgment!Chitturi Venkataratnam and ors. Vs. Siram Subba Rao
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Feb-26-1926
Reported in: AIR1926Mad1040; (1926)51MLJ410
Phillips, J.1. L.P. Appeal No. 42 of 1925:--The only question for consideration in this appeal is, whether the document, Ex. III, is admissible in evidence. It purports to be a kararnamah or release of partnership share and it recites that in consideration of a sum of Rs. 2,100 settled by the mediators, the executant relinquishes his share, title and interest in the partnership business. Admittedly the partnership was possessed of immoveable property and the learned Judge in second appeal has held that as the document is one creating or extinguishing an interest in immoveable property within the meaning of Section 17 of the Registration Act, it requires registration and is therefore inadmissible in evidence as not having been registered. The learned Judge finds that this document is a relinquishment of the executant's share in the partnership and thatinstead of Subba Rao being paid his share of the assets of the partnership, the partners entered into an arrangement by which he purporte...
Tag this Judgment!P. Hajee Batcha Saheb Vs. M. Mahomed Ebrahim Saheb
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Feb-26-1926
Reported in: AIR1926Mad739; 95Ind.Cas.865; (1926)51MLJ658
Phillips, J.1. The facts of this case are as follows:A certain property was sold by Court-auction in three lots on 4th September, 1922. The first lot was put up and knocked down to respondent's bid for Rs. 1,850. The 25 per cent, deposit was not paid at once but the sale of the second lot was1 proceeded with. While that was going on, the respondent wished to retract his bid for the first lot on the ground that he had been bidding under a mistake. The officer conducting the sale refused to allow him to do so and this order was confirmed by the Court on a petition put in two days later, namely, on the 6th of September, 1922. The first lot was again put up for sale after lots 2 and 3 but no bids were secured. The decree-holder then put in an execution (with which we are now concerned), dated 27th November, 1922. He asked (1) that the respondent should be directed to pay the purchase money of Rs. 1,850 into Court, (2) that in default of, such payment the said lot No. 1 should be ordered to...
Tag this Judgment!In Re: Ramachandra Chetty
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Feb-25-1926
Reported in: AIR1926Mad763; (1926)50MLJ557
ORDERWaller, J.1. The question raised in this ease is whether the prosecution is barred by limitation under Section 347 of the Madras District Municipalities Act. A notice was served on petitioner under Sections 146, 149 and 313 of the Act in June, 1924. On July 4th he put in a petition to the chairman asking him to inspect the latrine. In reply an endorsement was sent on August 11th, informing him that he would be prosecuted if he did not obey the notice in one week. At the same time the Chairman directed the Health Officer to report further. That Officer's report was unfavourable to petitioner. On 22nd October a fresh notice was sent to petitioner, which was served on November 6th. He failed to comply with it and a pro-cecution was launched. It was launched within 3 months after the second notice, but more than three months after the first. Mr Ethiraj contends that the offence was committed on the expiry of the first notice and that the prosecution is barred by limitation. His conten...
Tag this Judgment!Pandiri Viranna Vs. Grandhi Sattiraju and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Feb-25-1926
Reported in: AIR1927Mad445; (1927)52MLJ157
ORDERDevadoss, J.1. The only point in this appeal is whether a person who obtains a mortgage of the judgcent-debtor's property after the date of attachment and before the date of sale is entitled to apply under Order 21, Rule 89 for setting aside the sale. The learned DistrictJudge held that he could not, relying upon a decision of Mr. Justice Odgers in Subba Reddi v. Jayaramayya (1923) 17 LW 680. It was held in that case that by virtue of Section 64, Civil Procedure Code, any transfer of property attached was void and therefore the person who acquired a title after attachment had no locus standi to apply under Rule 89. With very great respect we are unable to agree with Odgers, J. Section 64 makes any private transfer of property or delivery of property attached or any interest therein void against all claims enforceable under the attachment. Where a decree-holder attaches the property of his judgment-debtor any transfer after the date of attachment is void against him. He could ignor...
Tag this Judgment!K. Munisamy Chetty Vs. K. Subbaroya Achari
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Feb-25-1926
Reported in: (1926)51MLJ498
1. The only point urged in this Revision Petition is that no application to the Full Bench lay against the order of the trial Judge inasmuch as the decree passed by him was on an award. The matter in dispute between the parties was referred to arbitration and the arbitrator passed an award. When it came up before the Judge who remitted the case to the arbitrator he held that the arbitrator did not consider certain facts and passed a decree modifying the award. Against his order an application to the Full Bench was made and the Full Bench held that the order of the Trial Judge modifying the award was wrong, and set aside his order and directed a decree to be passed in terms of the award. Mr. Srinivasa-gopalachariar's contention is that the decree of the Trial Judge was passed on the award and therefore under Section 38 no application to the Full Bench lay. If the decree was on the award or in terms of the award, no doubt his contention would be right, but the learned Trial Judge modifie...
Tag this Judgment!K. Munisami Chetti Vs. A. Subbaroya Achari
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Feb-25-1926
Reported in: 95Ind.Cas.442
1. The only point urged in this revision petition is that no application to the Full Bench lay against the Order of the Trial Judge inasmuch as the decree passed by him was on an award. The matter in dispute between the parties was referred to arbitration and the arbitrator passed an award. When it came up before the Judge who remitted the case to the arbitrator, he held that the arbitrator did not consider certain facts and passed a decree modifying the award. Against his order an application to the Full Bench was made and the Full Bench held that the award was wrong, and set aside his order and directed a decree to be passed in terms of the award. Mr. Srinivasagopalachariar's contention is that the decree of the Trial Judge was passed on the award and, therefore, under Section 38 no application to the Full Bench lay. If the decree was on the award or in the terms of the award, no doubt his contention would be right, but the learned Trial Judge modified the award by going into the mer...
Tag this Judgment!The Public Prosecutor Vs. Ratnavelu Chetty
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Feb-24-1926
Reported in: AIR1926Mad865; (1927)52MLJ210
Devadoss, J.1. This is an appeal by the Public Prosecutor against the order of acquittal of the Assistant Sessions Judge of Salem. The accused was committed to the Court of Session under Section 211, Indian Penal Code. The Assistant Sessions Judge held that the proceedings were started on a police report before the Magistrate and the proceedings were void and therefore the committal to the Sessions Court was illegal and acquitted the accused. The contention of the Public Prosecutor is that the initiation of the proceedings was not illegal and the committal therefore was right.2. The simple question for decision is whether the charge sheet in a non-cognizable case is a report or not. Section 190 of the Criminal Procedure Code empowers a Magistrate to take cognizance of a case '(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence, (b) upon a report in writing of such facts made by any police officer, (c) upon information received from any person other than a police offic...
Tag this Judgment!Krishnayya Vs. Polepeddi Ramayya and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Feb-24-1926
Reported in: (1926)51MLJ79
Phillips, J.1. The question for decision is whether, when an application to sue in forma pauperis is rejected under Order 33, Rule 5(a), a second application is barred by the provisions of Rule 15 of that order The Calcutta High Court in Atul Chandra Sen v. Peary Mohan Mukerjee (1915) 20 C.W.N. 669 held that there is no distinction between orders of rejection passed under Rule 5 and orders of refusal passed under Rule 7 and this view has been adopted in All Afzal v. Purna Chandra (1924) 40 C.L.J. 188. There is also a case in Ranchod Morar v. Bezanji Edulji I.L.R. (1894) B. 86, where a similar view appears to have prevailed.2. On the contrary, we have the authority of the Lahore High Court in Bal Knar v. Shib Das (1919) 56 I.C. 207 and of a Full Bench of the Burma Chief Court in Howa v. Sit Shein (1917) 42 I.C. 803 (F.B.) that a distinction should be made between these two class of orders. They have held accordingly that an order passed summarily under Rule 5(a) is not a bar to a second...
Tag this Judgment!(Polepeddi) Krishnamoorthy Vs. (Polepeddi) Ramayya and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Feb-24-1926
Reported in: AIR1926Mad875
Phillips, J.1. The question for decision is whether, when an application to sue in forma pauperis is rejected under Order 33, Rule 5(a), a second application is barred by the provisions of Rule 15 of that order The Calcutta High Court in Atul Chandra Sen v. Peary Mohan Mukerjee 20 C.W.N. 669 held that there is no distinction between orders of rejection passed under Rule 5 and orders of refusal passed under Rule 7 and this view has been adopted in Ali Afzal v. Purna Chandra : AIR1924Cal1039 . There is also a case in Ranchod Morar v. Bezanji Edulji [1896] 20 Bom. 86, where a similar view appears to have prevailed.2. On the contrary, we have the authority of the Lahore High Court in Bal Kuar v. Shib Das [1920] 1 Lah. 151 and of a Full Bench of the Burma Chief Court in Howa v. Sit Shein [1917] 42 I. C. 803 that a distinction should be made between these two classes of orders. They have held accordingly that an order passed summarily under Rule 5(a) is not a bar to a second application. The...
Tag this Judgment!- ‹ Prev
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- Next ›
- Last »