Chennai Court July 1923 Judgments
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(John Joseph) Brito Vs. Mrs. S.S. Brito
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jul-18-1923
Reported in: AIR1924Mad586
1. This is a petition under Section 115, Code of Civil Procedure, whether or not the Subordinate Judge was acting quite regularly in entertaining this petition. Under Section 151, we find there is the authority of this Court for considering that he might have reviewed his decree in the suit, under Order 47, Code of Civil Procedure see Alamelu Ammal v. Rama Aiyar 1922 Mad. 446, and if he had acted in the exercise of his power under that Chapter of the Code, he might have passed a similar order to that, now sought to be revised. As the Judge made a regular enquiry, before passing his order setting aside previous order dismissing the suit, and as he found as the result of that enquiry that the defendant fraudulently and through undue influence caused the plaintiff to sign the compromise petition and to present it in Court, and seeing that the merits of the whole case will be thoroughly enquired into at the trial of the suit, there are no good reasons for our exercising our revisional powe...
Visvanatha Aiyar Vs. Vengama Naidu and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jul-18-1923
Reported in: AIR1924Mad749
Venkatasubba Rao, J.1. The plaintiff alleges that in pursuance of a mortgage decree his properties were sold, that a certain amount was realised and credited towards the decree, that the 1st defendant was the owner of some of the other properties also included in the mortgage and that the amount paid towards the mortgage by the 1st defendant was less than what he would be liable to pay, having regard to the value of those items. The plaintiff therefore claims in the present suit contribution from the 1st defendant, being the difference between the amount rateably due in respect of the latter properties and the amount actually paid by him.2. The plaintiff's right to maintain the suit is questioned and to deal with this objection it is necessary to set forth a few facts.3. One Krishnaswamy Aiyar had two sons, Seshasayi and Lakshmikantham, and they formed members of a joint Hindu family. On the 11th September 1890, they mortgaged the properties described in Schedules A to F of the plaint ...
Ramaswami Reddiar Vs. Peria Veera Kudumban and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jul-17-1923
Reported in: 76Ind.Cas.154; (1923)45MLJ719
1. The only point argued in this appeal is whether the subordinate Judge was right in holding that the mortgage (Ex. I-a) had been broken up by the sale under Ex. I. It is urged for the appellant, that as all the sharers were bound by the mortgage under Section 60 of the Transfer of property Act, the security is not redeemable as to 3/5ths as decreed. The sale has been held valitl as to 2/5ths of the property conveyed thereunder and invalid as to 3/5ths. ft is urged that notwithstanding this there has been no extinction of the mortgage security in the hands of the purchaser (who was also the mortgagee) as to 2/5ths of the security. We have been referred to no authority beyond Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act by the appellant; he seeks to distinguish the cases we are about to refer to by saying that in none of them has there been any assent or conduct on the part of the mortgagee such as would show his acquiscense in a partial redemption. On the other hand we have been shown n...
Rao Bahadur P. Ayyannah Chetty and ors. Vs. P.K. Subramania Iyer
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jul-16-1923
Reported in: 76Ind.Cas.756; (1923)45MLJ409
Walter Salis Schwabe, K.C., C.J.1. The Chief Justice :This is an appeal from a judgment of Coutts-Trotter, J. in which he found in favour of a Commission Agent that he had earned his commission.2. All these cases - and there have been a very great number of them in England - depend, in the first place, on what is the contract between the parties. Where you have a contract in plain terms stating when commission is payable and when it is not, there is no difficulty : but, where you have a contract containing terms which may bear more than one interpretation, there have been many cases where difficulties have arisen. Different Judges have taken, different views and have left to some extent the law not as clear as one would wish to find it : but, in my judgment, one gets very little assistance from examining those authorities. What one has to do is to take the contract and the surrounding circumstances and see what was the intention of the parties to be deduced therefrom.3. In this case th...
P. Ayyannah Chetty Vs. P.K. Subramania Iyer
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jul-16-1923
Reported in: AIR1924Mad212
Schwabe, C.J.1. This is an appeal from a judgment of Coutts-Trotter, J. in which he found in favour of a Commission Agent that he had earned his commission.2. All these cases-and there have been a very great number of them in England-depend, in the first place, on what is the contract between the parties., Where you have a contract in plain terms stating when commission is payable and when it is not, there is no difficulty: but, where you have a contract containing terms which may bear more than one interpretation, there have been many cases where difficulties have arisen. Different Judges have taken different views and have left to some extent the law not as clear as one would wish to find it: but, in my judgment, one gets very little assistance from examining those authorities. What one has to do is to take the contract and the surrounding circumstances and see what was the intention of the parties to be-deduced therefrom.3. In this case the contract was verbal and it is stated by th...
V.E. Rajahbhaday Mudaliar Vs. A.M. Visvanatha Reddi and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jul-12-1923
Reported in: AIR1924Mad515; (1923)45MLJ543
1. Madras Act II of 1922 declares that no person elected as a member of a local board shall take his seat till he has made an oath of allegiance. Until each member takes his seat no business can be transacted. The election of a President is the first business to be transacted at the first meeting of the Board. (Vide Rule 15 of Schedule X of Madras Act XIV of 1920). It follows that the election of a President by persons who had not taken the oath was invalid. The lower Court was right. The Civil Revision Petition is dismissed with costs....
V.E. Rajahbather Mudaljar Vs. A.M. Viswanadha Reddi and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jul-12-1923
Reported in: 75Ind.Cas.620
1. Madras Act II of 1922 declares that no person elected as a member of a Local Board shall take his seat till he has made an oath of allegiance. Until each member takes his seat no business can be transacted. The election of a President is the first business to be transacted at the first meeting of the Board. (Vtde Section 15 Schedule X of Madras Act XIV of 1920). It follows that the election of a President by persons who had not taken the oath was invalid. The lower Court was right. The tivil revision petition is dismissed with costs....
In Re: Nanni Kudumban and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jul-11-1923
Reported in: 76Ind.Cas.289; (1923)45MLJ406
Walter Salis Schwabe, K.C., C.J.1. In this case very property at the suggestion of Mr. Adam the case was adjourned so that the accused's interests might be presented by an amicus curiae and his attendance has been very useful to the Court in calling its attention to certain decisions on the construction of Section 307 Criminal Procedure Code. Speaking for myself I agree with the view expressed in Emperor v. Lyall I.L.R. (1901) C. 128 and Emperor v. Anandacharan Thakur I.L.R. (1901) C. 629 as to the functions of the Court where Section 307 has been brought into operation. I think that the intention of the legislature has been clearly expressed by the section itself and it comes to this : where a judge hears a case with a jury and disagrees with the jury and disagrees to such an extent that he feels that he can not accept their verdict he is entitled to refuse to accept that verdict and then submit the case with his reasons to the High Court and the High Court then has thrown upon it the...
Nanni Kudumban and ors. Vs. Crown
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jul-11-1923
Reported in: AIR1924Mad232
Schwabe, C.J.1. In this case very probably at the suggestion of Mr. Adam the case was adjourned so that the accused's interests might be presented by an amicus curiae and his attendance has been very useful to the Court in calling its attention to certain decisions on the construction of Section 307 Criminal Procedure Code. Speaking for myself I agree with the view expressed in Emperor v. Lyall [1901] 29 Cal. 128 and Emperor v. Anandacharan Thakur [1909] 36 Cal. 629 as to the functions of the Court where Section 307 has been brought into operation. I think that the intention of the legislature has been clearly expressed by the section itself and it comes to this : where a judge hears a case with a jury and disagrees with the jury and disagrees to such an extent that he feels that he cannot accept their verdict he is untitled to refuse to accept that verdict and then submit the case with his reasons to the High Court and the High Court then has thrown upon it the burden of examining for...
Muddlapur Morari Rao and ors. Vs. Balwanth Dikshit and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jul-09-1923
Reported in: 76Ind.Cas.342
1. This suit is a dispute regarding the properties of one Gundu Bhat, who died leaving a miner daughter who survived him only a few days. Plaintiffs claim to be the nearest agnates of Gundu Brat while defendants are admittedly his sister's sons. The District Judge found plaintiffs' case to be true, but held that the sister's sons were the preferential heirs. Plaintiffs applied for review of judgment on the ground that it has been held in Kamala Bai v. Bhagirathi Bai : (1912)23MLJ518 that the agnates are to be preferred to the sister's Sons. This ruling had not been brought to the Judge's notice at the original trial and he accordingly revised this original order and gave a decree to pla:ntiffs. Defendants appeal both on the merits and on the ground that it was incompetent fir the District judge to grant a review, as none of the grounds mentioned in Order XLVII, Rule I, Civil Procedure Code is present in this case.2. On the merits we entirely agree with the District Judge's conclusions ...
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