Chennai Court July 1922 Judgments
Shiva Aithala Vs. Rangappaya Aithala
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jul-31-1922
Reported in: 92Ind.Cas.523
Jackson, J.1. The short point in this second appeal is who is to defray the funeral expenses when a widow dies being a member of a divided Hindu family, and not being in enjoyment of any self-acquired property of her husband. The widow was being maintained by her husband's nephew and great nephew each of whom contributed half. The lower Courts have ruled that they should pay for her funeral in like proportion and this seems logical and equitable. If the family were not divided they would pay at this rate. There is no direct authority on the point but Sir E.J. Trevelyan has deduced a similar rule from such authority as exists. See Hindu Law, 2nd Edition, page 88. I see no force in the contention that the relation who performs the ceremony under the Hindu Law must necessarily pay for it. In a joint family the son does not pay for the funeral of his father. Accordingly I confirm the decree of the lower Appellate Court and dismiss this appeal with-costs.2. The respondent files memorandum o...
Tag this Judgment!K.N. Parthasarathy Naidu and ors. Vs. P. Mukundammal
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jul-26-1922
Reported in: AIR1923Mad84; (1922)43MLJ551
Walter Salis Schwabe Kt., K.C., C.J.1. In this case the mortgagees brought a suit to enforce the mortgage. The mortgage was executed by an executor under a will. That will gave the executor express power to sell any part of the estate, moveable or immoveable as the executor might wish for purposes of paying off debts. It was contended before the learned Judge that, this power being an express power of sale, he had no power to mortgage. The learned Judge with regret, came to the conclusion that that was the proper construction of the will and that he was bound by Haldenby v. Spofforth 1 Reaven 390 and Indian Cases following that case, so to hold. On a careful examination of that case, so far from being authority in favour of the proposition that the executor with power of sale cannot mortgage, it is in my judgment direct authority for the proposition that he can except in cases such as the case there where a prohibition against mortgage can be inferred. The Master of the Rolls, Lord Lan...
Tag this Judgment!Achutha Naidu Vs. Oakley Bowden and Co. and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jul-26-1922
Reported in: (1922)43MLJ444
Walter Salis Schwabe, K.C., C.J.1. This is an appeal from the judgment of Mr. Justice Coutts Trotter in which he found that a certain contract for the purchase of tiles could be repudiated by the defendants. The facts appear fully from his judgment and may be stated shortly thus: The plaintiff entered into a contract with the 1st defendants who were themselves agents for the 2nd defendants for the supply over a period of a large number of tiles at a fixed price. Plaintiff in fact was a man of straw and was a mere alias of, or dummy contractor for, Balakrishna Mudaliar, the dubash of the 1st defendants. It was well-known to that dubash and it must be taken to have been within the knowledge of the plaintiff that no such contract would have been entered into by the 1st defendants if they had known the true facts. The 1st defendant has sworn that he would not have made such a contract and the reasons are obvious. It is difficult to imagine anything more undesirable for persons handling the...
Tag this Judgment!Sathappa Chetty and ors. Vs. S.N. Subramanian Chetty and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jul-25-1922
Reported in: AIR1922Mad510(1); 71Ind.Cas.334; (1922)43MLJ758
ORDER1. It is not disputed that the provision in Section 110, C.P.C. as to value of subject matter is complied with in this case. The objection we have to deal with is only that our decision in respect of which leave is asked for, is not a decree or final order, within the meaning of Section 109 : Petitioners contend that it is the latter.2. In the definition of decree in Section 2(2) C.P.C. the antithesis is between 'final' and 'preliminary', decrees of the latter description being defined as those, after which further proceedings, have to be taken before the suit can be completely disposed of. But in all the authorities at present relevant the opposition is for our present purpose regarded as being between 'final' and 'interlocutory' and 'interlocutory' is defined in Wharton's Law Lexicon as 'that which is decided during the course of an action and does not determine it'. This definition at first sight, differs little from the definition of 'preliminary' in the Code above referred to...
Tag this Judgment!Murugappa Naicker Vs. Thavammal
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jul-24-1922
Reported in: AIR1923Mad82; 70Ind.Cas.827
Walter Schwabe, C.J.1. In my Judgment this preliminary point fails. By the rules in existence, if a petition of appeal is presented out of time the grounds for the delay must be stated so that when the matter comes before the Admission Court, the Court may decide whether it shall be admitted, notwithstanding its being out of time. In this case it appears that the case came before Napier, J. That learned Judge accepted the excuse and admitted the appeal. Within a short time of that date the respondent must have been perfectly aware that the appeal was admitted. As has been decided by the Privy Council in Krishnasami Panikondar v. Ramasami Chettiar 43 Ind. Cas. 493 : 41 M. 412 : 34 M.L.J. 63 : 4 P.L.W. 54 : 16 A.L.J. 57 : 7 L.W. 156 : 23 M.L.T. 101 : 27 C.L.J. 253 : 2 P.L.R. 1918 : 22 C.W.N. 481 : 21 Bom. L.R. 541 : 11 Bur. L.T. 121 : (1918) M.W.N. 906 : 45 I.A. 25 (P.C.) he could have moved the Court to set aside the leave to appeal although out of time. He did not do so. But he says: '...
Tag this Judgment!Aydroos and anr. Vs. Emperor
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jul-24-1922
Reported in: 72Ind.Cas.360
1. We sec no reason for interference with the lower Court's findings of fact. The evidence against the second and eighth accused, appellants before us was, no doubt, given against the former only by first and third prosecution witnesses and against the latter only by first, third and fourth prosecution witnesses. We do not think that any sufficient reason of the nature of enmity or the like has been made out for rejecting this evidence. There was some delay in the giving of information to the authorities but that is an almost invariable feature of these cases and was probably inevitable in view of the state of the country. The dc-fence evidence did not assist the accused.2. Accepting the finding of facts, there is no reason for interference with the conviction of an offence punishable under Section 143, Indian Penal Code. The objection at the conviction under Section 126, Indian Railways Act, is that there is no evidence in the case of either of these accused of his having himself done...
Tag this Judgment!Subramaniyan Pattar Vs. Kizhakkakara Uthananthil Raman Puduval and ors ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jul-21-1922
Reported in: (1923)44MLJ596
1. The appellant the first defendant, holds a mortgage decree against the tavazhi property of the plaintiffs and certain other defendants. The plaintiffs sued for a declaration that this decree was not binding on the property. The appeal has been argued first on the ground that the plaintiffs, junior members of the tavazhi, were not entitled to sue For the recovery of this property without showing that the karnavan, who is the fourth defendant, had refused to proceed himself. This objection was not, so far as we have been shown taken in either of the Lower Courts. We cannot entertain it now as a ground of second appeal, the more so as the respondents have had no notice in the memo of appeal that it would be urged.2. The next contention is that the Lower Court erred in its finding that the property belonged to the tavazhi. That finding was supported by evidence and we cannot see how any question of law arose in connection with it. This contention also therefore fails.3. The next questio...
Tag this Judgment!Louis Dreyfus and Co. Vs. R.K. Rajgopala Iyer and Bros. and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jul-20-1922
Reported in: AIR1923Mad222; 70Ind.Cas.353
Walter Schwabe, C.J.1. This case raises very difficult points under the Arbitration Act. The facts are shortly these. Messrs. Louis Dreyfus and Co. entered into an agreement in April 1918 with the firm of R.K. Rajagopala Iyer and Brothers, which firm consisted of R.K. Rajagopala Iyer and Arunachella Iyer. Under that agreement the latter firm acted as Dubashes for Louis Dreyfus and Co on somewhat elaborate terms contained there in, one of those ternisbeing a very full arbitration/clause. In November 1918 R.K. Rajagopala Iyer was apparently On the point of death, and on the 3rd November, heads of agreement were come to between Arunachella Iyer, Sundaresa Iyer on the one. Part, certain persons described, as sureties on another part and Messrs. Dreyfus and Co., the objects of the heads of agreement being to povide for certain things in the past and for the future acting as Dubashes in this country for Messrs. Louis Dreyfus and Co. Disputes having arisen, Messrs. Dreyfus and Co. called upon...
Tag this Judgment!Abdur Salam Sahib and anr. Vs. M. Kandaswami Chettiar
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jul-19-1922
Reported in: AIR1923Mad54; 71Ind.Cas.330; (1922)43MLJ556
Walter Salis Schwabe, K.C., C.J.1. I am very loath to disagree with the Judge who heard the evidence on questions of fact but in this case I do not think that the view I am about to express really differs at all on the question of fact because I take the facts as found by the learned Judge. On these facts, whether the proper inference is that the tenancy in question is a permanent or temporary one is a question of law and not a question of fact.2. The facts of this case as found are that a superstructure described as a pucca house was erected on those premises at least fifty years ago - according to the evidence the period is nearly 100 years, from that date forwards there has always been fixed and paid a monthly ground rent of 14 annas. The tenant from time to time has disposed of his interest. The last tenant sold his interest to the present plaintiff for Rs. 350. During that period the value of the land in Madras has arisen and we are told that the present proper ground value of thi...
Tag this Judgment!In Re: Mohideen Pakkiri Marakkayar
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Jul-17-1922
Reported in: AIR1923Mad50(1); (1922)43MLJ475
ORDER1. We are asked in this revision case to interfere with an order passed by the 1st class Sub Divisional Magistrate of Devakottai Division, disallowing the objection of the petitioner in a criminal case.2. The case was instituted on a complaint by the Income Tax Assistant Tahsildar of Devakottai. In that complaint the accused was charged under Section 177, Indian Penal Code, within the meaning of Section 40 of the Incometax Act, VII of 1918. The facts set out are that the accused verified a petition, which he afterwards presented to the Revenue Divisional Officer under Section 21 of the Income Tax Act. That verification was made at Kottaipatnam in the Tanjore District. But the last sentence of the complaint states that the offence was committed at the place where the return was received by the Revenue Divisional Officer, Devakottai, within the lower court's jurisdiction.3. It must be borne in mind that the complaint is statedly of an offence, punishable under Section 177 I.P.C. wit...
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