Chennai Court March 1922 Judgments
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G. Ramaswami Aiyar Vs. Deivasigamani Pillai and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-14-1922
Reported in: AIR1922Mad397; (1922)43MLJ129
Kumaraswami Sastri, J.1. I am of opinion that the decision of the Subordinate Judge cannot be supported. There can be little doubt that the sum of Rs. 426-13-5 forms part of the amount borrowed tinder Ex. B which is a mortgage deed executed by Sivachidambaram Pillai, the 2nd defendant in S.C. No. 264 of 1908 and which recites that the money was borrowed and paid into Court for setting aside the Court sale. Ex. D. the lodgment schedule shows that the amount was paid by Sivachidambaram Pillai. The word 'Sadasivam Pillai' in the certified copy filed in Court is a mistake for 'Sivachidambaram Pillai' as appears from the certified copy filed before me. It seems to me to be clear that as between Kanakasabhai Pillai and Sivachidambaram Pillai Sivachidambaram who paid up the decree amount is prima facie entitled to contribution from Kanakasabhai Pillai as regards half the amount paid. Kanakasabhai Pillai died and his widow who is the 1st defendant in this suit conveyed her husband's property t...
Sundaresan Chetty Alias Sundaram Chettiar Vs. Visvanatha Pandarasannad ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-14-1922
Reported in: (1922)43MLJ147
Krishnan, J.1. This Second Appeal arises from a suit brought by the plaintiff against the late Pandara Sannadhi of Vedaraniam Devastanam for money due on a bond executed by him to plaintiff's deceased grand uncle. Plaintiff claimed a decree against the defendant personally and against the trust funds as he alleged that the money was borrowed for Devastanam purposes. The defendant raised several pleas which are not material now but did not set up any plea that the debt was not binding on the Devastanam properties.2. The Subordinate judge decreed the suit as brought, in plaintiff's favour and gave him a decree for payment by the defendant personally and out of the temple funds. The Pandara Sannadhi appealed and besides raising objections to the findings of the trial court pleaded that he was not in any event personally liable. He did not specifically object to the liability cast on the temple properties, Pending this appeal the Pandara sannadhi was removed from office in another suit and...
Sundaresan Chettiar Vs. Viswanada Pandara Sannadhi and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-14-1922
Reported in: AIR1922Mad402; (1922)ILR65Mad703
Krishnan, J.1. This Second Appeal arises from a suit brought) by the plaintiff against the late Pandara Sannadbi of Vedaranniyam Devastanam for money due on a bond executed by him to plaintiff's deceased grand-uncle. Plaintiff claimed a decree against the defendant personally and against the trust funds, as he alleged that the money was borrowed for devastanam purposes. The defendant raised several pleas which are not material now but did not set up any plea that the debt-was not binding on the devastanam properties.2. The Subordinate Judge decreed the suit as brought in plaintiff's favour and gave him a decree for payment by the defendant personally and out of the temple funds. The Pandara Sannadhi appealed and, besides raising objections to the findings of the trial Court, pleaded that he was not in any event personally liable. He did not specifically object to the liability cast on the temple properties. Pending this Appeal the Pandara Sannadhi was removed from office in another sui...
R.M.P.V. Chockalingam Chettiar Vs. S. Palani Ambalam
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-13-1922
Reported in: AIR1923Mad685; (1923)45MLJ124
1. The question is whether the plaintiff, landholder, is entitled to recover rent at wet rates from his tenant, the defendant, for land which the latter has been able to cultivate wet in consequence of improvements made at his own expense. The plaintiff claims that he is entitled to wet rates on the strength of a contract contained in Ex. D of the year 1885, before the Estates Land Act was passed. The improvements were made after it was passed. Krishnan, J. has held that, in these circumstances, the plaintiff is not entitled to rely on his contract with reference to Section 13(3) of the Estates Land Act.2. It is no doubt true that, as the plaintiff contends, such a contract would have been enforceable under the previous law, Section 11 of Act VIII of 1865. The only authority relied on by the plaintiff is a dictum of Kumaraswami Sastri J. in Venkataperumal Rajah v. Ramudu 28 M.L.J. 81, a case in which both the contract and the improvements were made before the passing of the present Act...
Rajarajeswara Sethupathi Alias Muthuramalinga Sethupathi Avargal, Raja ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-13-1922
Reported in: (1922)ILR65Mad890
Waller Salis Schwabe, Kt., K.C., C.J.1. The question referred to the Full Bench isHas a Civil Court jurisdiction to entertain a suit by a ryot to set aside a sale of his holding which was held under the provisions of Chapter VI of the Madras Estates Land Act?2. It is found as a fact in this case for the purpose of the reference that no notice was given to the ryot by the landholder of his intention to sell. The sale was therefore illegal, and Civil Courts of this country have a right to set aside illegal sales, unless there is some statutory provision to prevent them from doing so. It is, therefore, necessary to look at the Madras Estates Land Act of 1908 to see if the Civil Courts are precluded from setting aside such a sale. Under Section 213Any person deeming himself aggrieved by any proceedings taken under colour of this Act...shall be at liberty to seek redress by filing a suit for damages before the Collector.and thou Sub-section 2 saysThis section shall not be deemed to bar any ...
M. Doraswami Iyengar Vs. K. Narayana Aiyangar and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-10-1922
Reported in: (1922)43MLJ288
1. The first point in this appeal is whether the cognisance of the suit by tin City Civil Court is barred by Section 3 of the City Civil Court Act, VII of 1892. The appellant relies on Section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act XV of 1882 and contends that, because an application to eject a tenant could be filed in the Small Cause Court, the present suit before the City Civil Court is barred. We do not think this contention is tenable. The present suit before the City Civil Court is obviously not cognisable by the Small Cause Court (Vide Section 19 of Act XV of 1882). What is cognisable is merely an application. Order VI Rule 3 of the Rules for the Presidency Small Cause Courts no doubt says that an application of Section 4) of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act shall, ube in the form of a plaint but, on this ground, the application does not become a suit. We therefore feel ,that the present suit was not cognisable by the Small Cause Court as a suit and therefore Section 3 ...
H. Mahomed Ishack Sahib Vs. Mahomed Moideen and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-10-1922
Reported in: (1922)ILR65Mad849; (1922)43MLJ436
Coutts Trotter, J.1. This matter has been referred to me by the Chief Justice purporting to act under the provisions of Section 5 of the Court Fees Act VII of 1870. That Section runs as follows: 'When any difference arises between the officer whose duty it is to see that any fee is paid under this chapter and any suitor or attorney as to the necessity of paying a fee or the amount thereof, the question shall be referred to the Taxing Officer, except when the question is, in his opinion one of general importance, in which case he shall refer it to the final decision of the Chief Justice or of such Judge as the Chief Justice shall appoint on this behalf.' I have given the material words.2. The question arose out of an appeal from a determination of my brother Phillips, J. I need not say more about its nature for my purpose, and the contention of the applicant (the would-be appellant) was that the sum payable by him to file his Memorandum of Appeal was Rs. 100 under Article 36 of Appendix...
M. Doraisamy Aiyangar Vs. K. Narayana Aiyangar and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-10-1922
Reported in: 68Ind.Cas.983
1. The first point in this appeal is whether the cognizance of the suit by the City Civil Court is barred by Section 3 of the City Civil Court Act (VII of 1892) The appellant relies on Section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act (XV of 1882) and contends that, because an application to eject a tenant could be filed in the Small Cause Court, the present suit before the City Civil Court is barred. We do not thinly this contention is tenable, the present suit before the City Civil, Court is obviously not cognizable by the Small Cause Court (vide Section 19 of Act XV of 1882). What is cognizable is merely an application. 0. VI, Rule 3 of the Rules for the Presidency Small Cause Courts, no doubt, says that an application under Section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act shall be in the form of a plaint, but on this ground the application does not become a suit. We, therefore, feel that the present suit was not cognizable by the Small Cause Court as a suit and, therefore, Sec...
Malli and Co. Vs. V.A.A.R. Firm
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-09-1922
Reported in: (1922)43MLJ208
Coutts Trotter, J.1. This is an appeal from a judgment of Mr. Justice Phillips sitting on the Original Side and the claim was one by the plaintiffs for damages for breach of warranty in regard to 15 out of a consignment of 25 bales of series which were sold to them on the 28th of August 1918. The learned Judge has followed the decision of this Court in Peer Muhammad Routher v. Dalooram Jayanarayana : (1918)35MLJ180 that the effect of Section 113 of the Indian Contract Act is to lay down the same law in this country as in England, namely, that when there is no express warranty in the sale of goods, there is an implied warranty of merchantability, that is to say, the goods shall be immediately saleable under the description by which they are known in the market.2. We have had put before us figures about these bales and the figures are rather startling. Out of 1037 pieces in the first bale 782 pieces were 'damaged' and 105 'pieces were what are known in the trade as 'seconds', which I und...
In Re: Lakshminarayana Chettiar
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-09-1922
Reported in: AIR1922Mad405; (1922)42MLJ490
ORDER1. As the accused was only taking his own property which had been secured in his own shop, it is difficult to see how his act would be criminal. In order to constitute theft, there must be dishonesty, and it cannot be argued that accused intended to cause wrongful loss to complainant or wrongful gain to himself. Any loss that complainant might sustain owing to his inability to comply with the terms of his security bond could be remedied by civil proceedings. The Sessions Judge's order is therefore set aside....
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