Chennai Court December 1922 Judgments
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In Re: Kuppuswamy Naidu
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Dec-20-1922
Reported in: 72Ind.Cas.175
ORDER1. In this case we are asked to exercise our powers of revision and to set aside what is referred to as an order by the 3rd class Magistrate of Cheyyar Taluk, holding that he has jurisdiction to go on with a case and rejecting the petition from the accused, petitioners here, for discontinuance of the proceedings on a complaint pending against them. We are not clear what section of the Criminal Procedure Code authorised the passing of a formal order at the stage in question or that it was necessary or advisable that such as order should be passed. If the Magistrate proceeded without jurisdiction, that would be a ground for appeal, which could be dealt with by the Appellate Court in case the proceedings ended in a conviction. As, however, the matter is before us, we deal with it on the merits.2. The case against the accused was instituted on a charge-sheet alleging that they had Committed offences punishable under Section 55 of the Abkari Act I of 1886. It is sufficient for our purp...
Dhanammal Vs. Veeraraghava Naidu and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Dec-19-1922
Reported in: AIR1923Mad487; (1923)44MLJ325
Spencer, J.1. The petitioner applied under Order 21 Rule 89 Civil Procedure Code to have the sale of certain properties set aside on depositing the amount specified in the proclamation of sale plus 5 per cent of the purchase-money. The District Munsif and the District Judge to whom she appealed both disallowed her application but On different grounds. The District Munsif's reason for dismissing her application was that she had previously applied to pay the amount due to the decree holder before the sale was held, and that he then rejected her application because she had no locus standi to pay the amount. The District Judge dismissed the appeal on the ground that the petitioner having claimed the property previously in a claim petition under Order 21, Rule 58, and that claim petition having been dismissed, her only right was to bring a suit within one year to establish her title.2. The property sold in Court auction originally belonged to Swaminadha Mudali. The petitioner claims as a le...
Sri Raja A.V. Jagga Row Bahadur Garu (Dead) and ors. Vs. Gori Bibi Ali ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Dec-19-1922
Reported in: AIR1923Mad545; 72Ind.Cas.789
Phillips, J.1. I agree, bat I prefer not 10 express any opinion as to the meaning of the deed of grant (Exhibit VI), but would base my decision on the two points (1) res judicata, (2) failure to prove necessity. The decision of this Court in Appeal No. 169 of 1991 is undoubtedly based upon (sic) take of fact, but is nonetheless binding upon plaintiff for that reason. He cannot now contend that the properties are not wakf; that being so, he must prove necessity for the alienation. Having failed to do this, his appeal fails and must be dismissed wish, costs, of the first respondent.2. Plaintiff's right to retain possession of the property, if he is really in possession, does not arise in this suit for money and need not be discussed.Devadoss, J.3. This appeal is against the decree of the District Judge of Vizagapatam dismissing the plaintiff's suit on a mortgage-bond dated 8th December 1900 on the ground that the hypotheca are wakf or trust properties and, therefore, Could not be alienat...
Garine Satyanarayana Vs. Emperor
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Dec-18-1922
Reported in: 72Ind.Cas.613a
ORDERKrishnan, J.1. The accused is the proprietor of a rice-mill in Bezwada. He was convicted under the Municipal Act, Madras Act V of 1920, under Sections 199, 216 and 250 read with Section 317 and sentenced to fines of various amounts for the offences.2. On appeal, the Appellate Magistrate, holding that it was unnecessary to punish him for an offence under Section 199 of the Act, he being liable to be punished under Section 250 of the Act, as the two offences really overlapped, acquitted him, of the offence under Section 199 and remitted him the fine on that charge, but confirmed his conviction under the other two Sections, 216 and 250. It is argued in revision that no offence under Section 250 has been made out and that he ought to be acquitted under that section.3. As I understand the finding of the lower Court, part of the accused's rice-mill where the Sheller Machinery was installed was burnt down some time ago and what he did was to put up a brick building to install the old She...
In Re: Venkatasubbaier and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Dec-15-1922
Reported in: (1923)44MLJ407
ORDERKrishnan, J.1. It is argued that the conviction under Section 147, Indian Penal Code, was wrong as no force or violence was used to any person and that the accused are guilty under Section 143 only. The definition of force is given in Section 349 of the Indian. Penal Code. Now these accused are found to have gone and beaten on the door when the complainant fled away to save himself from being beaten and shut himself up in his room. Whatever difficulty there may be in bringing the action of the accused within the definition of force it is clear they used violence which is sufficient under Section 146 of the Indian Penal Code, to make their offence rioting. This view is supported by the ruling in Sama Ruddi v. Emperor I.L.R. (1912) Cal. 367 where it was held that the word violence was not restricted to force used against persons only but extends also to force against inanimate objects. The accused were therefore rightly convicted under Section 147 of the Indian Penal Code.2. The fin...
Koppi Reddi Nokayya (Dead) and ors. Vs. Mandalekka Bheemanna and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Dec-15-1922
Reported in: (1923)45MLJ91
Oldfield, J.1. The respondent, plaintiff, an inamdar, holds from 2nd defendant, a zemindar, under the sannad, Ex. A, and has assigned an interest in his holding to 1st defendant the appellant, under Ex. V. In 1912 the Revenue Officer engaged in the preparation of a record of rights for 2nd defendant's estate under Chapter XI, Madras Estates Land Act (1 of 1908), entered 1st defendant as occupancy ryot in respect of the holding instead of plaintiff. The question is whether he did so correctly. The answer to this question depends on (1) whether Ex. V is a mortgage with possession or a lease., (2) whether in the latter alternative 1st defendant is a ryot, as the term is defined in Section 3 Clause (15), Estates Land Act, and (3) whether the inam is pre-settlement and therefore an estate and plaintiff a land holder under Section 3 Clauses (2) and (5).2. Ex. V dated 20-1-15, is described as a Thirmanam document and provided that in accordance with a prior agreement, Ex. H, the property, whi...
Duraisami Iyer Vs. Subbaraya Iyer and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Dec-15-1922
Reported in: 72Ind.Cas.322
Walter Schwabe, C.J.1. In this case the facts are, that the 1st plaintiff, the managing member of a joint Hindu family, in 1903 sold some land. It is conceded that that sale was not binding on the other members of the family as not being for necessity. The plaintiff was at the date of that sale 17 years of age and he knew all about it then and thereafter. The money that was realised on the sale was invested by the managing member in a family money-lending business which he carried on. In 1915 there was a general partition of the family property between the plaintiff and the 1st defendant and other members of the family. In that partition the money-lending business was brought into account, but the property alienated in 1903 was not, though the proceeds of that sale, were in effect brought into the accounts of the money-lending business as it stood in 1915. After this partition, plaintiff sued the other members of his family and the alienee to recover back the property alienated. It was...
In Re: Venkatasubbier and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Dec-15-1922
Reported in: 72Ind.Cas.356
ORDERKrishnan, J.1. It is argued that the conviction under Section 147, Indian Penal Code, was wrong as no force or violence was used to any person and the accused are guilty under Section 143 only. The definition of 'force' is given in Section 349 of the Indian Penal Code. Now these accused are found to have gone and beaten en the door when the complainant fled away to save himself from being beaten and shut himself up in his room. Whatever difficulty there may be in bringing the action of the accused within the definition of force it is clear they used violence which is sufficient under Section 146 of the Indian Penal Code, to make their offence rioting. This view is supported by the ruling in Samaruddin v. Emperor 40 C. 367 : 13 Cr.L.J. 821, where it was held that the word 'violence' was not restricted to force used against persons only but extends also to force against inanimate objects. The accused were, therefore, rightly convicted under Section 147 of the Indian Penal Code.2. Th...
Pasumarti Bhagavanulu and ors. Vs. Bollan Seetharamaswami and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Dec-15-1922
Reported in: AIR1923Mad502; 73Ind.Cas.202
Spencer, J.1. The suit concerned in this Civil Revision Petition was instituted by a reversioner claiming the rights as an adopted son to have Ms title declared to certain properties in Schedules A, B and C and to recover possession of them from the person to whom the last male owner's wife and mother had alienated them. During the trial of the suit there were two references to arbitration under Schedule II, para, 1, Civil Procedure Code. The first was on 22nd August 1919 by plaintiff and defendants Not. 6 to 8 who were interested in B Schedule properties. The second reference was on 29th August 1919 by plaintiffs and defendants Nos. 1, 3 and 4 who were interested in A Schedule properties.2. It is now urged as the sole ground of revision by defendants Nos. 6 to 8 that the entire reference to arbitration and the arbitrator's award are invalid because defendants Nos. 2 and 5 did not join in the reference. Second defendant w the brother of first defendant and 5th defendant is the undivide...
Kuppu Reddi Nookayya (Dead) and ors. Vs. Mandaluka Bheemanna and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Dec-15-1922
Reported in: AIR1923Mad454; 73Ind.Cas.733
Oldiield, J.1. The respondent plaintiff an inamdar, holds from second defendant, a zimindar, under the sannad, Exhibit A, and has assigned an interest in his holding, to first defendant the ' appellant under Exhibit V. In 1912 the Revenue Officer engaged in the preparation of a Record of Rights for second defendant's estate under Chapter XI, the Madras Estatesl>nd Act (I of 1908),, entered first defendant as occupancy raiyatin respect of the holding instead of plaintiff. The question is whether he did so correctly. The answer to this question depends on (1) whether Exhibit V is a mortgage with possession or a lease, (2) whether in the latter alternative first defendant is a raiyat, as the term is defined in Section 3, Clause (15), Estates Land Act, and (3) whether the in am is pre-settlement and, therefore, an estate and plaintiff a landholder under Section 3, Clauses (2) and (5).2. Exhibit V dated. 20th, January 1913 is described as a thirumanam document and provides that in accordanc...
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