Chennai Court August 1920 Judgments
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Vemana Venkatachella Naidu Vs. Ethirajammal
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-11-1920
Reported in: AIR1921Mad65; (1920)39MLJ597
Abdur Rahim, J.1. I must hold that the learned District Judge is not right in saying that there was no proper proof of the existence of attachment at the date of the purchase of the 3rd defendant. As a matter of fact, we have got the attachment list of 1902 to show that the property was under attachment, and if at the time of the purchase by the third defendant which was in 1902 the attachment had been raised, it was for him to prove it. The learned District Judge ought to have proceeded on the assumption that the attachment continued. That being so, the purchase by the third defendant can be of no avail against the first defendant or his vendee. But it is argued that under Section 6 of the Madras Estates Land Act the tenant of the third defendant acquired a permanent right of occupancy when the Act came into force, i.e., in 1908, although the holding had been sold before the date and purchased by the first defendant, the landlord, in execution of his decree for rent. In support of thi...
Venkatachala Naidu Vs. Ethirajammal
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-11-1920
Reported in: (1921)ILR44Mad220
Oldfield, J.1. Delivered a separate Judgment on 19th August 1920, having expressed his concurrence with Abdur Rahim, J., on 11th August 1920.Abdur Rahim, J.2. I must hold that the learned District Judge is not right in saying that there was no proper proof of the existence of attachment at the date of the purchase by the third defendant. As a matter of fact we have got the attachment list of 1902 to show that the property was under attachment, and if at the time of the purchase by the third defendant, which was in 1902, the attachment had been raised, it was for him to prove it. The learned District Judge ought to have proceeded on the assumption that the attachment continued. That being so, the purchase by the third defendant can be of no avail against the first defendant or his vendee. But it is argued that under Section 6 of the Madras Estates Land Act the tenant of the third defendant acquired a permanent right of occupancy when the Act came into force, i e., in 1908, although the ...
Govinda Malavarayan Vs. Velu Mazhavaratan and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-11-1920
Reported in: 59Ind.Cas.307
Abdur Rahim, J.1. The question argued before us relates to the effect of a sale for arrears of revenue under the Revenue Recovery Act. The registered pattadar was an alienee from a Hindu widow and he made default in payment of the revenue and thus brought about a sale. It is contended by the learned Vakil for the reversioner, the appellant before us, that what passed under the sale was merely the right, title and interest, and nothing more, of the alienee from the widow and that, inasmuch as that alienation was made for necessity, his estate was confined to the lifetime of the widow. In support of this contention, which is in violation of the whole scheme of the Revenue Recovery Act, Section 89 is relied on. Section 39 says: 'that in oases of revenue sales a notice shall be published giving the name of the purchaser and the date of purchase together with a declaration of the lawful succession of such purchaser to all the rights and property of the former land-holder in the said land.' ...
Gordon Das Chuni Lal Dakuwala Vs. T. Sriman Kanthimathinatha Pillai an ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-11-1920
Reported in: AIR1921Mad286; 97Ind.Cas.295
William Ayling, J.1. These appeals arise out of proceedings in the District Court of Tinnevelly under Act VI of 1882 in connection with the winding-up of the South Indian Mills Company Limited. The Company in question was floated in 1908 and a compulsory order for its winding-up under Section 129 of the Act was made by the District Court on 21st February, 1913. For practical purposes its assets consisted of the building and the machinery of the Darragh Mills at Quilon which had been purchased by the Company in 1909 for Rs. 2,62,500. The sale price had been largely raised by a mortgage on the said property and the mortgagee in August, 1919, obtained a decree for about 4 1/2 lacs. For one reason or another among which the war and the litigation between the Company and the mortgagee doubtless figured largely, proceedings dragged on and practically nothing was done to realise the Company's assets till 20th February, 1920. On that date, the Official Liquidator wrote to the District Judge in...
Puthia Veetil MohidIn Vs. Irakkat Karnavan Raman Nayar (Dead) and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-11-1920
Reported in: 60Ind.Cas.117
1. The only question is, whether a decree holder can plead his application for copy of decree as an application to the Court 'to take some step-in-aid of execution.' We agree with the District Judge that it cannot be so treated. There is no necessary connection between obtaining a copy and utilising it for the purpose of execution, and we do not think that it can be said that the Court in granting the copy takes any step-in aid of execution. This appeal is dismissed...
Vemanna Venkatachella Naidu Vs. Ethirajammal
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-11-1920
Reported in: 60Ind.Cas.192
Oldfield, J.1. Delivered his Separate Judgment on 19th August 1920, having expressed his concurrence with Abdur Rahim, J. on 11th August 1920.Abdur Rahim, J.2. I must hold that the learned District Judge is not right in saying that there was no proper proof of the existence of attachment at the date of the purchase of the third defendant. As a matter of fact, we have got the attachment list of 1902 to show that the property was under attachment, and if, at the time of the purchase by the third defendant which was in 1902, the attachment had been raised, it was for him to prove it. The learned District Judge ought to have proceeded on the assumption that the attachment continued. That being so, the purchase by the third defendant can be of no avail against the first defendant or his vendee. But it is argued that, under Section 6 of the Madras Estates Land Act, the tenant of the third defendant acquired a permanent right of occupancy when the Act came into force, i.e., in 1908, although ...
Kataprath Vatakke Purayil Thayyil Mammad Karnavan of the Tarwad and of ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-10-1920
Reported in: 60Ind.Cas.118; (1920)39MLJ702
Abdur Rahim, J.1. In this appeal the question of law is as to the right of attaladakam heirs to dispute certain alienations made by the karnavan of a tavazhi who owned the property in dispute when the surviving member of the tavazhi living at the time did not revoke it by any unequivocal act of his during the lifetime of the karnavan or after his death. There is no express authority on the point. But it seems to me all the same that it does not admit of any substantial doubt. In this case there were two members of the tavazhi to which this property belonged and the karnavan for the time being made gifts of some of the properties to his children. The other member of the tavazhi at the time was one Pukoya. He did not during the lifetime of the karnavan take any steps to question these gifts except as regards one item of property which is not in dispute and with respect to which before his death he had instituted a suit and obtained a decree declaring that the alienation of the item of th...
Thayyil Mammad and Five ors. Vs. Purayil Mammad and Eight ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-10-1920
Reported in: AIR1921Mad376; (1921)ILR44Mad140
Abdur Rahim, J.1. In this appeal the question of law is as to the right of attaladakkam heirs to dispute certain alienations made by the karnavam of a tavazhi who owned the property in dispute when the other surviving member of the tavazhi living at the time did not revoke it by any unequivocal act of his during the life-time of the karnavan or after his death. There is no express authority on the point, but it seems to me all the same that it does not admit of any substantial doubt. In this case there were two members of the tavazhi to which this property belonged and the karnavan for the time being made gifts of some of the properties to his children. The other member of the tavazhi at the time was one Pukkoya. He did not during the life-lime of the karnavan take any steps to question these gifts except as regards one item of property, which is not, in dispute and with respect to which before his death lie had instituted a suit and obtained a decree declaring that the alienation of t...
Dhadha Sahib Vs. Mahomed Sultan Sahib
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-09-1920
Reported in: AIR1921Mad384; (1920)39MLJ706
1. The plaintiff brought certain specific land from the first defendant, a Mahomedan. The first defendant had bought this land from a co-parcener in a Hindu family. The other co-parceners instituted a suit for partition and it was during the pendency of that suit that the first defendant sold the land to the plaintiff. By the decree in the suit for partition the land with which we are concerned was not allotted to the vendor of the first defendant but some other land was given to him instead. According to the dictum of the learned Judges of this Court in Nanjayya v. Shanmuga I.L.R. (1918) Mad. 684 under such circumstances so far as any question lay between the first defendant and the co-parcener from whom he bought the land, the first defendant would be entitled to whatever was substituted by any decree for partition for the land which he had bought from the co-parcener. This principle seems to have been acquiesced in two other decisions of this Court, one of which is reported in Sabap...
Sistla Sitaramaswamy Sastri Vs. Bonthu Basavayya Alias Basivi Reddi
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Aug-09-1920
Reported in: 60Ind.Cas.114
1. We think appellant in this case is entitled to discharge of his security in accordance with the provisions of Section 139 of the Indian Contract Act. In his surety-bond, he contract to be liable for any decree which the Court may pass against the defendants in the suit, who were four in number. Plaintiff, subsequently, with the leave of the Court, exonerated defendants Nos. 2 to 4 and proceeded with the suit against, defendant No. 1 alone and obtained a decree against him.2. This materially alters the position of affairs from the surety's point of view, At the time he became surety there were four persons (equal co-parceners in family property, as we are told) against all of whom he would have his own remedy, if he had to pay anything under the decree. The after of the that of the Court and' decree-holder, is to destroy his remedy against three of these.3. We think the principle of Section 139 giverns the case; and that the surety must be held to be discharged.4. The order of the lo...
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