Chennai Court March 1920 Judgments
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Jainab Bibi Saheb Vs. Hyderally Saheb and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-25-1920
Reported in: (1920)38MLJ532
Wallis, C.J.1. The decision in Ponnusami Pillai v. Singaram Pillai I.L.R(1918) M. 781 that the consent of the parties to a suit cannot make admissible the evidence given in a previous judicial proceeding between the same parties where some of the issues were the same was based mainly on the provisions of Sections 165 and 33 of the Indian Evidence, Act. Section 165, which enables the presiding Judge to ask any questions 'about any fact relevant or irrelevant' contains a proviso ' that the judgment must be based on facts declared by this Act to be relevant and duly proved'. The effect of this section merely is that, while the presiding Judge in the course of the trial may ask questions about irrelevant facts including under the scheme of the Act statements made to the witness by other parties or hearsay, he must base his judgment upon facts which are relevant to the issues and are duly proved. It does not throw any light on the question what facts should be considered to be duly proved. ...
Jainab Bibi Saheba Vs. Hyderally Sahib and Three ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-25-1920
Reported in: (1920)ILR43Mad609
Wallis, C.J.1. The decision in Ponnuswami Pillay v. Singaram Pillay I.L.R., (1918) Mad., 731 that the consent of the parties to a suit cannot make admissible the evidence given in a previous judicial proceeding between the same parties where some of the issues were the same was based mainly on the provisions of Sections 165 and 33 of the Indian Evidence Act. Section 165, which enables the presiding Judge to ask any questions, 'about any fact relevant or irrelevant' contains a proviso, 'that the judgment must be based on facts declared by this Act to be relevant and duly proved.'2. The effect of this section merely is that, while the presiding Judge in the course of the trial may ask questions about irrelevant facts, including under the scheme of the Act statements made to the witness by other parties or hearsay, be must base his judgment upon facts, which are relevant to the issues and are duly proved. It does not throw any light on the question, what facts should be considered to be d...
N. Viswanatha Sastri Vs. Sitalakshmi Ammal and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-25-1920
Reported in: AIR1921Mad126; 61Ind.Cas.979
Oldfield, J.1. The appellant, petitioner, obtained a decree in the form authorized by Section 88, Transfer of Property A at, on 25th September 1907, time being allowed for payment until 25th March 1908. There was an appeal to this Court which ended maturely in his favour on 23rd February 1901, no further extension of time being given, and the next proceeding was taken on 30th February 1914 by an execution petition headed as presented under Order XXI, Rule 11. In it, tale of the property was inked for and also the passing of a final Jure; and the latter relief was also or separately on 20th March 1914, became; he Court had returned the petition for the creation as to why a separate petition or Such a decree should not be filed. The petition of 20th February 1914 was, however, disliked on 1st August 14, for Failure to pay batter. On 3rd Marsh 1915, the it respondent in the lower Court reported that he had paid Rs. 8 COO towards the, alleging that ha did so in accordance with a direction ...
Neelamani Patnaik Mussadi Vs. Sukaduva Behara and ors.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-24-1920
Reported in: 60Ind.Cas.255
1. We must accept in second appeal the findings of fast of the learned District Judge that the mortgagors made the payment they pleaded to the mortgagee, and that they did so without notice of the prior assignment of the mortgage to the plaintiff. We think the learned Judge is right in holding that on the above findings plaintiff was bound by the payment so made.2. The English Law on the point is quite clear, In Halsbury's Laws of England, Volume XXI, page 179, paragraph 334 it is state that the mortgagor is entitled to make payments to the mortgagee, whether of principal or interest, and to have credit for them as against the transferee after the transfer until he has received notice of it. And several English cases, including Bickerton v. Walker (1900) 1 Ch. 736 and Dixson v. Winch (1885) 31 Ch. D. 151 , are quoted.3. There does not seem to be any good reason why that rule, which is founded on principles of equity, should not be followed in this country. It is true that, after the am...
T. Nana Tawker Vs. Bhavani Boye and anr.
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-23-1920
Reported in: AIR1921Mad199; 60Ind.Cas.239; (1920)39MLJ391
John Wallis, Kt, C.J.1. The deceased T. Naga-natha Tawker on 14th May 1913, applied by letter Exhibit II to the Nidhi which is the 1st defendant in the case and requested them to receive payment of Rs. 200 for twelve months on fixed deposit. The application, which was made in a printed form provided by the Nidhi, contained certain particulars to be filled in by the depositor including the following :- ' Name of the person entitled to receive the. deposit, paid by me after me--relationship--profession or occupation'. Against this he entered the names of the present plaintiffs. T. Nana Tawker, elder brother's son, T. Kripasanker Tawker, grandson.' He then received from the Nidhi the fixed deposit receipt in the usual form Ex. I which provided that interest would cease at the end of the twelve months, when the receipt should be sent for renewal of payment bearing a one anna stamp.2. Article 36 of the Articles of Association of the Nidhi which was registered under the Indian Companies Act ...
Muhammed Khali Vs. Alathadi Malwa Kunhi Rama Nair
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-23-1920
Reported in: 59Ind.Cas.262
John Wallis, C.J.1. In this case the appellant, first defendant, claimed certain land which was included in the plaintiff's patta and a compromise decree was arrived at which awarded him the land but provided that he should pay the assessment (annas eight) to the plaintiff, who was the registered pattadar and liable to Government for the land revenue. Subsequent to that time, the Government increased the land revenue upon the land, but there was no separate registry in the name of the first defendant. The razinamah decree only provided that the defendant should pay the plaintiff annas eight by way of assessment and I cannot extract from that any implied agreement that any more should be paid, or, on the other hand, that that should be the only liability of the defendant in respect of assessment. I think that, as regards the additional assessment imposed upon the land subsequently, the matter must be governed by the decision of the Full Bench in Rajah of Vizianagram v. Setrucherla Somas...
Sri Rajah Sobhandari Apparao Bahadur Zemindar Garu and ors. Vs. Dathad ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-22-1920
Reported in: (1920)39MLJ476
Sadasiva Aiyar, J.1. The 3rd plaintiff is the appellant, he being the Zemindar of Nuzvid. The defendants in these suits claimed to hold what are called ' Banjar ' lands as parts of their respective jeroyiti holdings. The plaintiff's case is that these banjar lands are not parts of these defendants' jeroyiti holdings but had been in their occupation on temporary grazing leases, and that on the date of the suits the defendants were in possession as mere trespassers. The suits were brought on the strength of Section 103 of the Estates Land Act (Act I of 1908) in the Civil Court.2. Both the lower Courts found as a matter of fact that these banjar lands were jeroyiti lands, that they were treated by the Zemindar from time immemorial as parts of the respective holdings of the defendants which contained other lands admitted to be jeroyiti and that the defendants were not trespassers. But the plaintiff argued that by reason of the decisions in certain prior suits brought by the plaintiff (or, ...
Sri Rajah Sobhanadri Appa Rao Bahadur Zamindar Garu Vs. Gurraju and or ...
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-22-1920
Reported in: (1920)ILR43Mad859
Sadasiva Ayyar, J.1. The third plaintiff is the appellant, he being the Zamindar of Nuzvid. The defendants in these suits claimed to hold what are called 'Banjar' lands as part of their respective jirayati holdings. The plaintiff's case is that these banjar lands are not parts of these defendants' jirayati holdings, but had been in their occupation on temporary grazing leases, and that on the date of the suits the defendants were in possession as mere trespassers. The suits were brought, on the strength of Section 163 of the Estates Land Act (I of 1908), in the Civil Court.2. Both the lower Courts found as a matter of fact that these banjar lands were jirayati lands, that they were treated by the Zamindar from time immemorial as parts of the respective holdings of the defendants which contained other lands admitted to be jirayati, and that the defendants were not trespassers, But the plaintiff argued, that by reason of the decisions in certain prior suits brought by the plaintiff (or r...
M. Krishnamachariar Vs. T. Tiruvengada Chariar
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-22-1920
Reported in: 59Ind.Cas.275
Sadasiva Aiyar, J.1. The only question of law arguable in this case is whether Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act can be taken advantage of by a transferee who is not proved to have been misled by the erroneous representation of the transferor as to the latter's power to transfer.2. It is true that the words 'and the transferee has been misled by the erroneous representation' do not occur after the word 'consideration' in Section 43. Pandiri Bangatam, v. Karumoory Suboaraju 8 Ind. Cas. 388 , however, decided that though such additional words do not occur in this section, the Legislature must have intended to benefit only transferees who have been really misled. The provision being one based on considerations which Courts of Equity, rather than Courts applying strict law, take notice of, it was evidently considered that a person who was really not misled could not have, been intended to have the benefit of the provision.3. I followed Pandiri Bangaram v. Korumoory Subbaroju 8 Ind...
A.B. Adepu Reddi Vs. K. Ramayya
Court: Chennai
Decided on: Mar-19-1920
Reported in: 59Ind.Cas.414
ORDEROldfield, J.1. The Deputy Magistrate has held, on the strength of a Lower Burma ruling, that Section 517, Criminal Procedure Code, applies to immoveable property. He should confine himself to the rulings or the High Courts in which, for the present purposes, he would have found ample guidance. See Baisureswar Singh v. Bhola Nath Pathuk (Emperor) 22 Ind. Cas. 751 and Ahmed Ali v. Keenoo Khan 1 Ind. Cas. 202 Section 517 must be regarded as applying to moveable property only and the only question is, whether Section 522 is applicable.2. It is not necessary, in order to its applicability, that force should be an ingredient of the offence of which accused is convict-ed, if the use of force appears from the evidence. There seems in the present case to be evidence, on which a finding in favour of the use of the criminal force can be reached. The Deputy Magistrate's order as to possession is set aside and the case remanded, so that it may be restored to the file and the appeal, so far as ...
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