Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1920)39MLJ183
1. This is an appeal from the decree of the Temporary Subordinate Judge of Masulipatam, dismissing the plaintiff's suit for the declarations that the adoption of the 3rd defendant by defendants 1 and 2 is not true in fact and valid in law and that he, the plaintiff, is the next reversioner to the zamindari and is entitled to succeed to it, on the 1st defendant's death and that the alienation by her to defendants 4 and 5 are not binding on him. The Subordinate Judge found the adoption to be proved on evidence and he held it to be valid in law. On that finding plaintiff's suit failed and it was dismissed with costs. The plaintiff appeals.2. He does not now dispute the fact of the adoption but he contends that it is not valid in law. His argument is that the marriage between defendants 1 and 2 was invalid under the Hindu Law as being a Virudha Sambhandham or a marriage between persons within the prohibited degree of relationship and that they were therefore not legally husband and wife an...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : 57Ind.Cas.778; (1920)39MLJ225
1. We are all agreed that the plaintiff in this case was not a person owning 'an estate or a part thereof' within the meaning of Section 3(5) of the Madras Estates Land Act, as, by the terms of the patta and muchilika, Exhibits C and IV (6), dated 26-1-13, he continued to hold under the Zemindar. We are, also, of opinion that he was not 'a person entitled to collect the rents of the whole or any portion of the estate by virtue of any transfer from the owner or his predecessor-in-title' within the meaning of the rest of the section. The plaintiff's ancestors were estate ryots before the lands became karnam service inam lands and their lands again became ryoti land within the meaning of the Act, under the definition in Section 3(16), when the karnam service came to an end in January, 1913. The effect of Exhibits C and IV (6) was to grant the plaintiff, who thereby regained the status of a ryot, a remission of the greater portion of the rent payable by him to the Zemindar, and not to tran...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1920)ILR43Mad824
John Wallis, C.J.1. This is an appeal from a decision of the District Judge of Nellore giving the plaintiff a decree in a suit brought by her to enforce the provisions of a will made in her favour by her deceased husband dealing with properties which at the time when he made the will and at the time of his death were the joint family properties of himself and his infant son. The learned District Judge has held that the provision made by the testator for his wife would have been a proper provision for him to make during his lifetime, that such a disposition of joint family properties during his lifetime would have been good, and that, if he could make such a provision during his lifetime, he could equally make it after his death, and he has relied on the decision of Sadasiva Ayyar and Spencer, JJ., in Patra Chariar v. Srinivasa Chariar I.L.R.,(1917) Mad., 1122, which as I shall point out presently, is distinguishable from the present case. Mr. A. Krishnaswami Ayyar, for the appellants, ...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1920)ILR43Mad830
Krishnan, J.1. This is an appeal from the decree of the Temporary Subordinate Judge of Masulipatam dismissing the plaintiff's suit for the declarations that the adoption of the third defendant by defendants Nos. 1 and 2 is not true in fact and valid in law, and that he, the plaintiff, is the next reversioner to the zamindari, and is entitled to succeed to it on the first defendant's death, and that the alienations by her to defendants Nos. 4 and 5 are not binding on him. The Subordinate Judge found the adoption to be proved on the evidence and he held it to be valid in law. On that finding plaintiff's suit failed and it was dismissed with costs. The plaintiff appeals.2. He does not now dispute the fact of the adoption, but he contends that it is not valid in law. His argument is that the marriage between defendants Nos. 1 and 2 was invalid under the Hindu law, as being a 'Virudha Sambhandham', or a marriage between persons within the prohibited degree of relationship, and that they wer...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : 59Ind.Cas.390
1. The onus of proving that the debts, to discharge which a mortgage was executed in favour of the plaintiff by the 1st defendant, the father of the 2nd defendant, were incurred for immoral or illegal purposes, is on the 2nd defendant. What has been established is that the 1st defendant was keeping a woman, before the debts in question were incurred, that is, prior to 1903 The woman herself, called Nagaratnam, has given evidence and she says that her expenses were paid by the 1st defendant, that he made jewels for her and gave her money to carry on money-lending. Some promissory notes (Exhibits I to IV) were adduced in evidence, they were executed jointly by the 1st defendant and Nagaratnam but they were all subsequent to 1906, in which year the last items of the debts (Exhibits C and Y) were incurred. There is also evidence that Nagaratnam lent Rs. 1,000 on mortgage to one Venkatakrishnasami Naidu in 1910. That was long subsequent to the present transaction. Beyond this, there is no e...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : 59Ind.Cas.681
John Wallis, C.J.1. This is an appeal from a decision of the District Judge of Nellore giving the plaintiff a decree in a suit brought by her to enforce the provisions of a Will made in her favour by her deceased husband dealing with properties which at the time when he made the Will, and at the time of his death were the joint family properties of himself and his infant son. The learned District Judge has held that the provision made by the testator for his wife would have been a proper provision for him to make during his lifetime, that such a disposition of joint family properties during his lifetime would have been good and that if he could make such a provision during his lifetime, he could equally make it after his death and he has relied on the decision of Sadasiva Aiyar and Spencer, JJ., in Appan Patra Chariar v. Srinivasa Chariar 40 Ind. Cas. 118 , which, as I shall point out presently, is distinguishable from the present case. Mr. A. Krishnaswami Aiyar for the appellants has ...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1920)39MLJ84
1. This petition which originally came before Abdur, Rahim J, has been posted before a Bench because the learned Judge doubted Lakshmi Ammal v. Sankaran Nair : (1913)24MLJ205 and Subbarayudu v. Lakshmi Narasamma I.L.R, (1911) Mad. 775. Confining ourselves to the facts of this case, we are clearly of opinion that the petitioner who acquired a mortgage interest after the Court sale is not a person entitled to apply to set aside the sale under Order 21 Rule 89 Civil Procedure Code. A person having an interest in the property acquired before the sale is authorised to apply to set aside the sale. The petitioner has acquired an interest but acquired it after the sale and therefore does not come within the rule. As regards the further contention that he made the application to set aside the sale as agent of the owner, the Judgment debtor, the Lower Appellate Court has found as a fact that he did not and we cannot interfere in revision. The petition is dismissed with costs....
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : (1920)39MLJ181
1. Exhibit A was executed by the 1st defendant to the plaintiff and he was given possession of it. It is in terms a sale-deed but it was not registered. The finding is that the plaintiff made default in the payment of the purchase money and the document was not therefore registered. He now sues to enforce specific performance of an agreement, which according to him is implied in the sale-deed Ex. A. The question for consideration is whether it is open to the plaintiff to regard Exh. A which has become inoperative by reason of non-registration as an agreement to sell. In our opinion this remedy is not open to the plaintiff. He could have presented the document for registration under Section 32 of the Registration Act and could have enforced the attendance of the 1st defendant to admit execution under Section 36 of the same Act. If there was a refusal to register, he could have enforced his further remedies in this behalf under the Act. If he failed to take advantage of these provisions ...
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : 58Ind.Cas.856
1. This petition, which originally same before Abdur Rahim, J., had been posted before a Bench because the learned Judge doubted Anantha Lakshmi Ammal v. Sankaran Nair 18 Ind. Cas. 579 and Subbarayudu v. Lakshminarasamma 22 Ind. Cas. 193 Confining ourselves to the facts of this case, we are clearly of opinion that the petitioner who acquired a mortgage interest after the Court sale is not a person entitled to apply to set aside the sale under Order XXI, Rule 89, Civil Procedure Code. A person having an interest in the property acquired before the sale is authorised to apply to set aside the sale. The petitioner has acquired an interest, but acquired it after the sale and, therefore, does not some within the rule. As regards the further contention that he made the application to set aside the sale as agent of the owner, the judgment-debtor, the loner Court has found as a fact that he did not, and we cannot interfere in revision. The petition is dismissed with costs....
Tag this Judgment!Court : Chennai
Reported in : 59Ind.Cas.417
1. Exhibit A. was executed by the 1st defendant to the plaintiff and he was given possession of it. It is in terms a sale-deed but it was not registered. The finding is that the plaintiff made default in the payment of the purchase-money and the document was not, therefore, registered. He now sues to enforce specific performance of an agreement which, according to him, is implied in the sale deed, Exhibit A. The question for consideration is, whether it is open to the plaintiff to regard Exhibit A; which has become inoperative by reason of non-registration, as an agreement to sell. In our opinion this remedy is not open to the plaintiff. He could have presented the document for registration under Section 32 of the Registration Act and could have enforced the attendance of the 1st defendant to admit execution under Section 36 of the same Act. If there was a refusal to register, he could have enforced his further remedies in this behalf under the Act. If he failed to take advantage of th...
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